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Prologue
This dissertation presents a mathematical logical analysis of the infrastructure
of partialworlds, and demonstrates how its model-theoretical treatment can be
used for a constructive formalization of the dynamics of a group of reasoning
and communicating agents. Our choice in favor of partial worlds as the basic
semantic entity, which will be motivated elaborately in this introductory chap-
ter, distinguishes our treatment from well-known proposals of formalization of
epistemic dynamics and communication, such as [Jones 1983], [Appelt 1985] and
[Cohen 8e Levesque 1990]. The latter theories have been founded on the classical
principle of total or two-valued worlds and their underlying two-valued logic.
Because of this departure at the very basis of the model theory, we have spent
much effort in the technical organization of the variety of logics on the basis of
partial worlds. For this reason a complete part (II) of this thesis deals only with
meta-theoretical issues. It presents a technical streamlining of completeness and
decidability proof procedures. By means of a relatively small rearrangement of
standard techniques, we will demonstrate that partial logics do not have to be
much more troublesome, from a mathematical point of view, than their regular
two-valued counterparts.
Besides this mathematical second half, the first part also appears technical at
first sight. Nevertheless, the mathematics of part I is considerably less dense. It
does not include long proofs, but is meant as a conscientious presentation of the
relevant calculi and some prefab meta-theory, that prepares for part II. Part I
may therefore appear to be somewhat stuffy to some of the readers. We have
maintained this order, however, to guarantee the mathematical transparency of
part II.
Following G~,rdenfors' influential general view on epistemic dynamics [G~rden-
fors 1988], we will first specify our means for static representation of information
and then present the dynamics of such epistemic registrations. The static side
of our model-theory consists of a straightforward partial variant of the possióle
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worlds semantics of modal logic. Modal logics have been widely advocated to
be used as epistemic logics since the work of Hintikka [Hintikka 1962] [Hintikka
1969]; and partial variants have emerged in epistemic logic in the last ten years,
e.g. [Levesque 1984], [Lakemeyer 1991] and [Thijsse 1992].
The alternative aspect of partial possible worlds semantics on which this thesis
will focus is its dynamics, which deviates from, or rather extends, the dynamics
of ordinary two-valued possible worlds semantics. The dynamic perspective of
classical possible worlds semantics, as proposed in formal linguistics [Stalnaker
1979], philosophy [Landman 1986] and logics of common sense reasoning [Velt-
man 1991], is purely eliminative. This means that in two-valued possible worlds
semantics information grows through the elimination of (total) possibilities.
Partial possible worlds semantics adds a constructive component to this elim-
inative effect. This constructive dimension of epistemic dynamics is technically
possible because the informational content of a partial world may grow, some-
thing which is impossible for a total two-valued world. The key issue of this
thesis is to point out how such different ways of information flow can peacefully
cohabit in the theory of partial possible worlds. On the basis of this construction-
elimination dynamics we define relatively simple calculi for reasoning about in-
teracting agents.
The contents of the thesis
We start with an extensive introductory chapter which unfolds our view on
epistemic dynamics by means of interaction. This chapter is also meant as
a compensation for the technocratic flavor of this dissertation. It gives the
reader enough background information to bring the mathematics of part I and
II to life. Of course, we will also try to sharpen the intuitions on the way, but
this extensive introduction explains the basic motivations. It takes care for a
thorough beginning and for convenient thumbing back.
The other reason for us to start with an informal introduction, is simply to
give an explanation, beforehand, of the differences and philosophical advantages
of partial logic with respect to two-valued semantics when it comes to a formal
understanding of epistemic dynamic processes like communication.
The first two chapters of part I will hold on to the above-mentioned order of
statics and dynamics. Chapter 2 discusses partial truth-assignments, their un-
derlying calculus and, most importantly, their modal extensions, whereas chap-
ter 3 presents different constructive extensions, which provide explicit inference
for dynamics of modal (epistemic) information. The latter chapter ends with a
logic (Mud) that describes the constructive and eliminative dynamics which we
propagate.
The last chapter of part I, chapter 4, presents epistemic logical formalisms,
based on the static partial modal formalism (M) of chapter 2 and the above men-
tioned dynamic system Mud. Besides axiomatic strengthenings, we also discuss
additional expressive decoration for suitable interpretation of communicative
actions. Essential linguistic ingredients for a dynamic theory of communication
which will be formalized here are intentional modalities and the representation
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of mutual epistemic information of a group of agents. In section 1.4 of the
introductory chapter we give an informal presentation of such modalities over
partial worlds, and specify their use for different dynamic interpretations of sim-
ple communicative actions as assertions and questions. We will also demonstrate
how different cooperation postulates and conversational maxims with regard to
groups of communicating agents can be axiomatized. In chapter 4 we will specify
the technical constraints which evolve from such pragmatic principles.
From the perspective of modal logic, the partial and constructive logics, which
are to be presented in this thesis, are relatively new. Therefore, the thesis also
contributes to the general knowledge of modal logic which has been a reason
for us to dedicate a full part, part II, of the thesis to the meta-theory of these
modal formalisms. The chapters 5 and 6 of part II are of course essential for the
general setting of the thesis, as they prove the completeness and decidability of
the logics which we present in part I. These two chapters present a generalization
of the well-known Henkin method of proving completeness and decidability in
conventionál mo ogic ughes 8e Cresswe 1 is generalization of the
Henkin procedure facilitates accommodation of partial modal logics in the meta-
theory of modal logic. Chapter 7 is meant as an initiative for the development of
correspondence theory for partial modal logics. It has been incorporated merely
as a contribution to general modal logic.
It will be obvious by now that this thesis is not heading for the one and only
true logic of communication. What it does show is how a flexible epistemic
dynamics can be defined on the basis of partial possible worlds. In fact, the
only philosophical choice of this dissertation is our plea in favor of the earlier
mentioned dynamics of partial worlds, which is a rather primitive fundamental
preference. We leave it to linguists and philosophers in the field to support
or reject different interpretations of communicative actions and principles of
pragmatics. What we like to explain in section 1.4 and chapter 4 is how a
variety of dynamic interpretations of such actions, and principles of pragmatic
rationalism of communicating agents, can be stipulated in terms of partial modal
formalisms.
We will try to build mathematical bridges from partial modal logic to theories
of communication. The thesis should therefore be read as a study in applied
logic, rather than as a contribution to philosophy or linguistics.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Most proposals for model-theoretic semantics of communicative actions, have
been founded on modal logic 1 and its possible worlds semantics, for example
[Jones 1983] and [Appelt 1985]. Such theories can be separated into a static and
a dynamic component.
The static component concerns the epistemic information which the commu-
nicating partners possess at a certain point in time. Traditional possible worlds
analyses for formal interpretation of the contents of epistemic propositional at-
titudes are briefly described in section 1.1.
The dynamic component of modal logical analyses of communication consists
of a formalization of the way in which these epistemic information states are
manipulated by communicative actions. A very important prerequisite of such a
formal dynamic theory is a general structural specification of the way in which
information states may change. In other words, we need to give a formal de-
scription of the freedom of the flow of information in a communicative setting.
Throughout the thesis we will hold on to this distinction, which follows G~,r-
denfors' influential view, as presented in [G~,rdenfors 1988], on the construction
of formal theories on changing epistemic information states. In fact, we will
follow the line of thought of his book chronologically. First we present the static
part, and then the additional dynamics. The distinction between statics and
dynamics will be kept throughout the dissertation.
In this thesis we propose a combination of two traditional perspectives on in-
formation change. The first is the eliminative perspective, which has been prop-
agated by various dynamic approaches to semantics and philosophy of natural
language, e.g. [Stalnaker 1979] [Landman 1986], and more recently in dynamic
model-theoretic approaches to common sense reasoning, e.g. [Veltman 1991].
The second view is the constructive analysis of information change which has
evolved from model-theoretic interpretation of constructivistic philosophies of
1Modern standard texts on modal logics are [Chellas 1980], [Hughes 8z Cresswell 1984] and
[Bull 8c Segerberg 1984).
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the foundations of mathematical reasoning, e.g. [Fitting 1969]. These traditional
interpretations of the dynamics of information are presented in section 1.2.
We will advocate a combination of these different dynamic views, in which we
make a small, but particularly important, adaptation of the standard possible
worlds model theory for static representation of epistemic information states.
Instead of classical modal logics, which is most often employed for epistemic
reasoning [Hintikka 1962] [Halpern 1986], we propose partial modal logics as
in [Thijsse 1992] being a more suitable candidate for this static epistemic di-
mension. Partial modal logic arises from a partialization of ordinary possible
worlds semantics. In general, this partialization presents a finer logical analysis
of propositional attitudes [Barwise 8c Perry 1983]. Partial worlds may grow -
become less partial - or may be eliminated in order to get rid of uncertainties.
This roughly indicates how partial modal logic unfolds both a constructive and
an eliminative dimension along which information flows 2. Extending partial
modal logics in this dynamic fashion gives rise to what we will call constructive
modal logics. These logics are presented in section 1.3 as elementary constituents
of logics of interaction.
From the viewpoint of dynamic semantics, the thesis focuses on one other
important issue. Besides the two-dimensional dynamics, we wish to establish
logics for reasoning about the simple epistemic dynamics of groups of interacting
agents. Dynamic semantic theories are most often based on single agent analyses.
They formally describe the way an interpreter of a language has to make up his
mind given a certain input of consecutive sentences of this language. The reason
for this limited epistemic setting of dynamic theories is that interpretation of
text, described by the epistemic route of one virtual interpreter which reads
a text, provides for formal comprehension of dynamic phenomena of natural
language, such as anaphora and presuppositions. These dynamic appearances
in natural language are of primary interest to natural language semanticists.
Single agent interpretation suffices to get a good formal understanding of these
phenomena, although complete dynamic interpretation of discourse requires a
formalization of the above-mentioned multiple epistemic interchange 3.
Dynamic semantics for natural language interpretation originated from the
fundamental insight that there should be a clear distinction between the pure
static logical content of a proposition and its dynamic content, where the propo-
2Also, in the dynamic semantic perspective of Kamp's discourse representation theory
[Kamp 1984] and Heim's file change semantics [Heim 1982], we find a small constructive
component present. In these first order theories, variable assignments are taken to be fi-
nite. Existential statements enrich the domains of these `partial' variable assignments. The
constructivity in these theories is restricted to these sentences. Other propositions are taken
to have a purely eliminative dynamic meaning. The role of constructivity in our approach is
more dominant. Every consistent update may have a constructive effect.
30ne might also claim that this multiple agent generalization is needed for interpretation
of text. In fact, we deal with a one-way communication of writer and reader. Interpretation
of sentences from the text may also depend on the knowledge that the reader has of the
writer, and which may also change during the interpretation of the text. For a plea for such
sender~receiver dynamics see [Bunt 1990b].
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sition is considered as an utterance in a communicative context. According to
standaxd formal semantics, the static interpretation is simply the set of worlds or
situations in which this proposition is true. The dynamic interpretation should
be context sensitive. The dynamic meaning of a proposition is then described
by the way it modifies a given context.
In dynamic semantics, the context is nearly always restricted to its epistemic
part, that is the epistemic states of interpreting agents. In this way, the meaning
of an asserted proposition relies heavily on the propositions which have been
asserted before.
The singular dynamics can only be partially satisfactory. Dynamic semantics
of interaction obviously requires a multiple agent generalization of this perspec-
tive. If an agent a tells another agent b that "p" is the case, then this assertion
not only changes the information state of b; for the speaker a this message also
yields an epistemic switch. On a simplified account, this agent knows after the
assertion "p" that the other agent, b, knows that "p" . This information is par-
ticu ar y important or a to un ers an á continuation of thé diatogué by~T í1-e
above mentioned epistemic switch is only a detail of the full epistemic `force' of
this assertion. Complete idealization of the full dynamic content of the message
"p" from a to b is the change to a new state where "p" is common or mzLtv,al
knowledge of a and b. This means that a and b know that "p", and that a and
b know that a and b know that "p", and that a and b know that a and b know
that a and b know that "p", etcetera. Of course, this interpretation depends
on the unrestricted acceptance of a's information by b. Many other more sensi-
ble real life interpretations of a's message could be given. Many other context
determining variables play a role. a might be blushing, turning up his nose or
stammering. Moreover, dialogue roles like selling second-hand cars or teaching
mathematics, and many other external influences might affect the interpretation
of a's utterance. We have chosen for the reasonably safe position of a logician,
who studies laboratory dialogues, and we therefore limit context sensitivity to
individual attitudes.
Another important aspect of context, which is particularly important for dy-
namic modeling of conversation, is formed by intentional or preferential atti-
tudes. They should be taken into account to obtain a proper understanding of
communicative acts (e.g. [Searle 1983] (Bunt 1989] [Cohen 8i Levesque 1990]) 4.
They represent the communicating agents' personal views and preferences on
the epistemic dynamics of interaction. All agents have a personal dynamic per-
spective on how a certain interactive setting may change their own epistemic
state and those of the other interacting partners. Intention generates the com-
municative acts of an agent during interaction to a large extent. Agents try to
establish epistemic configurations which match their personal preferences. An
example which illustrates the importance of such preferential registration is the
demand for formal comprehension of questions. If agent a asks b whether "q"
is the case, then the questioner a enriches the mutual information of a and b
4For a recent survey of contextual parameters which are relevant for modeling communica-
tion see [Bunt 1994].
18 Chapter 1. Introduction
by a's intention to know whether ""q" holds or not. In an additional section
of chapter 4 we show how intentions can be embedded in the framework of the
dynamic epistemic logics of this thesis.
In the last section of this introduction we give an introductory exposition of
how mutual belief reports and intentions can be embedded in the two-dimensional,
i.e. constructive and eliminative, dynamic model-theory which we advocate.
Our proposal follows roughly the line of the possible worlds analysis in [Cohen
8c Levesque 1990] of intentional attitudes.
A proper formalization of the `subjectivistic' dynamic approach to semantics
can be established by means of relational interpretation of propositions. The
dynamic denotation of a proposition is taken to be a relation between in- and
output states, which is in contrast to the classical static view according to which
a proposition denotes a set of states. The dynamic relational interpretation of
a proposition describes how an informational context, that is the input state, is
changed by addition of the informational content of the proposition. We have
chosen to incorporate both kinds of interpretations as mentioned above, and
we will further motivate this in section 1.3. Doing so, we follow the earlier
mentioned view on epistemic dynamics of Gárdenfors. The style of logic will
be in line with the so-called dynamic modal logic of [van Benthem 1991b] and
[de R.ijke 1992] 5, where the distinction of statics and dynamics has been made
explicit.
Summarizing, this introductory chapter consists of four sections. The first
two sections present conventional proposals for static and dynamic epistemic
reasoning respectively. The third section unfolds our motivations to prefer par-
tial modal logics for epistemic representation and the two-dimensional dynamics
of such epistemic states. The last section indicates how this dynamic epistemic
formalism can be employed for modeling communication.
1.1 Modal logic and propositional attitudes
Modal logic, which has its roots in analytic philosophical studies on the concepts
of necessity and contingency, has been used extensively as the basic formalism
in the development of logical analyses of epistemic propositional attitudes like
knowledge and belief [Hintikka 1962] [Lenzen 1978] [Halpern 1986]. Nowadays
the modal approach to logical interpretation of epistemic reports is widely ad-
hered to. Due to this development it has become an independent branch of
applied modal logic called epístemic logic.
The invention of possible worlds semantics for modal logic, due to Carnap,
Kanger and especially Kripke, has brought modal logic within sight of many
other disciplines. Due to the pioneering work of Montague [Montague 1974]
in the late sixties, modal logic has become influential in formal semantics of
natural language. All kinds of intensional phenomena in natural language, such
SFor an extensive general view on dynamic modal logic the reader is referred to de Rijke's
thesis [de Rijke 1993].
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as attitude reports, can be given a clear semantics in terms of possible worlds.
Somewhat later, modal logic also made its entry in theoretical computer science
(e.g. [Pratt 1980] g) and artificial intelligence (e.g. [Moore 1980] 7).
Possible worlds semantics presents a simple and elegant model-theoretic anal-
ysis of reasoning with uncertainties. Every world can be seen as a state of
information, which is linked to a given set of possible worlds by a so-called ac-
cessibility relation. Such a relation is meant to determine the intensional or
modal information of the original world. In ordinary modal logic, a sentence or
propositíon is then said to be necessarily true if it holds in all accessible worlds,
and it is possibly true if it holds in it at least one of the accessible worlds.
From the point of view of epistemic logic, the above-mentioned original world
is taken to be the actual world, with its own extensional information, in which a
certain agent lives. The related or accessible worlds, which are called epistemic
alternatives in epistemic logic, represent the uncertainty of the agent. Accord-
ing to the agent, all alternatives can be the actual world. Subsequently, the
only information~this agent is sure of is~ ïnformatión which is s~aréd
by all these epistemic alternatives. Certainty or knowledge as seen in ordinary
epistemic logic therefore coincides with the interpretation of necessity in plain
modal logic.
1.1. FIGURE.
Figure 1.1 gives a partial illustration of the epistemological outlook on possible
worlds semantics. The agent a knows that p, but does not know whether q.
ePratt's modal logic has been baptized propositionnl dynamic logic (PDL). An extensive
survey on this branch of modal logic can be found in [Harel 1984]. The original motivation was
to establish a possible worlds interpretation of imperative programming languages. Also in
process algebra, modal logical classifications have been found for certain calculi (e.g. [Stirling
1987] ).
7Moore's logic is a combination of (a part of) dynamic logic and epistemic logic and is
meant as a formal approach to robotics.
20 Chapter 1. Introdzlction
Different epistemic attitudes can be incorporated through scaling the epistemic
alternatives. A very rough classification of possible worlds is the distinction
between epistemic and doxastic alternatives. The latter collection is taken to
be a subset of all the epistemic alternatives. Intuitively, this selection means
that the agent takes this set to be more probable than the remaining epistemic
alternatives. The agent is then said to believe a proposition if it holds in all the
worlds of this selected set of doxastic alternatives. In the configuration in the
figure l.l, it might be the case that the agent a thinks that the p, q, r- and the
p, q-world are more probable than the p-world. In this situation, the agent a
does not know whether q, but nevertheless believes that q 8.
Knowledge differs logically from belief by the truth of its content [Hintikka
1962]. This can be understood in terms of possible world models as in figure 1.1
by including the reality to be one of the epistemic alternatives. This need not
be the case for doxastic alternatives. Suppose once more, that the agent a's
doxastic alternatives in figure 1.1 are the q-worlds. Consequently, a believes
that q, but q is not true.
A full single agent possible worlds model also accounts for reflexive capacities
with respect to an agent's personal knowledge. In terms of possible worlds, the
agent meets herself thinking about the world in every accessible world. Incorpo-
ration of such introspective capacities can be accounted for by means of models
which have the more general structure of the next figure.
1.2. FIGURE.
Introspection is usually taken to be so strong that an agent is fully certain
8In the literature on epistemic logic we find more fine-grained analyses of different attitudes,
especially different degrees of belief. Full probabilistic ordering of worlds has been proposed
and investigated in [G~.rdenfors 1975]. Another approach to this differentiation is comparing
the amount of epistemic alternatives which support a certain proposition [Lenzen 1980]. For
an extensive survey on these extended modal formalisms see [van der Hoek 1992].
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about personal uncertainties. In fact, this full introspection restrains the class of
suitable models for interpreting epistemic attitudes radically. Let's say S is the
set of alternatives. ~11 introspection means that the set of alternatives which is
accessible from a world s E S must be S itself. For single agent epistemic logic,
the one-layer models of figure 1.1 suffice. The set of `second degree' worlds,
or the set of worlds in the second inner `mental clouds' in the picture above, is
identical to the set of immediately accessible worlds. Therefore, for singular fully
introspective logics, these long distance worlds do not have to be represented.
This simplification is only possible when we model single agent situations. The
fully introspective capacity of being certain about one's own uncertainties can
evidently not be extended to the uncertainties of somebody else. This means
that in the alternatives of an agent a the alternatives of another agent b might
very well fluctuate. The general picture of a model with two agents is presented
in the following figure.
~..3. FicuxE.
Technically speaking, multiple agents can be accounted for by allowing more
accessibility relations. The individualization of alternatives is simulated in fig-
ure 1.3 above through the different shades of the mental clouds. A formalization
of this is a pair (W, {Ra}QEA~ with W and A being non-empty sets of worlds
and agents, respectively. Every Ra symbolizes the individual accessibility rela-
tion over the universe of worlds W, i.e. Ra C W x W, of a specific agent a. This
general framework is called a possible worlds or Kripke fraTne 9.
Flill introspective capacity with respect to individual uncertainties such as we
have mentioned earlier can now be formalized as follows:
d~, y, z E W, da E A: Ra~x, y) ~~Ra~x, z) p Ra~y, x)) 10 ~1).
9A Kripke model is the result of addition of a truth assignment V to such a Kripke frame.
Roughly speaking, it assigns information to all the possible worlds in the frame.
loThe equivalence q abbreviates the better known structural frame properties transitivity
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This principle says that the set of accessible worlds of a given world ~ coincides
with the set of accessible worlds of any accessible world of x. The first-order
formula (1) can also be replaced by the shorter relational equation Ra - Ra o
RQ 11. Fully introspective frames are a very specific subclass of all possible
worlds frames. With regard to figure 1.3, full introspection can be understood
as follows: every cloud of a certain shade contains the same set of worlds as all
its inner clouds of the same shade.
For the formal interpretation of multiple attitudes, the set of accessibility
relations needs to be extended proportionately again. Especially in modal log-
ical theories of communication, such as [Jones 1983] and [Appelt 1985], the
variety of proposed modalities to interpret different attitude reports is enor-
mous. The most straightforward manner to interpret the variation of atti-
tudes is to extend the general framework by extra indexing of the accessibilities:
(W, {Ra,; ~ a E A, i E I}), where I is the assortment of attitudes. Modal logical
analyses of communication pay most of their attention to analytic philosophical
studies of the logical interplay of these attitudes, which semantically boils down
to definitions and justifications of the structural interplay of the relations Ra,; 12.
In this thesis we will not concern ourselves with investigations on the diversity
of attitudes for a realistic interpretation of everyday dialogues. Instead, we will
focus on a more fundamental question. Our main concern is to find an appropri-
ate formal description of the construction of new possible worlds configurations
by means of communication. As said earlier, we propagate an alternative view
for the dynamics of possible worlds. Instead of exploring expressive wealth for
fine-grained interpretation of all kinds of communicative actions, we try to limit
this expressivity to an acceptable level, so that clear interpretations of simple
actions can still be stipulated, without losing mathematical tractability. This
sober attitude prevents us from debouching into an ocean of philosophical spec-
ulations.
A clear advantage of this technical inspection of the dynamics of limited epis-
temic information is that it has brought us natural and formally transparent
interpretations of the other dynamic modalities which are of particular impor-
tance for a mathematical understanding of interaction. In section 1.3 we will
illustrate how dynamic modalities can be given a clear semantics in terms of
the dynamics of partial possible worlds. These modalities are called dynamic
because they are interpreted in terms of the information change. In chapter 3
and 4 a precise formal specification of these interpretations is presented.
The epistemic part of our calculi of constructive communication, which are to
and Euclidicity. The former refers to the property which evolves when q is replaced by G,
and Euclidicity is caught through substitution of ~ there.
11The symbol o denotes relational composition: R o S(x, y) G 3z : R(x, z) 8t S(z, y).
12In figure 1.1 we already explained such a constraint to make a proper distinction between
knowledge and belief. This simple constraint told us that the set of doxastic alternatives is
taken to be a subset of the full set of epistemic alternatives. The logical consequence of this
interplay of different alternatives yields that knowledge always implies belief.
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be presented in chapter 4 and will be abbreviated as C3-calculi after the title
of this dissertation, consists of only one modality. The incorporation of more
epistemic attitudes disturbs the technical presentation and would only divert
the reader from the key issues of the thesis. The epistemic modality which we
discuss is conviction. Pure knowledge, as it implies the truth of its content, is
taken to be too strong for interpretation of communication.
The formula ~ncp denotes that the agent a is convinced that the proposition
cp is the case 13. Readers who are familiar with epistemic logics and who are
used to differentiation of `degrees of belief' may replace our notion of conviction
by the strongest interpretation of belief, that is believing a proposition without
doubting it. Whenever we speak of belief in the remainder of this text, we refer
to this optimally strong doxastic attitude.
The variety of dynamic and preferential modalities, that is actions and in-
tentions, is also limited up to a necessary but acceptable level. The dynamic
dimension of the C3-calculi is restricted for the same reasons as the economic
use of epistemic expressivity is.
1.2 Growth of information
F~om our point of view the most fundamental requisite of modal logics for com-
munication is to establish a formal interpretation of the growth of information.
In communication we deal with transfer of information between agents, and
therefore we have to specify the way states of information, such as the epistemic
possible worlds models in figure 1.3, grow during interaction.
A great deal of our investigations has been dedicated to the formalization of
growth of information in partial possible worlds semantics. This research has
led to the constructive modal logics of chapter 3 which constitute the underlying
modal formalism of the family of C3-calculi. In this thesis we present the dy-
namic perspective that follows from our choice in favor of partial possible worlds
semantics. All C3-logics will also contain logical equipment to reason about
retractions of information.
Before switching to our own point of view, we discuss two traditional views
on growth of information. The alternative perspective which we propose in
section 1.3 is based on a combination of these traditional views.
Growth of information in classical modal logic
Despite the convenience and theoretical elegance of possible worlds interpreta-
tion of epistemic propositional attitudes, it suffers from an intrinsic unnatural
property. Interpretation of attitudes like knowledge and belief as a necessity
operator implies that little knowledge or belief corresponds to large models, and
vice versa. Roughly speaking, the dimension of the content of such an atti-
tude is taken to be inversely proportional to the degree of uncertainty which is
13In the case of single agent analysis in the next chapters 2 and 3 the index a is omitted.
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represented by the quantity of the corresponding possible worlds. Minimalis-
tic approaches to knowledge representation such as autoepistemic logic [Moore
1983] [Moore 1984], and circumscription of knowledge [Halpern 8e Moses 1984]
illustrate most clearly this deficit of possible worlds semantics. A model where
`only p' is known 14, is called a minimal model for p. Highly conflicting to this
designation and its underlying intuition, such a minimal model is particularly
large in size. In fact it is the largest among the models where p is known. All
different `p-worlds' have to be contained to make the ignorance maximal.
It is not because of technical reasons that we are against large models for
minimal interpretations, but we oppose to the total possible worlds perspective
according to which ignorance is the same as present uncertainty. We believe
that ignorance is only partially induced through uncertainty. This latter kind of
ignorance we will call active ignorance. The other source of ignorance is simply
lack of information. A distinction of uncertainty and absence of information is
offered by the partial possible world semantics presented in the next section 1.3.
As a consequence of the possible worlds analysis of knowledge and belief, the
only way to define enrichment of such attitudes is by means of elimination of
uncertainty. Especially among natural language semanticists this `destructive'
approach towards cognitive dynamics has been propagated. Illustrative examples
are Stalnaker's work on assertion [Stalnaker 1979], Heim's file change semantics
[Heim 1982] and Landman's elimination models [Landman 1986]. Also in Velt-
man's recent analysis of default reasoning in terms of so-called update semantics
[Veltman 1991] informational enrichment is taken to be purely eliminative.
Constructive logic and growth of information
An alternative to the eliminative approach to growth of information is offered
by the kind of model-theory which emanated from semantic studies of many
constru.ctive logics. Opposite to the possible worlds in the models for classical
modal logic the information states are taken to be partiad. Intuitively, such a
state may be interpreted as the most simplistic form of knowledge representation.
Partiality refers to the assignment of truth values. The information which is left
undefined, pictures the current ignorance of the agent.
To this static representation of information, by means of partial truth assign-
ment, a simple dynamic component is added. The structure of these models
is a special kind of Kripke frame: (W, C), with G being a partial order 15 or
a pre-order 16 over the collection of possible worlds W. Although these struc-
tures are a specific class of Kripke frames, the accessibility pattern of the models
in section 1.1 must conceptually be distinguished clearly from the information
order in the constructive models. This latter relation is meant to model the
growth of information, while the accessibility patterns of Kripke frames in the
laBy some specific agent.
15A partial order is a reflexive (every state is an extension of itself) transitive (all extensions
of extensions of a state are also extensions of this state) anti-symmetric (if two states are
extensions of one another then they must be identical) relation.
18A pre-order is a reflexive transitive relation.
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previous section are meant for static modeling of beliefs on the basis of multiple
uncertainties.
If x c y, then y is said to be an extension or enrichment of x 17. In other
words, y is a possible continuation of x, which represents an information state
of an agent on its way of acquiring knowledge.
1.4. FIGURE.
This incorporation of the extension relation as a primitive semantic parameter
provides explicit reasoning about the growth of information in constructive logic.
A simple example is the use of the negation in Heyting's intuitionistic logic ls.
In intuitionistic logic "not cp"means that the truth of the proposition cp can never
be demonstrated or proved. In terms of the `information states' semantics, this
means that "not cp" is verified by a state x if and only if no extension of x verifies
"cp" . In figure 1.4, this means that in all points in the inner triangle cp does not
hold.
Also the implication and universal quantification in intuitionistic logic are
interpreted intensionally over enrichments of information states. The truth of an
implication "if cp then z~" means intuitionistically that a method which transfers
any proof of c~ into a proof of ~ is currently present. F'rom an epistemic point of
view this means that the knowledge of "if cp then z,J" refers to a situation, where
enrichment of the current knowledge with cp automatically leads to knowing
that also ~ holds. For the intuitionistic reading of universal quantifiers in its
predicate lugical version in terms of information states we refer to [Troelstra 8z
van Dalen 1990].
We may have been given a paradoxical impression here. Little knowledge, also
with respect to this constructive semantics, yields large models, as it generates a
lot of possible extensions. Nevertheless, this impression is due to the resemblance
of the technical equipment for dynamic and static modeling of information. The
size of constructive models pictures the ways that information may grow. In
other words, it represents the dynamic freedom. The size of the epistemic ac-
17In order to guarantee that such an extension y enriches x indeed the truth assignment V,
which defines a model on such an information frame (W, G), need to be monotonic over C.
This means that if V determines a truth value for a certain proposition in x, then V also gives
the same truth value to this proposition in y.
18Heyting presented a logical formalization of Brouwer's intuitionistic philosophy on the
foundations of mathematics. For an extensive survey on Brouwer's philosophy see [van Stigt
1990]. For textbooks on the science of constructive mathematics which evolved from this
philosophy see [Beeson 1985] or [Troelstra 8c van Dalen 1990].
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cessibility represents static registration of the currently active uncertainties.
An example of an application of constructive model-theory in formal seman-
tics is so-called data-se~nantics of conditional sentences of Veltman [Veltman
1985]. Truth of a conditional is interpreted here just like the verification of the
intuitionistic implication. This interpretation yields a plausible alternative to
the rigorous material implication in classical logic.
The difference between Veltman's conditional logic and intuitionistic logic is
the postulation of an explicit status to falsity as an additional truth value. This
negative truth-value, which is not the same as the absence of truth because of the
partiality of truth assignments, does not appear in the constructive philosophy
of intuitionism. In this respect Veltman's conditional logic bears a closer resem-
blance to Nelson's logic of constructible falsity [Nelson 1949] [Nelson 1959] 19
This logic extends intuitionistic logic with an extra negation which refers to the
falsity of its argument. In Nelson's axiomatization of the logic of constructible
falsity, this negation implies the intuitionistic negation and has therefore also
been referred to as intuitionistic logic with strong negation [Gurevich 1977] 20.
Additional to the intuitionistic philosophy of `proof as detection of truth', Nelson
proposed refutation as a construction to determine falsity.
The semantics for Nelson's and Veltman's logic presents suitable formal equip-
ment for extending partial logics for reasoning about the growth of information.
In these partial logics a state is just a partial truth-value assignment. A propo-
sition might be either true, false or left undefined by such a partial valuation.
As we have already mentioned, and will further motivate in section 1.3, this par-
tialization makes possible worlds more suitable for logical knowledge or belief
representation (see also [Thijsse 1992] [van der Hoek, Jaspars 8e Thijsse 1993J).
The locomotion of such static representations can be given a clear interpretation
by means of the constructive extension order.
Of course, the above-mentioned constructive logics only describe the dynamics
of a single epistemic alternative. This is not very surprising when we consider the
philosophical motivations of Nelson's logic. It is meant to model mathematical
knowledge. A partial state consists only of proofs and refutations, represented by
the information which is verified and the information which is falsified by this
state respectively. These mathematical constructions entail only information
that is certain, and therefore, is liable to a very restricted dynamics. A logical
consequence of this rigid interpretation is persistence 21 of information and the
absence of disjunctive uncertainty.
Persistence simply means that once we have a proof or refutation of a propo-
sition, we never can get rid of it. 5emantically this means that once a classical
19There are some fundamental differences between Veltman's conditional logic and Nelson's
constructive logic. We will discuss them in chapter 3.
~oIn so-called four valued variants of Nelson's logic falsity does not imply the absence of
truth. Such interpretations subsequently skip the inferential dominance of Nelson's negation
above Heyting's negation (e.g. [López-Escobar 1972]).
21 Veltman's conditional logic is not completely persistent. This is not very surprising because
it is not meant to model mathematical reasoning.
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truth-value has been assigned to a proposition, it will keep that truth-value in
all informational extensions.
The absence of disjunctive uncertain information in constructive logics, such
as intuitionistic logic and Nelson's logic, is a fundamental difference with clas-
sical logic. It means that once we have a proof of a proposition of the form "cp
or ~", we must have a proof of one of the disjuncts, "cp" or "~" 22. A simple
consequential divergence between these constructive logics and classical logic is
its omission of the principle of the excluded middle, which says that for any
proposition cp "cp or not cp" is true 23.
In order to deal with uncertainties in a constructive setting, we will combine
the accessibility interpretation of possible worlds semantics and the constructive
semantics of Nelson's and Veltman's logics. This means that we describe growth
of information along two dimensions, both eliminative and constructive. Infor-
mation can be gained through the elimination of uncertainty, just like the simple
, euri alt -
natives in the constructive way. This additional constructive dimension can be
implemented by switching to partial states as epistemic alternatives. The rigid
interpretation of truth and falsity by means of proof and refutation is replaced
by available evidence and cou.nter-evidence respectively. In the following section
on the combination of partiality and modality we will present a more precise
outline of this dynamic perspective.
1.3 Partial modal logic and its dynamics
The combination of modality and partiality has been an issue of extensive debate
among natural language semanticists and philosophers of language since the pre-
sentation of situation semantics by Barwise and Perry [Barwise 8z Perry 1983].
Their work can be looked upon as a more cognitive approach to natural lan-
guage understanding in reaction to the classical (onto-)logical formal semantics
for natural language of Montague [Montague 1974] 24. Despite the consider-
able deviation of the formal equipment of situation theory from standard logical
approaches, the distinction with these latter approaches just cames down to a
partialization ("It's a small world after all" cf. [Cresswell 1988]). Muskens
has shown in his thesis that this partialization can be enforced without giving
up the formally transparent Tarskian-Montagovian style of semantics [Muskens
1989b] 25
22In Nelson's logic this also holds with respect to refutation of conjunctions. If "cp and ~"
has been refuted it must be the case that one of the conjuncts, "~p" or "~i", has been refuted.
23In intuitionistic logic and in Nelson's logic extistential uncertainty also vanishes. The proof
of the existence of the assertion that a certain object has a given property is only correct,
according to these constructive philosophies, if a fully identified witness which has this property
can be given ( for a formal explanation see [Troelstra 8z van Dalen 1990]).
24For more accessible texts on Montague's formal semantics see [Dowty, Wall 8c Peters 1981]
or [Gamut 1991]
25Muskens introduced a relational theory of types [Muskens 1989a] as an alternative to the
standard functional reading [Dowty, Wall Bc Peters 1981]. This ( re-)interpretation facilitated
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Especially for formal interpretation of propositional attitudes partial model
theory seems to be more compatible with our intuitions. This does not only
apply to the epistemic attitudes, which we discussed earlier, but extends to
the much wider class of psychological verbs. Another class of attitudes which
has been studied elaborately in partialized logical styles are perception reports
[Barwise 1981] [Kamp 1983].
Why partial modal logic?
There is a large number of reasons to prefer partial above classical modal logic
for interpretation of epistemic attitudes. Firstly, from our point of view the
content of such an attitude is fully determined by actually present information.
If in total possible world semantics a certain proposition is not present (true),
then its negation is verified. This means that, if a proposition is absent in all the
doxastic alternatives of a certain agent, then this agent believes the negation of
this proposition.
The classical distillation of a state of belief out of given range of total doxastic
alternatives is depicted below.
1.5. FIGURE.
~0 ~
Suppose that the upper three worlds in the figure above are the doxastic
alternatives of a certain agent. The white areas represent the true propositions.
The complementary black areas represent the false propositions. The lower
picture presents the resulting state of belief. Again the white and black represent
true and false propositions which the agent believes to be actually true and false
respectively. The grey area represents those propositions of which the agent is
uncertain. He neither believes the truth nor the falsity of propositions which lie
in the grey part. If a proposition lies in the black area of all three alternatives,
the agent believes the negation of this proposition. Such a ridiculously strong
inference from absent information does not fit with our intuitions.
the injection of partiality into the higher-order theory of Montague. In [Lapierre 1990] the
reader finds a type theory on the basis of partial functions for a partialization of Montague
semantics. In [Bunt 1990a] the reader finds a plea for the use of partiality for model-theoretic
approaches to communication.
1..3. Partial modal logic and its dynamics 29
In our view, negative information with regard to imaginary possibilities such
as doxastic alternatives refers to actual rejection, and not to the absence of
support. In this respect, our position coincides with Nelson's. In his logic of
constructible falsity the presence of a refutation of a proposition represents its
falsity. Our interpretation of conviction transmits this constructive analysis of
falsity to multiple possible worlds models. An agent is convinced of the falsity of
some proposition if all his doxastic alternatives contain counter-evidence against
this proposition. The presence of counter-evidence is stronger than the mere
absence of a proposition. Propositions which are undefined with respect to the
set of doxastic alternatives of an agent, are not believed to be false by this agent.
He does not reject this proposition, i.e. a doxastically plausible counter-model
cannot be presented by this agent.
Truth of a proposition in a partial world means that evidence in favor of this
proposition is locally available. An agent's conviction is then identified with the
amount of information which is supported by means of the available evidence in
all doxastic alternatives which this agent imagines to be possibly real. A partial
possible worlds configuration is displayed in the next figure.
1.6. FIGURE.o ~
The upper three worlds are partial alternatives of an agent. White and black
refer to truth and falsity, respectively. The grey area represents the undeter-
mined information. Neither evidence nor counter-evidence for such information
is present. Falsity is no longer identical to the absence of truth. The lower
figure represents the resulting belief state. Belief of the falsity of a proposition
requires falsification of, or presence of counter-evidence against this proposition,
with respect to all alternatives. This is represented by the black area. The
striped areas represent contingently present information. Horizontal lines refer
to information of which some evidence is present, and vertical stripes indicate
information of which some counter-evidence is present. The densely grey area
refers to information which is universally absent. Later on we will call this grey
spot the passive disbelief of the agent.
The second argument in favor of a partial variant of possible worlds semantics
depends heavily on the former motivation. It has already been mentioned in
the previous section. In our view, the purely eliminative perspective on growth
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of information as a consequence of ordinary possible world semantics is limited.
This destructive method of canceling alternatives only partially describes our
means to extract epistemic or doxastic progress. The supplementary manner to
gain information is constructive extension, which represents the widening of an
agent's epistemic capacity. This second dynamic dimension is made possible by
choosing in favor of partial worlds instead of total alternatives. A single partial
world can grow by extending the amount of evidence and counter-evidence for




This picture represents one line of growing information of an agent, with an
associated set of partial epistemic alternatives, in the dynamic space. In the first
situation no information is available. The second situation arises from the first
by persuasion of the agent that "p or q" must be the case. The third follows from
updating the agent with the information that "p" is false. The second situation
evolves from constructing worlds. The divergence into two worlds illustrates
that a disjunctive message is generating uncertainty. Although information has
been gained, the uncertainty has also increased. This effect reflects the growth
of the epistemic range of the agent. In the third situation one of the doxastic
alternatives has been eliminated and the remaining world has been extended
with counter-evidence against "p". In this case the new information state is
composed by means of construction and elimination.
We think that both construction and elimination of uncertainties, such as in
figure 1.7, are essential to enforce growth of information. Generally speaking,
the model-theoretic semantics of partial possíble world models makes it possible
to incorporate the more subtle collaboration of these two dynamic perspectives
on cognitive progress.
Tearing the philosophies of total and partial possible worlds apart more roughly,
we can associate the eliminative cognitive dynamics presented by total possible
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worlds to the medieval homunculus theory of cognitive development. According
to this philosophy, the child differs only from adults in suffering from having
wild fantasies. The task of its educators is to reduce these possibilities and lead
it into the right direction. The two dimensional dynamic perspective offered by
partial possible worlds semantics is closer to the environmentalist tabula rasa
theories of Locke and Rousseau. In the beginning uncertainty is only latent and
will arise from confrontation of the individual with its environment. The initial
state of information is just the single empty world (see I in fig 1.7) reflecting the
tabula rasa situation where no information is present, not even tautologies.
This logical weakness of partial modal logic illustrates yet another advantage
of it. Believing nothing in classical modal logic corresponds to maximal possible
worlds models. Every doxastic alternative is taken to be possibly real. Never-
theless, bécause of the complete informative status of all these possible worlds,
the minimal state of belief is the same as taking all worlds to be possible, which
entails that one believes all tautological information. In partial modal logic, this
minimal belief state reduces to the tabuIa rasásmg e wor situatí~'in ~-
ure 1.7. This means that tautological information is even absent. Transposing
once more this situation to theories of cognitive development, the newborn child
is truly devoid of any extensional information.
Another argument in favor of partiality, which also relies on the distinction
between falsity and absence of truth, is the distinction between two kinds of
disbelief, which have been indicated earlier. Retrospection of figures 1.5 and
1.6 clarifies this distinction. In figure 1.5 we dealt with only one grey bulk of
disbelief. In the resulting belief state of figure 1.6 different grey areas of disbelief
appeared. In this latter figure, the full grey area represents information which
is absent in all doxastic alternatives. The striped areas represent information
which is present in at least one of the alternatives. This information indicates a
certain active disbelief. The owner of this set of alternatives actively disbelieves
the negation of this information, which means that he has a possible counter-
model in mind. For example, the vertically striped area indicates information of
which, in some of the alternatives, counter-evidence is present. In this situation
the agent takes this counter-evidence to be possible, and therefore he actively
disbelieves this information.
This refined analysis of disbelief offers a very good compromise in the discus-
sion on the principle of negative introspection. This principle says, that if an
agent a does not believe a proposition, then he also believes that he does not
believe this proposition. Among philosophers this principle has often been re-
jected [Hintikka 1962] [Lenzen 1978J. In computer science, on the other hand, it
has been widely propagated as a principle for formal reasoning about knowledge
(e.g. [Moore 1983] [Halpern 8e Moses 1984]). The most dominant plea in favor of
this epistemic principle is purely technical. It legitimates, in combination with
the philosophically acceptable principle of positive introspection 28, a reduction
to the simple structured models in case of single agent's modeling, which have
been described earlier (see page 20 and 21). The distínction between active and
28If a believes that ~p then a believes that a believes that cp.
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passive disbelief shows that partial modal logic offers a settlement of this dispute.
Negative introspection is acceptable when it is applied to active disbelief. If an
agent has access to some contingently present counter-evidence of some proposi-
tion, he also believes that he has access to this feasible counter-model. However,
we do not accept negative introspection with respect to passive disbelief. This
refined justifiable partial acceptance of negative introspection admits the same
elegant model-theoretical reduction to the full introspective models just like this
principle in classical modal logic does. The strong correspondence result will be
explained in chapter 4.
The last piece of propaganda we like to present in favor of partial modal logic
for reasoning about epistemic attitudes is its lack of contra-position. Contra-
position means that if cp implies ~, then the falsity of ~ implies the falsity ~p.
This classical principle is simply caused by the classical interpretation of falsity
as absence of truth. Abandonment of this complementary definition of falsity,
like in partial logic, no longer entails contra-position 27.
The reader may wonder why such structural digression is fruitful. A radical
example, which demonstrates the advantage of this `logical decay' very sharply,
can be given in terms of partial modal logic for representation of knowledge,
instead of belief. As we have mentioned earlier, knowledge implies the truth
of its content: "t]acp ~ cp". In classical modal logic the contra-position of this
`veridicality' principle yields that the truth of a proposition implies the epistemic
possibility of this proposition. In other words, everything which is true should
be taken to be possibly true by the agents. The attribution of such a ridiculous
width of intellect to agents does not automatically follow from implementation
of the veridicality principle in partial modal logic. The corresponding constraint
on total possible trorld models, which pictures this mental width (see figure 1.1),
of taking the reality to be one of the epistemic alternatives, can be relativized
in terms of partial possible world models to a more acceptable level as well.
Model-theoretically, the veridicality princíple of knowledge in partial modal logic
requires that at least a part of reality appears as an epistemic alternative. A
formal explanation of this correspondence is given in chapter 7. An epistemic
logic which uses this veridicality axiom without its contra-position can be found
in [van der Hoek, Jaspars 8L Thijsse 1993].
Models of epistemic dynamics
Let us now focus on the formalization of the dynamics of partial states. We
wish to combine static partial possible worlds representations with the construc-
tive information order as an additional dynamic parameter for reasoning about
changes of such epistemic registrations. The clear difference is that we em-
bed accessibility relations as well. In the case of multiple agents we deal with
models of the format (W, {Ra}QEA, G, V), with the relations RQ as static individ-
ual epistemic accessibility relations, and C the dynamic information structure.
Z~In some partial logics the definition of implication or consequence has been defined in
such a way that contra-position gets restored. An example is the definition of so-called double
barreled consequence definitions [Blamey 1986] [Muskens 1989b].
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We take the relation to be fully introspective (see (1) on page 21) and serial:
bx E W~y E W: Ra(x, y) for all a E A. This latter constraint makes sure that
an agent's conviction is never inconsistent.
An illustration of the structure of these models is given by the following pic-
ture. The accessibility relation registers the mental clouds at each point in the
structure. The dynamic dimension is represented by the horizontal plane, across
which the epistemic configuration moves.
1.8. FIGURE.
In constructive logics for mathematical reasoning, such as intuitionistic logic
and Nelson's logic of constructible falsity, the extension order is a pure temporal
order. Proofs and refutation are not retractable, and therefore changing infor-
mation states leads only to enrichment. The modal formalisms which we will
discuss do not advocate such a strict temporal interpretation of the information
structure G. It might be the case that an agent needs to revise his conviction
because of external persuasion of contrary facts. If x C y then it is possible for
the agents to move from situation x to situation y by extending their beliefs.
Here we need to be careful with our terminology. By extending one's belief we
mean that extensional information, i.e. non-epistemic or dynamic information,
has been acquired. For example, it might be the case that in extension y an
agent a has lost his belief about certain disbelief. This can be made clear by
retrospection of figure 1.7. In situation III the agent has lost his active disbelief
of the falsity of the proposition p.
In chapter 3 we will also embed the notion of retraction of doxastic informa-
tion. If y is an extension of x, then agents may move from y to x by giving up
extensional information.
In order to associate this dynamic status to the information order G, we need
to define a structural interplay of the epistemic accessibility relation and C. A
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purely eliminative `classical' interpretation of these models (W, {Ra}QEA, G, V) is
established by taking the truth-value assignment V to be total and by requiring
that if some state is an extension of another, then its uncertainty should be less.
This constraint just means that if some world is accessible, it has always been
accessible. In formal transcription,
dx, y, z E W: x C y 8c Ra(y, z) ~ Ra(x, z) for all a E A.
Constructive interpretation of these models is enforced by restraining the inter-
play of the partial truth-value assignment V and the information structure G.
Just like in the model theory of constructive logic, the valuation function is taken
to be monotonic over the information structure. The two-dimensional perspec-
tive is then laid upon the model structure through restraining the interplay of
the accessibility relation and the information structure. If y is an enrichment of
world x then everything which is accessible from y must be some extension of a
world which is seen from x. The corresponding constraint is the following:
`dx,y,zEW,b'aEA:xGyBsRa(y,z) ~~z'EW:Ra(x,z')8zz'Gz2s.
This constraint precisely describes the requirements for growth of partial pos-
sible worlds which we sketched above. Every uncertainty must be an extension
of some uncertainty in every poorer information state. In this constructive pos-
sible worlds semantics uncertainty is latent, while in the eliminative models all
uncertainty in extensions must actually be present.
In terms of the conceptual presentation of figure 1.8, this constraint of the
interplay of static accessibility and the dynamic or constructive extension order
tells us how the mental clouds behave if we move forward in the dynamic plane.
Actions as up- and downdates
Communicative actions are to be interpreted in terms of the information struc-
ture G in the constructive possible worlds models of the previous subsection.
These actions switch cognitive states along this pattern.
The relational style of interpretation of information is currently influential
among logicians and natural language semanticists. This dynamic semantics, as
it is known among formal linguists, has reached a significant reputation through
the work of Stalnaker on the formal interpretation of assertion [Stalnaker 1979],
Kamp's discourse representation theory [Kamp 1984], Heim's file change seman-
tics [Heim 1982], Barwise's dynamic theory of quantifiers and anaphora [Bar-
wise 1987] and Groenendijk and Stokhof's dynamic predicate logic [Groenendijk
8e Stokhof 1991]. In mathematical logic we find the relational model theory
in modern branches as arrow logic [van Benthem 1991a] and two-dimensional
modal logic [Venema 1991].
In dynamic semantics the meaning of a proposition is taken to be a relation
instead of a set of states such as in classical and in partial logic too. This
relation reflects the mathematical denotation of such a proposition. Intuitive
28A shorter way to write this is C oRa C R~o C. Remember o denotes relational
composition.
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interpretation of such a relation is an update, a cognitive action such as assertion
or revision, or an instruction or program. A proposition cp is the action which
is performed when cp is added to some information state. This idea originally
stems from operational semantics for imperative programming languages, e.g.
[Goldblatt 1982J.
In line with van Benthem and de R.ijke's dynamic modal logic [van Benthem
1991b] [de R.ijke 1992] we use both dynamic and static interpretation in one
system. In the constructive possible world semantics which we have presented
above, dynamic meaning can be assigned to formulae by means of the informa-
tion structure C, which represents the structural growth of epistemic informa-
tion. With respect to a certain model M -(W, {Ra}aEA, C, V) the dynamic
interpretation of a proposition cp is the set of pairs (w, v) of worlds such that v
supports cp and w C v29.. In other words, v is a cp-enrichment of w. Besides
this positive enrichment interpretation, once again following the style of van
Benthem's dynamic modal logic, we assign to every proposition cp a`negative'
retraction interpretation. This interpretation consists of pairs (w, v) such that
v G w and v does not contain cp. Informally speaking, v is a cp-impoverishment
of w.
Explicit reasoning about the epistemic dynamics in the constructive possible
worlds models which we discussed above is made possible by means of action
or dynamic modalities. Every proposition cp corresponds to modal operators
(cp]u and [cp]d . The former modal operator ranges over states which extend the
current state in such a way that they contain cp. The latter operator ranges over
states which are poorer than the current one in such a way that they do not
contain cp. In short, [cp]u ranges over ~p-additions, and [cp]d over cp-retractions.
[cp],~ ~ is a proposition which means that ~ holds after any addition of cp, and
analogously [cp]d~ means that z~ holds after any retraction of cp 30
This modal formulation of switching information states clearly distinguishes
the dynamic relational interpretation from the static interpretation of proposi-
tions. Syntactic separation is enforced by the introduction of the dynamic modal
operators, that correspond to the relational interpretation of the infix argument
of such an operator. Normal propositions always refer to the static interpre-
tation. The basic dynamic epistemic logic of this monograph, C3, combines
individual modal operators with the dynamic up- and downdate operators 31
29There is nothing partial about this dynamic relation interpretation. For a partial logical
atyle in pure relational semantics see e.g. [Krahmer 1994]
3oNote that the meaning of [~p]u ~ coincides with the constructive interpretation of implica-
tion. Falsification of [~p]u ~i deviates from Nelson's judgement of the falaity of an implication.
According to the last ideology an implication is false if the antecedent holds and the conse-
quent fails. This means that falsification of implications, opposite to verification of implication,
is defined extensionally. We follow Veltman's criterion of falsity assignment to conditionals.
[~p]u ~i is false with respect to a certain state of information if and only if this atate can be
enriched with the truth of ~p and falsity of ~i. Chapters 3 and 4 elaborate on this distinction.
31The namea of up- and downdate may be a misleading. In most dynamic theories updates
refer to minimal enrichments. [~p]u should then only range over minimal ~p-enrichments. In
our systems, an update is arbitrary. This means that a"p and q"-update is also taken to be
a p-update and a q-update.
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1.4 Constructive comr~lt~nication
Now that we have provided the model-theoretic equipment for dynamic epis-
temic reasoning on the basis of deletion and construction of uncertainties, we
want to introduce some essential additional expressivity for interpretation of
communicative actions. The most important novelties are the representation
of mutual beliefs and the interpretation of intentional attitudes. They are of
particular importance for the identification of natural interpretations of interac-
tive behavior. They appear in most analytic studies of communication, such as
speech act theory [Searle 1969] and analytic philosophical studies of conventions
[Lewis 1969] . Modern logical approaches to communication which incorporate
such operators are for example [Jones 1983] and [Appelt 1985].
Mutual beliefs
As we have already explained briefly, an important requirement for a suitable
model-theoretic semantics for interaction is the interpretation of mutual beliefs.
The full epistemic effect, or the dynamic meaning, of a(convincing) message cp
from an agent a to an agent b is the addition of cp to the mutual belief of a and
b. This means that even when b already had this informatíon, there has been
made some cognitive switch. The epistemic outcome is also that a believes that
b believes that cp holds, and b believes that a believes that ~p, etcetera. This
infinite conjunction of epistemic information will be abbreviated by C{a,b}~P.
Interpretation of this operator is established through gluing the personal ac-
cessibility relation Ra and R6 together in arbitrary order. This operation is the
transitive closure of the union of the relations Ra and Rb. This amounts to a
new accessibility relation which we will call R{a,6}32'
R{a,b} '- {(x, y) E W x W ~ R~3 0... o R~„ (x, y)
for certain n E IlV `{0}, xi E{a, b}}.
Note that this new accessibility relation establishes a suitable interpretation
of the mutual belief operator in a possible worlds setting. If all worlds y with
Rt{ a b} (x, y) are cp-worlds then both agents a and b believe that cp, they both
beliéve that they both believe that cp, they both believe that they both believe
that they both believe that ~p, and so on.
The dynamic meaning of an assertion cp of agent a to another agent b can
now be interpreted as a dynamic modal operator [C{a,b}cp]u . The proposition
[C{a,b}~]u~ expresses that zli certainly holds after a has told b that cp is the
case. It would be instructive to present such a mutual belief update by means
of a picture in the style of the earlier mental cartoons. Because of the infinite
nature of such updates, it is most problematic to display such an effect properly.
However, the doxastic effect of ideal assertion can be comprehended easily by
means of earlier illustrations. In terms of our illustration in figure 1.8, the
definition of the mutual belief update of the two agents in this illustration with
32This interpretation of mutual beliefs stems from [Halpern 8t Moses 1990].
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cp means that we move upwards to a situation where all mental clouds, that is
all layers of embedded clouds as well, are filled with only cp-worlds.
The interpretation of assertion also requires the use of preconditions. A simple
precondition of the assertion above is the sender's conviction of the content of
the message cp. This can be seen as a certain qualitative precondition of the
assertion. In formal pragmatics we find more of this kind of qualitative maxims
of conversation [Grice 1975].
Another important precondition is the requirement that a must think that
her message possibly has some epistemic effect. Of course, if we stipulate such
a strong update as the mutual belief change, this condition is a very weak re-
quirement. Even if a believes that b believes that cp and b indeed believes that
this proposition holds, then there is still some epistemic progress made by her
assertion. For example, after the assertion, b also believes that a believes that cp.
Such a change might be relevant. It might have been the case that b had tested
a on cp before her assertion as an afí'irmation of sharing b's belief of cp. In chap-
ter 4, we will present formalizations of the additional qualitative information
requirements.
Of course, in real life communication the interpretation of assertion as a mu-
tual belief update may be too idealistic. As we have said before, other context
parameters might very well entail alternative interpretations. Instead of losing
ourselves in philosophical speculations about stipulation of more realistic inter-
pretations, we like to point out that a proper definition, and axiomatization, of
mutual belief operators can be given in the constructive possible worlds seman-
tics which we propagate. Many philosophers, linguists and computer scientists
have found such mutual attitudes indispensable for formalization of interaction
and cooperation [Lewis 1969] [Jones 1983] [Appelt 1985] [Halpern 8z Moses 1990]
[Bunt 1990b].
In chapter 4 we will give a generalized formal definition of CXcp, which says
that cp is mutually believed by X, for arbitrary sets X C A of agents. Because
the relation RX is defined in terms of the accessibility relations, there is no need
for more semantic equipment. Nevertheless, the implicit infinite conjunction
of mutual belief yields a substantial complication of the axiomatization and its
meta-theory (chapter 4 and chapter 6).
Intentional modalities
Boulomaic or intentional attitudes are particularly important for formal com-
prehension of communication [Appelt 1985] [Cohen 8e Levesque 1990]. Many
pragmatic principles in speech act theory and prescriptions for cooperative be-
havior of interacting partners are defined on the basis of intentions 33
The basic C3-logic, which will be discussed in chapter 4, does not contain
such intentional operators, for the sake of technical transparency and gradual
presentation. An additional section of this chapter is devoted to an extension
of the semantic machinery in such a way that the intentional operator can be
33For a modal-like approach to these mattera see [Beun 1989].
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given a suitable interpretation. This interpretation is established by means of
an additional semantic parameter Pa for every agent a E A to the constructive
possible world models (W, {Ra}aEA, C, V), which denotes again a binary rela-
tion over the universe of possible worlds W. This relation Pa has a dynamic
intentional meaning and is called a preference relation 34. It is interpreted in
terms of the perspective of the future that the agent a has. It determines which
of these personal possible future points are preferred by a. A proposition [p]acp
then describes a situation x in which all a's preferred worlds agree on the truth
of ~p.
If only worlds have a preferential status, it does not tell us much about the
intentions and the consequential behavior of agents. It tells us only what an
agent wants. The agent may think that such a preferential world is not feasible,
and therefore may leave the agent passive.
By an additional constraint we could attribute a subjective form of feasibility
to these preferential world, so that they can be interpreted just like the goal-
worlds in [Cohen 8c Levesque 1990]. To bring an agent to action, he must conceive
the possible realizability of his preferences. Of course, such goals do not have
to be factually realizable. In the two-valued modal formalisms of Cohen and
Levesque, this realism is enforced simply by taking preferential worlds as a subset
of doxastic alternatives, which brings along their realism principle Dacp ~(P]acp.
We will show how variations of this principle can be given in the partial modal
logical style. In fact we will show that more realistic principles of realism can
be encoded. To give a simple example, we do not wish to apply such a realism
principle to belief of others. An agent may very well prefer situations where other
agents have less information. Agents may even want to retract or revise beliefs
of other agents. Such intentions are in fact one of the basic motives to interact.
Our epistemic attitude is nevertheless taken to be so strong that agents never
wish to revise or retract their own beliefs, which indicates a partial acceptance
of the realism principle above.
In chapter 4 we will also discuss the interpersonal constraints on the prefer-
ential worlds and doxastic alternatives. An instructive example which models
a certain integrity constraint is the following qualitative conversation principle
[p]a~6~ ~ ~a~P. If one aims at situations in which another agent believes cp,
then one should believe it oneself [Grice 1975] [Beun 1989]. We will show what
such a principle means for our kind of dynamic epistemic model theory. Other
weakenings can be given for this principle.
A very important facility of embedding this preferential operator is the def-
inition of a suitable simple interpretation of questions as communicative acts.
34In the field of applied logic, preferential semantics refers to certain non-monotonic logics
[Shoham 1988]. Preferential worlds or models are meant to cover lack of information. Instead
of reasoning over all worlds like in classical logic, such preferential non-monotonic logic reasons
over a set of preferred models. In dynamic semantics such preferential relations also show up.
For example Veltman's expectation patterns can be seen as a sort of preferential ordering of
worlds [Veltman 1991]. This author proposes a dynamic interpretation of default rules in terms
of updating such patterns. In [van Benthem, van Eijck 8t Frolova 1993] we find modal logical
interpretations of such preferential updates, which they call upgrades as to distinguish them
from `hard' factual updates.
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The transfer of information generated by such an action implies that the re-
ceiver b of this question is now convinced that the sender a intends to receive
a convincing argument in favor or against the content of the question. In fact,
this preference of a becomes mutual belief of a and b. This means the epistemic
effect of a's question to b is formally interpreted as a dynamic modal operator:
[C{a,6}[P]a~~a~P v ~a~~~]u
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It depends on the cooperation of b whether an answer follows. Such coopera-
tive behavior can also be encoded in the logic. Let b be some servile agent, whose
preferences consist only of situations of which he believes that the agent a prefers
them as well. In this case, b should always generate an answer. The correspond-
ing servility postulate is then ~e[P]a~P ~[P]b~G- A more reasonable weakening
of such maximal cooperation is the following: ~6[p]acP ~[p]bcP V C]b~cp 36 This
means that b goes along with other agent's preferences as long as they are not
contradictory with his own belief.
The preferential operator can also distinguish different degrees of assertion of
information from one agent to another. In the previous subsection on mutual
beliefs, the action of a telling b that cp has been interpreted as [C{a,b}cp]u . A more
skeptical interpretation would be [ob[p]aObcP]u, that is a switch to a situation
where b is convinced that a intends to let b believe that cp. This means that real
persuasion can be distinguished from telling.
In this subsection we have mixed up our vocabulary a little. In chapter 4
we distinguish intentions and preferences formally. Preferences are attitudes
towards propositions, while intentions are defined as attitudes towards actions.
Of course, there is a very close connection. If an action has been defined in terms
of our dynamic epistemic model theory, we define an intention of an agent a with
regard to such an action as the belief of a that the preconditions of this action
are fulfilled, in combination with a's preference of situations where the epistemic
effect, or dynamic denotation, of the utterance is verified. This formalizes the
`readiness' of the agent to perform a communicative action.
~Real worlds'
So far, we have only discussed subjective epistemic information. For this rea-
son we have chosen for conviction instead of knowledge as epistemic modality.
Knowledge implies the truth of its content. Such logical interplay of epistemic
modalities and reality would entice us into discussions whether reality is a partial
or a total world. We wish to resist such a philosophical seduction.
However, not choosing does not keep us from logical speculations. Incorporat-
ing a total reality does not lead to severe complications. It entails straightforward
mixtures of classical and partial logics. Total worlds can be embedded easily,
from a semantic point of view, in the constructive possible world semantics of
35Oacp V ~a~cp means that a knows whether ~p. Of course, also in the case of questions more
cautious interpretations have been advocated ( e.g. [Bunt 1989~ and [Bunt 1990b]). Some of
thoae proposals can be handled in our logical framework as well.
38fP16~ V Ob~~p means that b prefers ~p-situations or believes that ~p is false.
40 Chapter 1. Introdv,ction
the C3-logics. We may interpret the real world as a selection from the full uni-
verse of possible worlds. This leads to models of the form (W, S, {Ra}QEA, G, V)
with S being the selected set of realities in W: S C W. This set has already im-
plicitly been displayed in many of the preceding illustrations. In figure 1.8, the
set S is simply the different globes on which the communicating agents stand.
The particular role of this set is its interplay with the global valuation function
V, which should locally taken to be total on S. Moreover, the local effect of V
on the different members of S is identical. In chapter 4 we will discuss a logic,
called C3R, which deals with such an additional physical outer world.
It is not only for philosophical reasons that additional modeling of total worlds
is needed. In intelligent communication systems artificial realities play an im-
portant role. Especially for models of database querying through intelligent
interfacing between the questioner and the system who is omniscient with re-
spect to this artificial reality, which is modeled as a total world. Because the
dialogue of users with such a system will only be about the information in the
database, interpreting this as the artificial reality is legitimate (see e.g. [Bunt
et al. 1984] [Ahn 8z Beun 1991]). Besides the totality of this artificial reality,
the system, which is one of the agents in this epistemic setting, is completely in-
formed about this reality. The only thing of which the system is not completely
informed, is the information-state of the user. In this sense the information of
the system might also grow (or shrink).
The way to interpret such interactive configurations in terms of constructive
possible world semantics is through the same specification of a set of total worlds
among the universe of possible worlds. This leads to the following models:
(W, S, {R~, Ru}, G, V), where S2 is the system and u the user (and S C W).
Ro is the accessibility relation which determines the uncertainties of the system
SZ. SZ's complete information about reality enforces:
`dsES:R~(s,t)~tES.
Additional logical analysis of such configurations will be exhibited in a supple-
mentary section of chapter 4. The corresponding system is called C~.
Before deliberating on communication with completely omniscient agents, we
wish to regain the humble position of the mathematician, and leave further spec-
ulation to the readers 37. Instead of dwelling on fine-grained interpretations of
all different kinds of utterances and their epistemic and pragmatic implications,
we have chosen to present the mathematics of the dynamics of constructing and
deleting worlds by means of communicative actions. This also implies that the
pace of the forthcoming chapters will be considerably more careful and techni-
cally more attentive than that of this chapter.
37In the last section of chapter 4 we will present some ideas for further dressing up our
epistemic dynamics, on the basis of other literature on epistemic logic and communication.





This chapter presents our logical means for static representation of modal infor-
mation. First we present our partial possible worlds framework in section 2.1.
In section 2.2 we present the corresponding derivational systems. Section 2.3 in-
troduces a formal structural definition of `growing' possible worlds. This section
is meant as a bridge to the next chapter on constructive and dynamic modal
logics for reasoning about the growth of modal information.
2.1 Partial worlds
Generally speaking, the most important aspect of partial logic is its model-
theoretic semantics (see e.g. (Langholm 1988], [Blamey 1986] and [Barwise 1988]).
As extensively argued in the previous chapter, the difference with ordinary clas-
sical logic originates from fundamental semantic motivations. In this thesis, we
will only consider partial propositional and partial modal logics which differ from
classical logic in the assignment of truth-values. To get the picture as clear as
possible, we will start with the purely extensional partial propositional logic,
which is based only on partial truth-assignments. Some interesting typical phe-
nomena of partial semantics can be explained more easily in terms of this simple
extensional semantics.
Partial valuations
The most elementary semantic entity in partial logic is the partial valuation. It
partially assigns truth-values, 0(false) and 1 ( true), to a given set of proposi-
tional variables.
2.1. DEF~1viT~oN. A,vartial valuation V is a partial function which assigns truth-
values to a given set of propositional variables IP. In order to distinguish partial
functions from total functions we replace the normal functional arrow ---i by
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M. In short V : IP ~ {0,1}. The collection of all partial valuations is denoted
by ~3.
The domain of V E ~3, ~om(V), is the set of all propositional variables which
obtain a truth-value by V:
~om(V) :- {p E 1P ~ V(p) - 1 or V(p) - 0}.
If ~om( V) - IP then V is said to be total. `,~ denotes the set of all total
valuations.
The following relations are considered to be of particular importance for partial
logic. In the sequel of this work we will call them information orders.
2.2. DEFINITION.
V C V' q p E:~om(V) ~ V'(p) - V(p) for all p E IP,
V~ V' a p E ~om(V) n 3)om(V') ~ V(p) - V'(p) for all p E IP,
V C~ V' q ~om(V) C~om(V').
The first relation is the most important one. It says that V' contains all the
information of V and can therefore be understood as a possible enrichment of
V. In short, we will call V' an e~tension of V whenever V C V'. We will refer
to the second relation as coherence of the pair V and V'. If V Cd V' we say that
V' is at least as large as V. -
2.3. OasEItvATION. The relation C is a partial order over ~3. The coherence
relation N is a symmetric reflexive relation over ~3, while the information order
Cd pre-orders ~3, i.e. it is a reflexive transitive relation over the universe of
partial valuations.
For these three relations over the universe of partial valuations the following
equivalence holds:
V C V' ~f V Cd V' 8e V N V'.
These information orders are typical notions of partial logic. With regard to
total valuations these orders do not mean very much. The first two relations,
C and N , reduce to the identity relation over the class of total valuations. The
last relation, Cd, expands into the universal relation over total valuations.
The formalization of these information orders establishes an interesting per-
spective when partial logic is used as technical equipment for uniform represen-
tation of stages of information. If V' is an extension of V, V' may be understood
to be an informational enrichment of V. The coherence relation expresses the
mutual compatibility of valuations. They can be taken as two parts of one com-
mon extension, namely the valuation which contains the joint information of
such a pair. Such a union is denoted by the binary operator U:
V(p) if p E ~om(V)
V u V'(p) - V'(p) if p E ~om(V')
undefined otherwise.
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The relation Cd compares the informational size of two valuations. It does
not consider truth-values, but only judges on the basis of the presence of truth-
values. It compares the degree of determination of partial valuations.
Before elaborating on the specific properties of the presented partial semantics,
we introduce the basic language with which we will be working.
2.4. DEFItvITlotv. Let IP be a non-empty enumerable set of propositional vari-
ables. The language G is the smallest superset of IP such that
cp,~EG~(-~cp),(~pnz~)EGand1EG
These connectives are called negation, conjv,nction and falszLm respectively. This
is the basic language of this text. We avoid superfluous use of parentheses, and
take binary connectives to dominate over unary connectives. For example ~cpn~
means ((~cp) n~) and not (~(cp n z~)). The propositional variables p E IP are
also called atoms or atomic propositions. A literal is an atom or the negation of
an atom.
In the following sections we will use more connectives, let us say cl, .., cn for
the moment. The smallest superset extending IP which is closed under these
connectives and the connectives of G will be written as G~'~~~~`n 1. An extension
which is particularly relevant in the next subsections is Go, where [] refers to
necessity. In some parts of the text we will also mention languages which do not
incorporate all the basic connectives of G. If some connective c is withdrawn,
we specify this in a subscript: G-1 refers for example to the sublanguage of G
without occurrences of the 0-ary connective 1.
Furthermore, we will also use convenient abbreviations, like T:- ~1 (verum),
cp V ~i :- ~(~~p n ~zli) (disjunction) and Ocp :- ~C~cp (possibility).
In the sequel we will use the letters p, q, r, possibly with additional sub- or
superscripts, as atoms. Greek undercast letters are used to denote arbitrary
formulae. Greek capitals denote sets of formulae. We will often use the abbre-
viation cI' for a given unary connective c and a set of formulae I'. cI' refers to
the set {cry ~ ry E I'}, and c-I' denotes the set {ry ~ cry E I'}, that is the set of all
formulae ry which appear as cry in I'. Repetitions of a unary connective c will be
abbreviated by an exponential, e.g. c3cp - ccccp2, and c-~I' :- {ry ~ cny E I'}.
If a language GS has been specified, and I' C Gs, then (I')~ refers to the
complement of I' in GS: (I')~ :- {cp E GS ~ cp ~ I'} - GS ` I'. I' - cp and I' f cp are
sometimes used as abbreviations of r`{cp} and I' U{cp}, respectively. Su6(I')
refers to the set of subformulae of I'.
lIf we were more accurate, we would also have to indicate the arity of all these connectives.
Instead of being formalistic, we guarantee that this parameter will always be cleaz from the
context.
ZcO~G - ~P.
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At first sight, one might get the impression that this language G is not different
from the language which is normally used in total (classical) propositional logic.
However, the relative greater liberty of partial semantics creates more possibili-
ties for truth-conditional interpretation of negation and conjunction. Let us first
present our choices. In the jargon of partial logic, these choices are called the
strong Kleene interpretations [Langholm 1988].
In choosing truth-conditions for partial logic, falsification has to be imple-
mented explicitly, as falsity is no longer the same as absence of truth. Apart
from the standard verification relation ~ between a valuation and a proposition,
saying that such a proposition holds with respect to this valuation, a falsification
relation ~ between valuations and propositions is defined. The compositional
inductive clauses for determining truth and falsity of formulae with respect to a





V ~~pn~aV ~~pB~V ~~
V~paV(p)-0 (pE1P)
V~1
V ~ ~~p a V ~ ~p
V~cpn~aV~cporV~~
The interpretation function []~ : G-~ ~3 is the function which assigns to every
formula the set of partial valuations which verify it:
[cp]~ -{V E~3 ~ V~ cp}.
Note that the disjunction, which was introduced earlier as an abbreviation,
obtains the intended truth-value assignment. It is true with respect to a partial
valuation V if V verifies one of the disjuncts. Falsification of the disjunction by
V occurs if both the disjuncts are falsified by V.
The language G has some important natural properties with respect to the
structural information orders between valuations which were defined above.
Some fundamental properties which are valid for propositional variables (IP)
are inherited by all formulae.
2.6. TxEOREM. Persistence of information:
VCV' iff V~cp~V'~cpforall~pEG.
Informational compatibility of coherent partial valuations:
V~V' iff V~~p~V' ~cpforall cpEG.
The union V U V' of two coherent partial valuations V and V' contains the joint
information of the two separate valuations:
if V ~cpor V' ~cpthen VUV'~cp forallcpEG.3
3Note that V uV' may contain more information than the joint information of two coherent
valuations V and V'. V u V' ~ p n q does not guarantee V ~ p n q and V' ~ p n q. Obvioualy,
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Larger valuations contain more information:
VCdV' iff V~cp~V'~cporV'~cpforallcpEG.
The relation Cd preserves classical tautological information. A formula is clas-
sically tautological if it is verified by all total valuations, i.e. `S C Qcp~~. If cp is
such a formula, then -
V Cd V' 8z V~ cp ~ V' ~ cp.
Proof. Proofs of all characterization results on these three information relations on
partial valuations can be given by a straightforward induction on the construction of
formulae in ,C. We refer to [Langholm 1988] for proofs for the first two characterizations.
The fourth result can be accomplished in the same manner. The third result follows
from the first and the simple fact that V C V U V' and V' C V U V' for two coherent
partial valuations V and V'. The last result is a simple consequence of the fourth,
combined with the non-falsifiability of classical tautologies:
rr v~ r~- -n v ~~. ~ --n v~ ~ 4hen V ~-~~e ~
This result is an immediate consequence of the persistence result for C, and the fact
that all partial valuations have a total extension: `dV' E~3 ~ 3V E`,~ : V C V'. ~
It is easy to see that with respect to total valuations the meaning of the
negation and the conjunction is purely classical. The choices in case of undefined
arguments of these connectives are open for debate and depend heavily on the
intended application area of partial logics. For example, the negation which we
used above means that its argument is false. If the argument is left undefined by
a partial valuation, it also leaves the negation of this proposition undefined. So,
a natural extension of the formalism above would be the addition of a so-called
weak negation, which expresses that its argument is not true. We will use the
symbol N for this negation. The truth-value assignment looks as follows.
V~ N cp q V~ cp and V~ N cp q V~ cp
In partial logic this connective is often omitted, because in a way it restores
totality. In the general study of multiple valued logics - where partial logic is
seen as the specific case of three valued logics - such a negation may not be
ignored (see [Urquhart 1986~). Because of this perspective we will not exclude
it, but keep it a little aside.
Also the conjunction we used is disputable. Its truth-conditional interpreta-
tion causes falsification of a conjunction if one of the conjuncts is falsified. The
truth-value assignment of the other conjunct is overruled, and might therefore
be undefined without having any influence. Applications of partial logic which
make such falsification undesirable are conceivable. For example, partial logic
may be used in order to permit truth-value assignment only to a class of `compre-
hensible' propositions. In this case, one prefers dominance of undefinedness with
respect to conjunctions. According to this conceptual analysis, the truth-value
clauses for such a conjunction, which we will write as ~, look as follows:
the converse of this implication is a property which is not transferred from P to the full
language G.
4The converse of this observation is also valid [Thijsse 1992].
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V ~cp~z~t~V ~cpBzV~~, and
V~~Q~~ V~~pBz(V~~orV~~i) ,or
V~~Bz(V~cporV~cp) .
This conjunction, also called the weak Kleene conjunction, which expresses
something stronger about its arguments than the conjunction ~, can be defined
in terms of this latter conjunction and the strong negation in G in the following
way:
~o~G - ,(,(~ ~ ~G) ~ ,(~ ~ ,~) ~ ,(~G ~ ,~)).
The disjunctive duality v, the weak Kleene disjunction, whose verification
requires verification of at least one of its arguments and definedness for both the
disjuncts, has an easier definition in terms of the disjunction v:
~ v ~ - (~ v ~) n (~ v ,~) n (~ v ,~).
In contrast with total valuations the language G is not fv,nctionally complete
over partial valuations. F~nctional completeness means that not every connec-
tive with an extensional definition in terms of partial valuations can be rewritten
by the connectives of G. A simple example is the weak negation ~.
Nevertheless, G defines a natural class of connectives [van Benthem 1984J.
This class can be described as having classical interpretations with respect to
total valuations, in the sense that truth-value assignment is fully guaranteed
with respect to total valuations 5 , and they preserve persistence of propositions.
A proposition is persistent if its validity is never lost when information grows.
In terms of partial valuations, a proposition cp is persistent if
V~~pBzVCV' ~ V'~cp forallV,V'E~.
A connective is then said to be persistence preserving if persistence of its argu-
ments always yields a persistent proposition. We will not give further analysis
of definability in partial propositional logic, as it is a subject somewhat outside
the scope of this thesisfi.
The weak negation is typically not persistence preserving. To comprehend
such behavior, consider the following simple illustration. The empty valuation,
that is the valuation with the empty domain, verifies N p for any propositional
variable p E IP. Evidently, every extension which assigns the truth-value 1 to
such an atom p, does not verify N p. This means that ~ p is not persistent,
while p is.
SThis property has been called closedness [van Benthem 1984] and also classical closure
[Thijsse 1992].
eIn [Blamey 1986] it has been proved that functional completeness with respect to preser-
vation of persistence only can be achieved by adding 0-ary connective ~ to the basic language
G(G~). This proposition is always undefined: V~~ and V~ ~ for all V E~. The
language G~~~ is functionally complete with respect to the complete class ~, e.g. [Langholm
1988].
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We refer the interested reader to [Blamey 1986], [van Benthem 1984], [Lang-
holm 1988] and [Thijsse 1992]. In this latter reference, the reader finds a full
chapter dedicated to definability results in partial propositional logic.
Semantical consequence
The only formality with which we should deal before proceeding, is the notion
of valid consequ.ence.
2.7. DEFINITION. Let r and 0 be two sets of formulae in ,C. We say that 0
is a valid ~:i-consequence of r, whenever all partial valuations which support all
elements of r also support at least one of the elements of 0. The abbreviation
of this relation is ~~.
r~~,oe~dvE~:(e-rEr:v~ry~~óEo:v~b)
In terms of interpretations, this definition of validity comes down to
r~~ o~ n Q~~~ ~ U Qb~~ 7.
7Er 6E0
If for two formulae Qcp~~ - Qzv~~ then cp and ~ are semantically equivalent, i.e.
have the same models. The abbreviation of this relation is cp ~~ z~.
There is some freedom here. The so-called dou.ble barreled consequence def-
inition has also been used [Muskens 1989b]. This refers to a stricter notion of
validity: "all models of r verify at least one of 0 and all models which falsify
all formulae in 0 falsify at least one element of r" . This notion of validity
is propagated mainly because it structurally behaves better than our single-
barreled definition. The underlying reason is that it restores contra-position:
r~ 0~~~ ~~r. Note that this does not hold for our definition of validity:
P ~~p ~~ q, but ~q ~~ ~(p n~p).
For a categorization of consequence relations and their axiomatizations in partial
propositional and partial modal logic we refer the reader to [Thijsse 1992]. The
definition which we gave above, which we will use throughout the thesis, is known
in partial logic as the strong consequence relation.
Of course, the most remarkable non-~3-validity is the principle of the exclu.ded
middle:
0 ~~t ~p V ~cp.
Most other classical principles such as De Morgan laws (1), absorption (2), dou-
ble negation ( 3), idempotence ( 4), distribution ( 5), commutativity (6), associa-
tivity ( 7) and `ex falso' ( 8) are also ~3-valid principles.
7The most convenient understanding of this style of defining a consequence relation is
probably obtained through interpretation of the left hand argument I' as a big conjunction
over its elements and the right hand argument 0 as a big disjunction.
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2.8. TABLE.
(1) ~(~P n ~) ~~s ~~P v ~~
~(~ v ~G) ~~r ~w n ~~G
(2)
(3) ~~~P ~~ ~P (4)
(5) ~v v(~G n x) ~~ (~ v~G) n(~v v x) (6)
~vn(~vx)~~ (~n~G)v(~nx)
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cG n (~P v ~t~i) ,~~T cP
~vv(~n~G)~~~v




(7) ~P v (~ v x) ~~ (~P v ~) v x (8) ~ n ~
~vn(~Gnx)~~(~vn~G)nx w~~s~G
In definition 2.7 above we presupposed that both arguments of the conse-
quence relation were subsets of the restricted language G. Of course, a similar
definition can be given for syntactic extensions of G. Such an extended use of
the consequence relation will be specified by its subscript. For example, ~~~
refers to the consequence relation over ~3 for the language G~.
Partial Kripke models
In the introductory chapter 1 we already presented the basic parameters of
a partial possible worlds or Kripke model. In this chapter and in the next
chapter on constructive modal logics, we will use only one modality ~. This
means that only one accessibility relation - recall that this relation is the formal
description of the collection of uncertainties with respect to a given world -
suffices for suitable interpretation of modal formulae. Poly-modal formalisms,
in order to cope with multiple agents, will be discussed later on in chapter 3
and chapter 4. For the presentation of the basic modal formalisms, expansion to
multiple accessibility relations would only yield redundant syntax. It would not
contribute to the technical profit of this chapter and the next one. In chapter 3
we discuss logics with mutual beliefs, where a multiple set of modalities (agents)
is of course necessary.
For the sake of completeness we give the formalization of the above-mentioned
models in the following definition.
2.9. DEFINITION. A partial Kripke or partial possible worlds model is a triple
M-(W, R, V). W is a non-empty set of worlds, R C W x W is the accessibility
relation and V is a global valuation function which assigns a partial valuation
to every world: V: W ---r ~3. The class of all partial Kripke models is denoted
by fit.
The class of total Kripke models M-(W, R, V} is the subclass of fiT with
~om(V(w)) - IP for all w E W. This class is denoted by .~.
A(Kripke) frame is the accessibility structure of such a model, that is the
universe of worlds together with the accessibility relation (W, R). A partial
Kripke model (W, R, V') with V' : W -~ ~3 is said to be a model on F.
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Partial Kripke models allow us to interpret intensional formulae in Go in a
satisfactory way. The truth-value decomposition for the extensional connectives
is precisely defined as for partial valuations. Only now, the semantic specification
on the right-hand side of the forcing relation is a full partial Kripke model,
instead of a single partial valuation. Besides that, we also specify the world,
taken from the set of worlds in the model, which in fact assigns the truth-values.
2.10. TASI.E. Let M-(W, R, V) and w E W. The truth-value assignment






M,w ~ p q V(w)(p) - 0 (p E 1P)
M, w ~ 1
M, w~~cp q M, w~ cp
M,w~cpn~qM,w~cporM,w~~
M,w~ Ocpq ~w':R(w,w')ózM,w'~cp
Above we formalized the meaning of our static modal operator, which will be
employed in chapter 4 as our epistemic operator. Notice that this modal operator
obtains the meaning which we have described in the introductory chapter. Ocp
is verified if all worlds that are accessible (possible) verify cp, or epistemically
speaking, contain evidence for cp. Falsification of such a proposition refers to
active disbelief. An agent who has access to a counter-model, i.e. a world which
falsifies cp, actively disbelieves this proposition.
2.11. DEFINITION. We say that the model M verifies a formula cp E Go if
M, v ~ cp for all worlds v E W. The frame F-(W, R) verifies a formula
~p E Go iff all partial Kripke models over F verify cp.
The interpretation of a formula cp E Go with respect to ~ is defined as follows:
[cp]~ :- {(M, w) ~ M, w~ cp}.
The interpretation of a formula cp over a single model M-(W, R, V) E fit is
the set of worlds in M which verify cp:
[cp]M -{w E W ~ M,w ~ cp}.
The interpretation of a formula cp E Go over a frame F is defined as
BThe definitions and formats atem from [Thijsse 1990].
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[cp~F :- {(M, w) ~ M, w~ cp, M is a model on F}.
In general for any restricted class of partial Kripke models ~ C~Jt
[cp~c :- {(M, w) ~ M, w~ cp, M E~}.
Semantic equivalence of two formulae ~p and ~ with respect to a class of partial
Kripke models ~, i.e. [cp~~ -[z~~~, is denoted by cp ~~ ~.
The possibility operator O obtains its intended truth and falsity conditions.
Ocp has been defined dually to t]cp: ~t]~cp.
M,w~Ocp a ~vEW:R(w,v)BeM,v~cp
M,w~Ocp a dvEW:R(w,v) ~ M,v~cp
2.12. DEF1N1Tlotv. fii-validity for pairs of sets of formulae from Go obtains the
following format:
r ~~ o ~ (~ [~rD~ ~ U [~~~.
7EI' áE0
In agreement with the vocabulary developed in the previous section, 0 is said
to be an fJR-valid consequence of I'. ~~~ denotes the same relation expanded
over subsets of G~~o
For a subclass of models ~ C JJt we define ~-validity, ~c, in precisely the
same way as above with ~ substituted for ~JJ2. Validity over a Kripke frame F,
~F, is the same as validity over the class of all models in ~T which have F as
their underlying frame.
2.13. TASLE. A few important fiZ-validities are listed below.
a(~p n~i) ~~ o~p n o~, 01 ~~ 1
O(cp V zli) N~ Ocp V Ocp OT :~ T
o~, o~ ~~ o(~ n ~) o~ v o~, ~~ o(~ v~)
t](~ v t~) ~~ o~, O~ o(~ n~) ~~ o~ n O~
2.2 Derivation
In section 2.1 a multiple conclusion definition of validity has been presented.
The system of inference for partial modal logic presented in this section does
not diverge from this perspective. This amounts to a Gentzen sequential-like
axiomatization 9, with the only difFerence that premises and conclusions are sets
instead of sequences. This reduces the quantity of structural rules.
The sequential style of axiomatization has been chosen mainly because of two
reasons. The first reason is that it shows very clearly the difference with classical
modal logics, and the second reason is its calculational style of deduction, due
9Sequential calculi for modal logics axe rare. We refer to [Wansing 1992b~ and the bibliog-
raphy there for different proposals.
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to the equal tuning of the arguments of the inference relation. This relation
orders the collection of sets of formulae. This latter argument will prove its
benefit most evidently in the second part of this thesis which deals with meta-
theoretical issues. Many definitions and meta-theoretical proofs can be presented
concisely and in this sequential style. For example, the completeness proof of the
axiomatization system, which will be presented below, can be shown by means
of a short sequential calculation.
Sequential rules for partial modal logic
In the following three tables, 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16, we will present a sequential ax-
iomatization of the minimal partial modal logic. This sequential axiomatization




ri and Di are sets of formulae for all i E {1, .., n-{- 1}. The symbol i- denotes
the derivation relation between these sets of formulae. r~ 0 is called a sequent,
r is the assumption set of this sequent and 0 its conclusion set. The fraction
notation in (1) must be interpreted as a conditional. The sequents rt ~ ~i with
i C n are the conditions of the rule in (1), and r,~~l ~ O~,tl is the consequence
of this rule. If n- 0 then the set of conditions is empty. In this case the rule is
said to be axiomatic. Because the arguments of the derivation relation are sets,
the notations r, cp and r, r' refer to r U{cp} and r U r', respectively.
Table 2.14 shows the structural rules, that is rules without linguistic specific
properties such as connectives. The only relevant structural rules are the sTART
rule and two monotonicity rules, L-MON and R-MON. The first one expresses
the most trivial derivation step. It says that if an element of the conclusion set
~ also appears in the assumption set r then r~ 0. The monotonicity rules
embody the freedom of extending both the assumption set and the conclusion
set. Furthermore a cuT rule is present.
2.14. TABLE.
STRUCTURAL RULES
r~o if rn0~0 START
r~o rcr' r~o oco'
I,~ ~ Q L-MON I, ~ Q~ R-MON
r~~,o r',~v~o' CUTr, r' ~ o, o'
The introduction rules for the connectives are separated into TRUE and FALSE
rules. This somewhat unusual distinction is inspired by the partial model-theory
of the preceding section. As falsity and truth are no longer interdefinable, we
distinguish each introduction of a new connective in a false or a true proposition.
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Syntactically, the former case of introduction simply means that the resulting
connected proposition appears in the scope of a negation.
We present the TRUE rules first:
2.15. TABLE.
r, 1~ 0 L-TRUE L
r~~,o
I,' ~~ ~ Q L-TRUE -~
r, ~v, ~ ~ o
r,~n~~o L-TRUE l~
TRUE
r i- cp' ~ r~ ~ 7~' 0~
R-TRUE hrr~~~nzGoo~
r ~- ~, ,o
ar ~ o~,,oo




r f- ~1, 0 R-FALSE 1
r, ~ ~ o
r, „~ ~- o L-FALSE ~ I, ~~ ~~Q R-FALSE ~
r, ,~ ~ o r~, ,~ ~ o~ r~- ,~, ,~, o
I,, r~, ~~cp n~~ ~ ~, 0~
L-FALSE n I, ~~~~ n~1' Q R-FALSE I~
r, ,~ ~- ,o
Or, ~~cP ~ ~OD
L-FALSE O
Other sequential systems for partial logics
Instead of separating the introduction rules into TRUE and FALSE rules, we could
also define two derivation relations. Apart from the ordinary relation ~, a second
relation -i can be defined. r~ 0 then means that at least one of the members
of ~ is false, if all formulae in r hold. This gives a somewhat more elegant
presentation of the false rules, i.e. without using the negation. For example, the
reformulation of the FALSE introduction of the conjunction would then look as
follows
r -~ ~, ~G, o
r~~n~,o ~
Another stylish sequential system for partial logics has been proposed in [Fen-
stad, Langholm 8a Vespren 1992]. In this paper two-placed sequents are replaced
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by four-placed quadrants. Just like the additional -i -notation, falsity is used in
the definition such that FALSE-rules do not need negations. An inference rule in
this system has the following format:
rl
Ó1





The meaning of such a rule coincides with the following reformulation in our
sequential style:
rl, ~0, ~ ~il, ~~1 .. rn, -,On ~ ~.n, ~~~,
r~, -,o~ ~ ~~, ,o~ .






An advantage of this four-placed variant is that the rules in the tables 2.14 -
2.16 can be formulated more symmetrically. The L-TRUE ~ can be incorporated
as a structural rule:
r
ó ~~, ~20 ~
~2o'
Now, the other rules make up a nice dual system. The R-TRUE rules can be
identified as North west rules (Nw). The R-FALSE-rules reappear as Nw- and
sw-rules, and the L-TRUE- and L-FALSE-rules as NE- and SE-rules, respectively.
For example, Nw ~ and sE n obtain the same description:









0 0,~,~ ~ ó
~ andO
The other two rules for conjunction introduction are also similar:
r E r~ ~~
~~ ~ 0 ~ ~~~ ~ ~i
r ~, ~ r' ~', ~
0 0 ~ o~ o~
~
~
r, r~ ~, E~
o,o',~~~G ~ o,o'
r, r~ E, E~, ~ n~
oo~ oo~ .
and
Throughout the thesis we will stick to our expllclt TRUE-FALSE dlstlnctlon in
sequential rules.
2.17. DEFiNiT~oN. A set of formulae 0 is M-derivable from another set of for-
mulae r whenever r F- ~ can be established by following a finite number of
applications of the rules above (table 2.14 - 2.16). The corresponding relation
is denoted as r~ly 0, and is called an M-sequent. P-derivability refers to the
relation between sets r, 0 C G, denoted by r~P 0, such that r f- 0 can be
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shown by a finite number of applications of the rules above with the exception
of the O-introduction rules.
If cp f-M ~ and z~ ~M cp then we write cp -M ~. The relation -P is defined
analogously.
In the sequel of this thesis we will skip this kind of definitions as they will
always be in the same format as in the previous definition. Given a set of S-rules,
S-derivability and S-sequent refer to this set of rules in the same way as these
notions for M refer to the given M-rules.
Another important feature of definition 2.17 is its implicit finiteness.
2.18. OBSERVATION. If r~M 0 then there exist finite subsets r' C r and
~' C p such that r' ~M 0'. This can be proved by a straightforward induction
on the length of derivations. M-derivability is defined by making only a finite
number of derivation steps.
This legalization of limiting sequents to the class of finite sequents is very
practical for development of the meta-theory in part II. All the systems discussed
throughout this thesis have this finiteness property. We will avoid superfluous
reference to this property and freely apply it whenever it is necessary.
2.19. DEFiNiT~oN. Let X and S be two sequential derivation systems. X is said
to be a sequential e~tension, or extension for short, of S if they both have the
finiteness property as formulated in observation 2.18 and for all r~S 0 also
r~X 0. If their associated languages also coincide, then X is said to be a
normal extension of S.
Properties of P and M
The most urgent question is whether these systems are sound with respect to
the validity notions ~~ and ~~ presented in section 2.1.
2.ZU. THEOREM. SOUNDNESS P AND M
Forallr ,oCG:r~-po~r~~,o ,and
forallr,OCGo:r~ly~~r~~0.
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the length of derivations. By way of
illustration we demonstrate the soundness of the rule R-TRUE O for M. Let this rule
be applicable: for certain I', 0 C Go and cp E Go I' ~,y cp, ~0, and therefore through
application of this rule OI' F-M Ocp, ~00. We need to prove ~I' ~~ ~cp, ~Op.
Suppose that M, w~(]y for all ry E I' and M, w~ Ocp. This latter assumption
says that there exists a world v in M such that M, v~ ~p. The former assumption
yields M, v ~ ry for all ry E r. Because I' ~ cp, ~~ and the induction hypothesis
(I' ~~ ~p, -~0), we know that there exists b E 0 such that M, v~~b: whence
M, w~~Ob. In short, M, w ~ O~p or M, w ~~Ob for certain 8 E 0. Because (M, w)
has been picked freely from nyErQO-y~~, we conclude OI' ~~ ~cp,~~0, ~
The reader who is not familiar with sequential calculi is advised to check the
soundness of different rules for himself.
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The converse of these soundness results above, completeness of M and P, is
less trivial. We will present the completeness results in chapter 5 in part II.
2.21. TASLE. Rules for the defined connectives T, V and O are derivable by
the M-rules. They can all be derived by means of the double negation rules
L-FALSE ~ and R-FALSE ~ only.
r~ T, 0 R-TRUE T
r, ~T ~ ~ L-FALSE T
r,~~o r~,~FO'
r,r',~~~~o,o' L-TRUE V r ~ ~' ~' ~ R-TRUE Vr~~v~,0
r, ,~, ,~ ~ o r~,~v, o r' ~- ,~, o,
~, -!~ V~ II L-FALSE V ~,' I,~ ~ r~ V~Q' Q~ R-FALSE V
1 Il ~`
r,~~o
or, o~ ~- o0 L-TRUE O
r ~ ,~, o
or ~ ,o~, o0 R-FALSE o
The O-notation in front of sets of formulae is more convenient than ~0. There-
fore, we most often use the following reformulation of R-TRUE O and L-FALSE ~:
r~-~,o r,,~~o
or I- o~p, o~ or, ~o~p ~ 00 '
As promised in the introduction of this section, the sequential axiomatization
of partial propositional and modal logic illustrates very clearly the difference
with classical modal logic. It simply comes down to the absence of a R-TRUE
~-rule:
r,~~-o
r ~ ,~v, o .
This causes the absence of the law of the excluded middle: If,u cp V~cp. A lot of
other classically valid principles still hold. All the principles listed in table 2.8
and table 2.13 are quickly derivable. In the following example we demonstrate
the distribution principles of conjunction over disjunction.
2.22. EXAMPLE.
1. cQ ~ P cQ
2. ~G ~P ~, X
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6. ~p,Tli ~p cp n(~iV x) R-TRUE n(1,4)
7. ~p, x~p cp n (Tli V)() R-TRUE n(1,5)
8. cp n z~i ~p cp n ( ~i V x) L-TRUE n(6)
9. cp n x ~p cp n(~t,i V x) L-TRUE n(7)
10. (~p n ~) V (~p n x) I-p cp n(~ V x) L-TRUE V(8,9)
~n(~G~x)~p (~vn~)~(~an~G)
1. cp ~p cp START
2. z~ ~p ~i START
3. x i-p x START
4. tp, ~i f-p cp n z~i R-TRUE n(1,2)
5. cp, x~p ~p n x R-TRUE n(1,3)
6. cp ,1~ V)( ~p ~ n~I , ~p n x L-TRUE V(4,5)
7. cp n (zl, V X) ~-p ~p n ~ , tp n x L-TRUE n(6)
8. ~ n(~ V x) ~p (~ n~) V(~ n x) R-TRUE V(7)
These derivations also hold for F-M, of course. All the P-rules are also M-rules.
Because of commutativity, associativity and idempotence of both the disjunc-
tion and the conjunction, the disjunction and conjunction over an arbitrary
finite sets of formulae I' is unambiguous modulo the equivalence relation -,y.
Throughout the thesis we will use the notation V I' and n I' for this disjunction
and conjunction, and treat them as ordinary formulae.
In the calculus which we presented we may replace finite right hand arguments
by a disjunction, and finite left hand arguments by a conjunction.
2.23. ~BSERVATION.
I' ~,y 0 óc 0 finite ~ I' F-,u V ~, and
I'~MD 8e I'finite~ nI'~MO.
T and 1 are taken to be the empty conjunction, n 0, and the empty disjunc-
tion, V 0, respectively. Note that these definitions are correct with respect to
the observation about finite assumption and conclusion sets above.
In order to demonstrate the use of modal rules we show two simple derivations.
2.24. ExAIvtPLE. We first give the simple derivation of the "modal ex falso" :
o(~ n ,~) ~M ~.
1. ~p ~M ~p START
2. ~P, ~~P ~M ~ L-TRUE ~ (1)
3. ~ n ~cp f-1y ~ L-TRUE n(2)
4. O(cp n-~cp) ~ly ~ L-TRUE O(3)
5. O(cp n~~p) i-,y ~ R-MON (4)
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An important M-sequent is ~(a VQ) ~,y ~a, t]Q, Oa n O,Q. It tells us how to get
rid of disjunctions inside the scope of a necessity operator. A six step derivation
of this M-sequent is presented below.
1. c~ ~~y a, Q START
2. ,Q ~~y a, Q START
3. a V~3 ~M a, ~Í L-TRUE V(1,2)
4. ~(a V Q) ~,y ~a, OQ R-TRUE O(3)
5. ~(~ V,(i) ~~y O,(3, Oa R-TRUE O(3)
6. ~(a V Q) h-M Oa, OQ, Oa n OQ R-TRUE I` (4,5)
Remember that the sequential arguments, assumptions and conclusions are sets.
The last inference step in the derivation above is therefore legitimate.
For additional mastering of the calculus, we advise the reader to derive the
semantic validities listed in table 2.13 on page 52.
Adding the weak negation: P~ and M~
In the first subsection of this chapter we have discussed the weak negation, which
expresses that its argument is not true. In partial logic, this absence of truth
does not coincide with falsity. In our terminology, addition of the weak negation
in the systems P and M leads to three-valued propositional and three-valued
modal logiclo
Establishing sequential calculi for axiomatization of ~~~ and ~~~ is not very
hard. As mentioned earlier in section 2.1, the weak negation restores totality
in a certain way. In terms of derivation this can be seen through its complete
imitation of the classical negation: a R-TRUE N-rule is added. The other rules
are simply the same as the ones presented for the strong negation.
2.25. TABLE.





r ~N ~. ;~
r~-~~
R-TRUE N
r ~ Q L-FALSE N I, ~ ' Q R-FALSE N
~ 1 N lIi 1 N l~i~
2.26. THEOREM. SOUNDNESS P~ AND M~
For all r, 0 C G~ : r~P~ 0~ r~~~ 0, and
forallr,OCGo~~:r~,y~~ ~ r~~~0.
Proof. Once again, by induction on the length of derivation. We demonstrate
application of the rule R-TRUE ~ here for the system P~. Suppose r, cp ~P~ 0. The
loThe first article on three-valued modal logic is [Segerberg 1965J. Other short essaya on this
issue are [Schotch et al. 1978] and [Morikawa 1989]. A longer article on many-valued modal
logics can be found in [Fitting 1992].
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induction hypothesis yields I', cp ~~ti 0 (3). We need to show that the derivation step
I' ~P~ ~ cp, 0 is sound: I' ~~~ ~ cp, 0.
Let V~ y for all ry E I' for certain V E~3. If V ~~ cp then V ~ cp and therefore,
according to (3), V~ b for certain b E ~. This means, because of the arbitrary choice
of V from nyErQryD~, that I' ~~~ cp, 0. ~
2.3 Ordering partial possible worlds
The growth of modal information, as elaborately argued in the introduction
chapter, is of particular importance for logical analysis of epistemic dynamic
processes such as communication. This section is devoted to a structural defi-
nition of what it means for one partial possible world to extend another. In the
next chapter we will develop supplementary linguistic tools which enable us to
define inference systems to reason about growth and retraction of information.
In the first section of this chapter we have already defined an extension rela-
tion for partial valuations. This is a very straightforward definition of growth
of extensional propositional information. A partial valuation V' contains all the
information of another partial valuation V if the atomic content of V' contains
the atomic content of V. An appropriate definitíon of such an extension rela-
tion among partial possible worlds is more complicated. Some intuition of this










M ~P'q. z3 3
Y3
P,R M4 ~'y - M 5
With the exception of Ml and M4, each two models have a mutually different
structure. It is not hard to grasp that x4 should be an extension of xl. Never-
theless, it turns out that all the worlds contain the information in xl. For the
extensional part of Go, G, this can be seen immediately, because all the local
truth-value assignments extend the empty local valuation of xl.
Expansion of this conclusion to intensional information (Go ) requires a closer
exploration of the underlying frames of the different models.
The most instructive example from the illustration in figure 2.27 is a com-
parison between z3 and x5, because they have access to multiple worlds. With
2.3. Ordering partial possible worlds 61
regard to their modal informational content xs turns out to be an enrichment of
z3. The challenge is to give a structural reason why x5 adopts all modal infor-
mation of z3. An explanation of this structural argument becomes most clear if
we firstly demonstrate the transfer of truth-assignment in z3 to formulae of the
form ~cp with cp E G to x5.
Suppose M5, xs ~ ocp with cp E G. This means that xs sees some world
which does not verify cp. In other words, M5i ys ~ cp. Because z3 has access
to a world which has a smaller extensional content than ys, namely y3i we
have made sure that M3i z3 ~ Ccp, because Ma, y3 ~ cp.
Suppose M3i z3 ~ Ccp with cp E G. This means that M3, x3 ~ cp or M3, y3 ~
cp. Because all these accessibilities of z3i x3 and y3i have local valuations
which are extended by the local valuation of y5 in MS and cp E G we obtain
M5, ys ~ cp. Because xs sees y5 in M5, we also have M5, x5 ~ Ocp.
Generalization of this line of argumentation to arbitrary worlds w in M and
w' in~, wit~respect to~ansfér óf trut~-valu~s of ~G-formulae-entails~he
following order.
`dv E W: R(w,v) ~~v' E W' : R'(w',v') and V(v) C V'(v), and
dv' E W' : R'(w', v') ~ ~v E W: R(w, v) and V(v) C V'(v).
The first requirement takes care of transfer of falsity of these formulae Ocp with
cp E G, and the second forces adoption of truth of such formulae. If the relation
above holds between w and w' and also V(w) C V'(w') then w' in M' is said
to be an extension of degree 1 of w in M. This structural relation guarantees
not only that all information of w about G U OG is adopted by w'. In fact it
amounts to the transfer of all information of modal depth not larger than 1, that
is formulae in which no subformula appears in the scope of more than one modal
operator.
2.28. DEFINITION. Tlle modal depth of a formula cp E Go, abbreviated by
md(cp), is defined by the following recursive definition:
md(p) - 0(p E IP) md(1) - 0
md(~cp) - md(cp) md(cp n~) - max{md(cp), md(z~)}
md(Ccp) - md(cp) -~ 1
In order to ensure full transfer of modal information of arbitrary modal depth
we present the following recursive definition.
2.29. DEFINITION. Let M-(W, R, V) and M' -(W', R', V') be a pair of
partial Kripke models. A world w' in the model M' is said to be an extension
of degree 0 of a world w in M iff V(w) C V'(w'). This relation is abbreviated
by w CM,M, w'. w' in M' is an extension of degree n, for n ~ 0, of w in M,
w CM ly, w', if
w Cn-1 , w'-M,M ~
b'vEW:R(w,v)~~v'EW':R'(w',v')BevCMM,v',and
62 Chapter 2. PartialModal Logic
dv'EW':R'(w',v')~~vEW:R(w,v)BcvCMM,v'.11
2.30. OBSERVATION. IÏ w' in M' is an extension of degree n of w in M for
certain n E IN then also w CM ~y, w' for all k C n.
2.31. LEIvtMA. Let M-(W, R, V) and M' -(W', R', V') be a pair of partial
Kripke models, and let w E W and w' E W'. For all cp E Go
w Cn`d(sv) w~ ~ M' w~`~ ~-M,M
M', w' ~ cp, and
M', w' ~ cp.
Proof. By induction on the construction of formulae of Go. The basic step, cp - p E
IP, is immediately obtained from the definition w CM,1N, w' and theorem 2.6. The case
1 is trivial, and the other two `extensional' connectives are immediate consequences
of the induction hypothesis (in the case of conjunction observation 2.30 is needed as
well).
Let w CydM~ w' and ~p - ~~p'.
Suppose M, w~ Ocp'. This means that M, v~ cp' for certain v E W such that
R(w, v). By definition of CM~y~, we know that there also exista v' E W' such that
v CMa~y"1-1 v'. Because md(~p') - md(~p) -1 and the induction hypothesis, we may
conclude M', v' ~ cp' and also M', w' ~ D~p'.
If M', w' ~ Ocp' then there exists v' E W' such that R'(w', v') and M', v' ~ cp'.
Analogously to the argument above, using the third clause in definition 2.29 and
the induction hypothesis, we obtain M, v ~ ~p' for certain v E W with R(w, v).
Consequently, M, w ~ l7cp'.
0
In general, the converse of this lemma does not hold. Nevertheless, it applies
to wide classes of partial Kripke models. An example is the class of finitely
branching models. This class consists of models in which every world has access
to only a finite number of worlds.
2.32. LEIvItvtA. Let M-(W, R, V) and M' -(W', R', V') be a pair of partial
Kripke models which are both finitely branching and let w E W and w' E W'.
If for all cp E Go, with md(cp) c n, M, w ~~p implies M', w' ~ cp, then also
w CM M, w'.
Proof. By induction on the degree n. If n- 0 the result is simply a repetition of
the persistence result in theorem 2.6.
Let n~ 0, and suppose w ~1y M, vi . This means that one of the three clauses in
definition 2.29 does not hold. We need to show in all three cases the existence of a
~p E Go with md(cp) c n such that M, w ~ ~p and M', w' ~~p.
If w ~MM, w' then the induction hypothesis may be applied. It immediately
guarantees the existence of a formula ~p E Go such that M, w ~ ~p and M', w' ~ cp
M,w~cp ~
11This recursive definition stems from [Jaspars 1991a]. In this article this definition has been
employed to define minimal interpretation in ~i of Go-formulae.
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and md(cp) G n.
Suppose that there exists v E W such that R(w, v) and for all v' E W' if R'(w', v')
then v~MM, v'. This means, on account of the induction hypothesis, that for all
v' with R'(w', v') there exists cp„~ E Go such that md(cp„~ ) C n-1, M, v~ cp„~ and
M', v' ~ cp„~ . We define -
cp :- n{~p„~ ~ R'(w', v')}.
This definition is legitimate, for M' is finitely branching. Moreover, md(cp) G n.
Obviously, M, v ~ cp, and therefore M, w~ Ocp. On the other hand, if R'(w', v')
then M', v' ~ ~p, and so M', w' ~ Ocp. Note that md(Ocp) G n.
Suppose there exists v' E W' such that R'(w',v'), and for all v E W if R(w,v)
then v~M M, v'. The induction hypothesis guarantees the existence of a certain
~p„ E Go such that md(cp„ ) C n- 1 and M, v~ cpv and M', v' ~ cp„ for all v with
R(w, v). Let -
cp :- V{~p„ ~ R(w,v)}. --- -
M is finitely branching, and therefore ~p is a formula with md(cp) G n. Clearly,
M, v~ cp for all v with R(w, v). This yields M, v~ O~p. On the contrary, M', v' ~
cp, and thus M', w' ~ ~cp (md(Ocp) G n).
The following picture shows that this lemma cannot be extended to the full
class of partial Kripke models.






Furthermore, we define a second partial Kripke model M' -(W', R', V'):
4V' - W U{y} V'(yi)(p~) - V(y:,p.i)
R' - R U {(yo,y)} V'(y)(p~) - 1 for all p~ E IP.
The structures of these two models are displayed below.
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It is not hard to verify, by an induction of the construction of formulae, that
M~ yo ~ ~P ~ M~, yo ~ ~P (1).
We also find yo Ciy M, yo for all n E IN. Nevertheless, the converse does not
hold. In particular, yo ~M, M yo. This property can easily be inferred from the
simple fact that
V'(y) ~ V(y;) for all i E IN `{0}.
This means that the right-to-left direction of the equivalence in (1) and this
non-l-extension relation is a counter-example for the converse of lemma 2.31.
This counterexample of the converse of lemma 2.31 relies on the infinity of the
set of atoms IP. The question arises whether restricting IP to be finite helps to
obtain a converse result of this lemma. This relative conversion of lemma 2.31
is indeed valid.
2.34. LENtNta. Let M-(W, R, V) and M' -(W', R', V') be a pair of partial
Kripke models, and let w E W and w' E W', and let IP, the set of atoms, be
finite. If for all cp E Go, with rn,d(cp) c n, M, w ~ cp implies M', w' ~ cp, then
also w CM,M, w'.
Proof. We will only give a sketch of the proof. It can easily be deduced from
the fact that the set of equivalence classes of semantically equivalent formulae with
a given maximal modal depth n is finite if IP is finite (see e.g. [Jaspars 1993]). Let
~n -{~pl, ..., cp„~} be a set where every distinct equivalent class is represented by one
of the cp;'s. So, tlcp E Go : md(cp) C n~~cp; E~n : cp -~ cpi.
Let M, M' E 91i, possibly with infinite branches, and reconsider the induction steps
in the proof of lemma 2.32. Of course, the first step immediately follows from the
induction hypothesis again. The last two steps can now also be made by the finiteness
of ~n. The formulae ~p there can be constructed by taking cp„~ E~n in the first step,
and cp„ E~„ in the second. The resulting conjunction and disjunction are well-defined
by the finiteness of ~,,, despite the fact that w and w' may have infinitely accessíble v
and v'. ~
A similar converse result of lemma 2.31 can be obtained for a extension of
Go with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions. The proof of lemma 2.32 can be
applied to obtain such a result.
In the following picture we present the result of application of the recursive
definition 2.29 of gradual extension order to the worlds in figure 2.27.
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The numbers under the diagrams represent the degree of the extension order.
These diagrams must be interpreted in the way Hasse-diagrams are used for par-
tial orders. If there exists a pure ascending path from a to b, then a is smaller
than b. If there exists a horizontal path from a to b, then a is as large as b.
Of course, the schematic presentation of these possible worlds is not completely
correct. Additional labeling of the paths with model names would have been
more accurate. As we have chosen different world names among the models,
there is no danger of ambiguity here. In fact, we could have stopped after the
extension order of degree 2. Deeper extension orders yield the same diagram.
Note that all these models are finitely branching, and thus lemma 2.31 and
lemma 2.32 make sure that the order in the picture above coincides with the
inclusion order of the informational contents up to the associated modal depth
of these worlds. The last two diagrams are similar to the extension order for
arbitrary extension order degree larger than 1. This means that an ordering
of worlds according to their modal informational content coincides with the
structure of these last two diagrams.
In the following subsection a more compact non-recursive definition is given
on the basis of the widely employed notion of bisimulation. It redefines this
structural description of growth of modal information in a more conventional
way. Fhrthermore it creates a more general point of view, in the sense that also
other information orders which we have introduced in section 2.1 can easily be
raised up to the level of partial Kripke models.
The price of this redefinition by means of bisimulations is some loss of strength.
Nevertheless, the results of the important lemmas 2.31 and 2.32 can be taken
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along. Only the result of lemma 2.34 is lost.
In part II, where bisimulations will reappear, the loss of strength of this re-
formulation is negligible. It turns out that the order of informational content
and the structural bisimulation order coincide in the canonical model of M. As
canonical modeling will be our most important means for establishing meta-
theoretical results, such as completeness and correspondence results, the small
difference between the earlier recursive definition 2.29 and the shorter and more
workable bisimulation definition of the next subsection will not disturb us. In
the sequel of this thesis we will stick to thís bisimulation definition.
Bisimulations
Bisimulations are important meta-theoretical concepts in classical modal logic12.
A bisimulation is a relation which links worlds to other worlds, regardless of their
home models, such that the accessibility pattern of linked pairs is preserved. It
can be seen as a two-way relational reformulation of the concept of homomor-
phism in mathematics. A homomorphism, in terms of Kripke models, is a func-
tion f from one Kripke model M-(W, R, V) to another M' -(W', R', V') such
that for every (x, y) E R also ( f(x), f(y)) E R'. This captures the functional
perspective of accessibility structure preservation.
A bisimulation B is not defined as a map from one model to another, but as
a relation between models M and M'. It intertwines pairs of homomorphism
between M and M', of which one is going from M to M' and the other from M'
to M. If (x, y) E R and B(x, x') then (x', y') E R' for certain y' with B(y, y').
Vice versa, if (x', y') E R' and B(x, x') then there exists y such that B(y, y') and
(x, y) E R. In short, bisimulations capture the relational view on accessibility
preservation in both directions. The following figure presents a schematic display
of this situation.
2.36. FIGURE.
:M M~~ :M . M': y a ......."::.'.. :.-. - -. ~ .. .:...::....:.:.o-;:... ~ ` y ~ ... y~ : -- - - - Qy
x ~ x'
The vectors symbolize accessibility links, the zigzag lines denote a bisimulation.
Black vectors, zigzag lines and points have a universal conditional meaning. The
dashed variants have an existential denotation.
These relational views on structure preservation lead to the following definition
x l~~iwww~ . x
12The concept of bisimulation stems from process algebra (see e.g. [Hennessy 1988]). In
modal logic we meet the same concept also as zigzag-correspondence [van Benthem 1985]
[van Benthem 1991b]. In [van Benthem 1976] this concept already appeared as `p-relation'.
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of bisimulations.
2.37. DEFINITION. Let M-(W, R, V) and M' -(W', R', V'). A bisimulation
between M and M' is a relation B C W x W' such that for all x E W and
yEW' -
R(x, w) ~~v E W' : R'(y, v) 8c B(w, v)
B(x, y) ~
R'(y, v) ~ 3w E W: R(x, w) 8c B(w, v) (1)
If (w, v) E B we say that w and v bisimulate by B. If B is not specified, this
simply means that there exists a bisimulation through which they bisimulate.
This relation is denoted by w D4M,M~ v. The collection of all bisimulations
between M and M' is abbreviated by Bis(M, M'). If B is a bisimulation between
M and M itself, we say that B is a bisimulation on M. D4M is the relation of
bisimulating pairs in one model M.
The definition of bisimulation given above is based purely on frames and there-
fore we al lativns between frame-.~~á-~la~sical modal logie
bisimulations often refer to a subclass of what we call bisimulations. In these
definitions, e.g. [van Benthem 1991b], bisimulating pairs are taken to have iden-
tical local valuation as a structural description of worlds with identical modal
informational content. As we plan to describe different relations between par-
tial valuations we have chosen a more general position with our frame-based
definition 2.37 above. This definition originates from [Stirling 1987].
2.38. OssExvATION. A shorter reformulation of the requirement (1) in defini-
tion 2.37 of bisimulations can be given by the following relational equation:
BoR'CRoB and B-IORCR'oB-1.
The symbol o denotes composition of relations, while the superscript -1 refers
to the converse relation of its argument.
2.39. OsSEItvATION. The following general principles hold for bisimulating
pairs of possible worlds.
~ x D4M x for all x in the model M.
~ xD4~yly~y~yD4ly,,yxforallxinMandyinM'.
~ x D4,y ,y~ y 8e y D4,y~,M~~ z~ x D4,y 1N~~ x for all x, y and x in M,M' and M".
The first principle, reflexivity of D4M, is a simple consequence of the fact that
the identity relation over the worlds in M is a bisimulation of M. The second
symmetry principle holds because converting bisimulation yields a bisimulation
in the other direction. The third transitivity principle is valid because the com-
position of two bisimulations yields a new bisimulation. This means that the
relation D4,~ is an equivalence relation.
2.40. ExANIPI.E. All dead ends, that is worlds which do not have any accessible
world, bisimulate. If x in M-(W, R, V) and y in M' -(W', R', V') are
dead ends, then B-{(x,y)} is a bisimulation. Application of the relational
equations in observation 2.38 shows this immediately: B o R' - R o B- 0 and
B-1 o R- R' o B- 0. Therefore, x D4~y,1N~ y. On the other hand, dead ends
only bisimulate with dead ends.
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Bisimulations provide a very elegant machinery for transposing the informa-
tional orders on partial valuations in the preceding subsection into the universe
of partial Kripke models ~.
2.41. DEFINITION. Let M- (W, R, V) and M' -(W', R', V') be a pair of
partial Kripke models. A world w in M is said to be extended by w' in M' if
there exists B E Bis,~,M~ such that B(w, w' ) and
B(x, y) ~ V(x) C V'(y) for all x E W, y E W'.
This extension order relation is written as w CM,M~ w'.
The coherence relation N and the domain-inclusion relation Cd are transferred
to fiT in the same way. To obtain there definitions, substitute these other infor-
mation orders for C in the definition above. Their abbreviations are ~M,M~ and
d -
CM,M''
2.42. ExAivIPI.E. Let us review the examples in figure 2.27 in order to further
clarify the bisimulation definition. Consider x3 in M4 and y5 in M5. These
worlds bisimulate through the bisimulation B-{(x3,ys), (y3,y5)}.
B o Rs -{(xs, ys), (ys, ys)} Í
Rg o B- i(x3, y5), (y3, y5), (z3, y5)}
~BoR5CR3oB
B-1 o R3 - {(y5,x3), (ys,y3)}
I ~B-loR3CR5oB-1
R5 o B-1 - 1(x5,x3), (x5,y3), (y5,x3), (y5,y3)}
BBCause V3 (x3 ) C V5 (y5 )~d V3 (y3 ) C V5 (y5 ) we conclude x3 CM,,MS y5 and
a1S0 y3 CMs,Ms y5'
Our initial example, the structural explanation of adaptation of all modal infor-
mation of z3 by x5i can be demonstrated by a small extension of the bisimulation
above:
C - {(z3e x5), (x3, y5), (y3, y5)}'
Notice that V3(z3) C V5(x5), V3(x3) C V5(y5) and V3(y3) C VS(y5). We need t0
prove additionally that this relation is a bisimulation in Bie,y3,1y5. The following
relational equations show this membership of C.
C o R5 - W3 X{y5} - R3 o C, and
C-1 o R3 - WS X{x3,y3} - RS o C-1.
This proves z3 CM,,Mb x5.
In order to get more feeling for bisimulations, the reader is advised to try to
find bisimulations which prove other extension relations in figure 2.35.
What is left to show is the correctness of the bisimulation definition of the
extension order among possible worlds. According to lemma 2.31 we only need to
prove that C1y,M, coincides with the extension order of arbitrary degree among
possible worlds, which has been presented in definition 2.29.
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2.43. THEOREM. Let M-(W, R, V) and M' -(W', R', V') be a pair of partial
Kripke models and let w E W and w' E W'.
wCM,,~~w' ~ dnEIN:wCMM,w'.
Proof. By induction on n. Suppose w C,y,,y~ w'. This means that there exists
a bisimulation B E~'t8n~,,y~ such that B(w, w') and for all x E W and x' E W' if
B(x,y) then V(x) C V'(x'). This means that at least V(w) C V'(w') and therefore
w CM,,y, w'.
Let n 1 0, and R(w, v) for certain v E W. According to the bisimulation definition,
there exists v' E W' such that B(v, v') and R'(w', v'). This also means that v C,y,,y~
v' by means of the bisimulation B. The induction hypothesis yields v CM,M, v'.
Analogously for all u' E W' with R'(w', v') there exists u E W such that u CM M, u'
and R(w, u). This bisimulation interplay of accessibilities of w and w' establishes
w Cy ,y, w' . ~
The converse of this theorem does not hold in general. The following example
illustrates this failure.
2.44. Ex.aMPLE. Consider the following two models M-(W, R, V), M'
(W', R', V') E 97t with
W-{w~ ~i,jEIN,jGi}U{0}
W' - W U {v;};E~
R- {(w~,w~~l) ~ j G i} U{(O,wó) ~ i E IlV}
R' - R U{(v11 vifl ) ~ i E IN} U{(0, vo) }
~om(V(w))-0forallwE W
~om(V'(w')) - 0 for all w' E W'
The following picture presents the structures of these two models.
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It is not hard to prove that 0 CM ,~, 0 and 0 Cy, M 0 for all n E IN. Neverthe-
less, we can show that 0[zM„~- 0, and also 0~,y~,M 0. We can even prove that
0 in M and 0 in M' do not bisimulate.
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Suppose that there is a B E BisM,,y~ such that B(0, 0). This means that
B o R' C R o B (1), and because R'(0, vo) we may infer that R o B(0, vo). In
other words, there exists i E IN such that B(wó, vo). By an iterative application
of (1), we also find B(wi, vi). This gives us the contradiction, for wi is a dead
world, while vi is not.
In order to transfer the result of lemma 2.32 we only need the converse result
for finitely branching partial Kripke models.
2.45. TxEOREM. Let M-(W, R, V) and M' -(W', R', V') be a pair of finitely
branching partial Kripke models and w E W and w' E W'. If w CM 1y, w' for
all n E IIV, then also w CM,M~ w'. -
Proof. Let w Cy ~y, w' for all n E IN, and let B - {(x, x') E W x W' ~ x Cy,~y,
x' for all n E IN}. Suppose that B ~ Bt6~y,1y~ (2). This means
~x E W 3x', y' E W' : B(x, x') 8z R'(x', y')
8c dy E W: R(x, y) ~ not B(y, y') (3), or
~x, y E W 3x' : B(x, x') 8z R(x, y)
8a by' E W' : R(x', y') ~ not B(y, y') (4).
If (3) holds then for all y with R(x, y) there exists n E IN such that y~M,1y, y' (5). Let
ky be the minimal natural number for which ( 5) holds for all such y with R(x, y), and
let k be the maximal natural number of the kys. The finiteness of the set of accessible
worlds from x makes sure that k is well-defined. Observation 2.30 ensures y~M,,y, y'
for all y such that R(x, y). This means x~M Íy, x', which contradicts B(x, x'). By an
analogous argument, we can show that ( 4) also leads to a contradiction, and therefore
(2) cannot be true, i.e. B E Bi.s,y,,y~ .
Flirthermore, note that B(x, x') implies V(x) C V'(x') ( take n- 0 in the definition
of B). This shows w CM,M~ w', because B(w,w'). ~
2.46. CoROLLARY. Lemma 2.31 and theorem 2.43 yield a persistence result for
the extension order between possible worlds. If M, M' E fiJt and w and w' are
two worlds in M and M' respectively, then
w C,y,M~ w' 8e M, w~ cp ~ M', w' ~ cp for all cp E Go.
2.47. CoROLr.ARY. Lemma 2.32 and theorem 2.43 yield the converse of this
result for finitely branching partial Kripke models. If M and M' are two finitely
branching partial Kripke models and w and w' are two worlds in M and M'
respectively, then
(dcpEGo:M,w~~p~M',w'~~p)~wC,~,M~w'.
In chapter 5 we will extend this latter corollary to the so-called canonical
models. The result, lemma 5.26 on page 157, justifies the bisimulation definition
of the extension order over partial possible worlds more evidently than the result
above. For the sake of gradual presentation, we will come back to this issue in
chapter 5 after the definition of these canonical models.
Appendix
~4 Other~~~ormatic~r~ orders~ world~
By means of the definition of bisimulation we can also transfer the coherence
relation ~ and the domain-inclusion relation Cd to possible worlds in partial
Kripke models. The question arises whether characterization results as in the-
orem 2.6 are preserved. As usually, the success of this transfer of information
orders turns out to be only partly satisfactory.
The coherence relation
The success of the bisimulation transfer of the coherence relation is similar to the
results which have been shown in the previous section for the extension order.
Purely analogous to the procedure of proving preservation of Ga-information over
this bisimulation extension order, we can prove that two bisimulation coherent
worlds do not contain mutually conflicting Go-information.
2.48. TxEORENt. Let M, M' E~7t and let w and w' be two worlds in the models
M and M' respectively. For all cp E Go:
w~M,,y~ w' 8c M, w~ cp ~ M', w' ~ cp13.
Proof. By induction on the construction of formulae. Once again, only the ~-step
deserves some clarification.
Let w~,y,~y~ w', by means of a bisimulation B between M and M', and M, w~
Ocp. We need to prove that M', w' ~j Ocp.
Let v' be a world in M' such that R'(w',v'). This means B o R'(w,v'), because
B(w, w'). Since B E Bi6M,M~, we also have R o B(w, v'), or there exists v E M
such that R(w, v) and B(v,v'). The latter conclusion yields v~,y,,y~ v'. Evidently,
M, v ~~p, which establishes M', v' ~~p by the induction hypothesis.
In other words, R'(w', v') ~ M', v' ~ cp. This means M', w' ~ O~p.
13By contra-position and the symmetry of the relation ~M M~ we also have w NM,M'
w' 8t M, w~ cp ~ M', w' ~ cp. In fact, this is an equivalent reformulation.
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Again, the converse of this theorem does not hold in general, but succeeds for
finitely branching models.
2.49. TxEORENt. Let M, M' E fit both finitely branching and w and w' two
worlds in M and M', respectively. If M, w~ cp ~ M', w' ,-e~ cp for all cp E Go,
then w ~,~,M~~ w'.
Proof. Let M, w~~p ~ M', w' g~ cp for all cp E Go and let
B-{(v,v') EW xW' ~ M,v~cp~M',v'~j~p}.
Clearly B(w,w') and B(x,x') ~ V(x) ~ V'(x') (by theorem 2.6) for all x in M and
~ E M'. What we need to show is that this B is a bisimulation between M and M'.
This ensures w ti1y,,y~ w'.
Suppose that B ~ 93i.s,y,,u~: B o R' ~L R o B (1) or B-1 o R g R' o B-I (2).
If (1) were the case, then there exist u', v' in M' and u E M such that B(u, u'),
Rw, (u', v') and for all v E W with R(u, v) it does not hold that B(v, v'). By
definition of B, this means that there eacists a formula cp„ E Go for all v E W with
R(w, v) such that M, v~ ~p„ and M', v' ~ cp„ for all such v. We define
~P - v cp„.
R(u,v)
This formula is well-defined, because M is finitely branching. Clearly, M, u ~ Ocp
and M', v' ~ cp, and therefore also M', u' ~ Ocp. This contradicts B(u, u'). In
other words, (1) cannot be the case.
In order to prove that (2) also leads to a contradiction, we can use a similar argument.
We leave this to the reader (see theorem 2.32 for analogy: use the finite branching of
M', a big conjunction n and a O). ~
In the same way as for the extension order, we could also use a recursive defi-
nition of coherence as in definition 2.29. We only need to replace all occurrences
of C and CM M,, and we will end up with a suitable definition of NM,,N,. In
an identical way we can prove that this definition strengthens the bisimulation
definition.
2.50. OBSERVATION. Let M, M' E 91T, fit' and w and w' two worlds in M and
M' respectively. If w~M,M~ w' then w~~y,~y, w' for all n, E IN.
Again, the converse of this result does not hold in general. It holds for the
class of finitely branching Kripke models. This means that the two theorems 2.48
and 2.49 can be repeated for this recursive definition of the coherence relation.
It is also the case that if Go only contains a finite set of propositional atoms,
the recursive definition of the coherence relation precisely matches the infor-
mational compatibility of worlds. This rephrases lemma 2.34 for the coherence
relation. We will not give technical details, as they can easily be collected from
the analogous results for the extension order of the previous section.
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The size of possible worlds
The situation for the transferred domain-inclusion relation, CM M,, is more trou-
blesome. For the relation Cd over ~3 we have found that verification of a formula
by a partial valuation guarantees verification or falsification of that formula by
all larger partial valuations. This does certainly not hold for the bisimulation
version over worlds in ~1t. The following picture presents a very simple counter-
example.
2.51. FIGURE.






I M M ~1~ 3 ~
The relation B- {(1, 3), ( 2, 4)} is a bisimulation. Furthermore, B(x, x') ~
V(x) CM M, V'(x'). Altogether, this means 1 CM M, 3. Nevertheless, M,1 ~
Op while M', 3 ~ Op and M', 3~ Op. -
An interesting question which remains to be answered, is whether an appro-
priate transfer definition of Cd, which preserves the above-mentioned property,
can be given. This is an issue which we leave for future research.
A result which still holds for the relation CM M, is preservation of tautological
information. -
2.52. OBSERVATION. For all .~-tautological cp E Go, i.e. .~ C Qcp~~, and for all
M, M' E fit -
w CM M, w' 8e M, w~ cp ~ M', w' ~ cp.
Joining possible worlds
Another structural loss when going from partial valuations, ~3, to partial Kripke
models, fit, is a proper definition of the join of possible worlds. In fact, a good
technical definition cannot be given. It is not the case that pairs of coherent
partial possible worlds always have a smallest common extension. A good illus-
tration can be given by the following simple models.
2.53. FIGURE.
Suppose IP - {p, q, r}.




The worlds 1 in M and 4 in M' do not have a common smallest extension. This








Both 7 in Ml and 8 in M2 are common extensions of the worlds 1 and 4 in the
models in the first picture. Because all these models are finitely branching, this
also means that the information of 1 and 4 is contained in 7 and 8. Furthermore,
it can be seen immediately that 7~,~,,ly, 8 and 8~M2iM1 7. Furthermore, it
can be shown that every common extension of the worlds 1 and 4 is an extension
of at least one of 7 and 8. In this sense, 7 and 8 are minimal common extensions
of 1 and 4. In other words, there exists no unique minimal common extension
of 1 and 4.
Technically speaking, the problem of joining possible worlds boils down to
the plurality of accessibilities 14. The accessibility relations in Kripke models
cause two worlds to be possibly structurally coherent in different ways, that
is there might be different coherent bisimulations between two worlds. For
example, in figure 2.53 we have two coherent bisimulations between 1 and 4:
Bl -{(1, 4), ( 2, 5), (3, 6)} and B2 - Bl U{(3, 5)}. This leads to different ways
of joining coherent pairs. Of course, we could fix such a coherent bisimulation
B, and then speak of a B-join15. In figure 2.53, this leads to 7 as a B2-join of 1
and 4, while 8 is the Bl-join of this pair.
2.54. DEFINITION. Let M, M' E~Jt and let w and w' be two worlds in M and
M' respectively, such that w NM ,,y~ w' by means of a bisimulation B. The
B-join is a world w UB w' in a model M -(W uB W', R UB R', V u8 V'} E~JJT
such that
W-{v UB v' ~ B(v,v')},
R uB R'(v uB v', u UB u') t~ R(v, u) or R'(v', u'), and
140f course, the problem disappears if accessibilities were taken to be partial functione:
b'x, y, z: R(x, y) 8c R(x, z) ~ y- z.
lsOr B-product, which is closer to the terminology of standard predicate logic.
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V uB V'(v UB v') - V(v) U V'(v').
2.55. PxoPOSiTiotv. For every pair of worlds, which is coherent by means of a
bisimulation B, its B-join is an extension.
Proof. Let M, M' E 9~i and let w in M and w' in M' such that w~,~,,y~ w' and
let B E Bi.6nT,n.r~. Define:
Bl (x, x UB y) and B2 ( y, x UB y) for all x in M and y in M'.
The two relations are bisimulation, because B is a bisimulation. Furthermore V(x) C
V UB V'(x UB y) and V'(y) C V UB V'(x UB y) for all x in M and y in M'. This entails
w C1y,,y~ w UB w' and w' C,y,~y~ w UB w'. 1
2.56. CottoLLwxY. For every coherent bisimulation between two possible worlds
winME~andw'inME~
M,w~cporM',w'~cp ~ MUBM',wUBw'~cp.
From a conceptual point of view, this B-join is still not completely satisfactory.
These B-joins do not have to be minimal extensions. In figure 2.53 we have shown
that the possible bisimulation joins were both minimal, in the sense that for both
these joins no smaller extension of 1 and 4 could be found. This minimality does
not always hold. For example, take the models M and M' of figure 2.53 again and
remove r from the world 6. We still have the same two coherent bisimulations,
and the two products are the same as in figure 2.53 with r removed from all
possible worlds. In this case, the three-world model is an extension of the four-
world model. In other words, the four-world model is not minimal.
The way to establish this technically is to define minimal coherence bisimu-
lations. Such bisimulations only link a world to a coherent partner if a smaller
coherent alternative cannot be found.
2.57. DEFttvtTtort. A minimal bisimulation B is a bisimulation for a pair of
models M, M' E~JJt such that
dv in M dv', u' in M' : B(v, v'),B(v, u') 8z u' CM~ v' ~ v' CM, u', and
dv, u in M`dv' in M' : B(v, v'),B(u, v) 8z u CM v ~ v CM u.
It can be proved that such a bisimulation can be found for all coherent pairs
of worlds. Furthermore, it can be shown that every coherence bisimulation B
for a pair of worlds can be reduced to a minimal coherence bisimulation for this
pair: B' C B, and w UB~ w' C~y,M~ w uB w'. This entails that every common
extension of a pair of worlds is an extension of some bisimulation join.
2.5 ~sed partial modal logic
In [Jaspars 1991c] a so-called fused modal logic is proposed for the representation
of inconsistent beliefs, based on an interpretation, which has been proposed by
Rescher and Brandom in [Rescher 8e Brandom 1980], of inconsistent information
by means of collections of `fused' sets of truth assignments. In this fused modal
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logic, accessibility is taken to be a relation between worlds and non-empty sets
of worlds. The underlying idea is that an agent confuses possible worlds.
The proposition ~cp is then said to be true if cp holds with respect to at least
one of the worlds in each accessible `confused' set. The effect of this modeling is a
weakening of the modal strength of the logic, which disconnects the propositions
~cp n ~z~ and ~(cp ~ ~y). The latter still implies the former, but not the other
way around.
A partial version of this fused modal semantics is given by the following defi-
nition.
2.58. DEF~N~T~orr. A fused partial Kripke model is a triple M-(W, R, V) such
that W~ 0, R C W x (~W `{0}) and V: W-~ ~3. The collection of fused
partial Kripke models is denoted by ~fiZ.
The truth-value assignment of the propositional connective is defined as in the
case of the partial modal logic in section 2.1. The modal operator is interpreted




The system FM consists of the system P with additional restricted versions
of the modal rules of M: R-TRUE 0 and L-FALSE ~. The sets r and 0, which
have been used as `surroundings' for these rules in table 2.15 and table 2.16, are
taken to be particularly small: one of them should be empty, while the other
contains maximally one element. Formally speaking, ~(r U 0) C 1. This yields




cp ~ ~t~i ~ Ocp ~ 07v
L-FALSE O
~p~~~ocp~~
cp ~- ~~ Ocp l- O~
~- ~v, ~~~ o~, o~G ~ sv, ~~ 0~ o~, ozV ~ 0
Intermediate systems between M and FM can be given by changing the truth
clause or the falsity clause for 0~ in table 2.59. If we take ocp to be true iff cp
holds in all worlds in all accessible sets, then the underlying calculus consists of
less restricted versions of R-TRUE ~ and L-FALSE ~. Only the ~ in these rules
in the tables 2.15 and 2.16 should be a singleton. This restriction to the modal
rules of M are then the following:
r,,~~~ r~~,~
or, ,o~ ~ o~ or ~ o~, o~
r,,~~0 r~-~
or, ~a~ ~- 0 or ~ o~
,2.5. Fused partial modal logic 77
If we change the falsification of ~cp into falsification of cp with respect to a world
in at least one of the accessible sets, we end up with a system where the set I' in
the original formulation of the introduction rules for o may only be a singleton.
~,~~G~~ ~~~P,~
o~,, ,o~ ~ 00 0~ ~ o~, o~
~~~~ 0~~,0
~o~ ~ o0 0 ~ o~, o0
Chapter 3
Constructive Modal Logic
In sections 2.1 and 2.3 we have demonstrated how partial worlds can be ordered
on a structural basis. In this chapter we will present and investigate logics which
use this type of information structures to reason explicitly about growth and loss
of extensional and intensional information. The general aim of this chapter is to
give a theoretical classification of the underlying formalisms which capture this
dynamic reasoning. Because constructivity is the most characteristic dimension
of the dynamics of these systems, we call them constructive modal logícs. Such
logics can be used, as we will see in chapter 4, for stipulating dynamic epistemic
interpretation of communicative actions.
We start with a presentation of Nelson's logic of constructible falsity as a
propositional basis of the constructive modal logics later on. This logic can be
seen as a straightforward constructive extension of partial propositionallogic. Its
informational infrastructure is the simple extension order over partial valuations
(see definition 2.2). Additional expressivity in the logic in order to capture this
dynamics is obtained by a supplementary constructive implication.
The dynamics of Nelson's logic is only progressive, that is once information
is obtained, it persists. This is not very surprising as Nelson's logic deals with
the rigorous dynamics of present mathematical information. Such information
persists. In the second section of this chapter we discuss simple extensions of
Nelson's logic which contain `non-persistent' pollution. The most obvious non-
persistent extension is a system with an additional weak negation. It accommo-
dates also reasoning about absent information. As a non-technical intermezzo,
we will briefly describe different applications of such non-persistent extensions.
In the third section we discuss a logic which extends the freedom of information
flow: it presents a Nelson-like system in which we also may move downwards.
This means that information may also be retracted. These logics are meant
to interpret the dynamics of information which is less rigorously anchored than
proofs and refutations. As we deal with belief rather than mathematical knowl-
edge, we will mainly focus on information which is only entaíled by means of
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evidence and counter-evidence.
The last section of this chapter presents modal extensions of Nelson's logic
which are based on the extension orders over partial possible worlds, which have
been introduced in section 2.3. The most elegant modal extension is the peaceful
confluence of the minimal partial modal logic M and Nelson's logic. Its semantics
imitates exactly the bisimulation implementation in definition 2.41 on page 68
in 9~t of the extension order C over ~3.
From the epistemic point of view, this logic is not very interesting, as we
have pointed out earlier in the first chapter, because all information is taken to
be persistent. This means that information flows only along the constructive
dimension. As propagated deliberately in chapter 1, we wish to add an elimina-
tive dimension as well. From the perspective of epistemic dynamics, we capture
deletion of epistemic alternatives as informational enrichment. Getting rid of
uncertainties is a way of gaining information, and we will demonstrate how to
combine this `destructive' progress with the constructive locomotion of dynamic
extensions of partial logic such as Nelson's logic. The proper way to capture this
two-dimensional dynamics is to mitigate the structural constraints of growth of
information. Technically, this wider interpretation of cognitive progress boils
down to a reduction of the bisimulation requirements which we have met in def-
inition 2.37 (page 67). We simply drop one of the two structural constraints in
this definition and retain the characterization of the dynamics of construction
and elimination as has been explained on page 34 in chapter 1. As we will see
in this chapter and in chapter 5 in part II, this characteristic constraint enforces
persistence preservation of the truth of the modal operator C and not its falsity.
In the epistemic terminology of chapter 1, belief about persistent information is
persistent itself, while active disbelief does not have this property.
In the technical survey of this last section we present a modal extension of
the `up-and-down' generalization of the constructive semantics of Nelson's logic.
This logic combines the above-mentioned non-persistent modal extension of Nel-
son's logic, with additional `downdate' operators. This logic presents the basic
modal logical equipment of the communication logics which are to be presented
in the next chapter.
The constructive modal logics which we will meet below are relatively un-
known. Modal extensions of Heyting's intuitionistic logic have been studied
elaborately. Much of the techniques which have been used in the development of
these latter logics, will be employed in this chapter for the presentation of modal
extensions of Nelson's logic below (especially [(Bozie 8z Do'sen 1984]). In the last
subsection of the last section we give a brief outline of these intuitionistic modal
logics.
3.1 Constructive logic
As may have become clear from the introductory chapter of this thesis, con-
structive logic is not a specific logic, but it rather refers to a class of logics. The
underlying idea of constructivity refers to an epistemological analysis of truth,
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which highly contrasts with the ontological notion of truth in classical logic.
A proposition, according to constructivists, is true whenever a construction is
present which demonstrates it. Constructive truth is therefore related to our
(human) capacities, which explains the underlying subjectivism of the construc-
tivistic position. In classical logic truth is not related to subjects, but to a total
reality, in which all propositions are either true or false. The crucial difference
is that truth of a proposition has to be demonstrated according to the construc-
tivists, while the standpoint of classical logic advocates that truth only needs to
be detected.
This essential difference on the understanding of truth explains the validity
of the principle of `reductio ad absurdum' in classical logic, and its invalidity in
constructive logic. According to the classical view, showing that the assumption
`not cp' leads to a contradiction, counts as a sound method to derive that cp must
hold. The difference of constructive formalisms with respect to classical logic
is the absence of this principle. Showing that every hypothetical construction
w~ïichdémons~ratesnot ip' leads ïo a contradiction~~s not entáiláu~mát-
ically a construction which demonstrates cp. In most axiomatic systems for
constructive logics, this absence is most clear from the omission of the `principle
of the excluded third' ( see [1~oelstra 8e van Dalen 1990J): cp v~cp.
The divergence of different constructivistic philosophies can be understood
as the dispute on the admissability of different constructions. The most well-
known constructive logic adopted in mathematics is Heyting's formalization of
Brouwer's intuitionism [Heyting 1956]. As a foundation of mathematics, the
only construction that is essential for determining truth is proof. A proposition
is true if and only if a proof is currently present.
Nelson's logic of constructible falsity
Another constructive logic, is Nel,son's logic of constrzictible falsity [Nelson 1949]
which should not be seen as a rival of Heyting's intuitionistic logic, but rather as
an extension. Apart from the concept of proof, there exists a second construction
in this formalism: refutation, which is introduced to account for extensional
negative information. In other words, refutation is an independent mathematical
construction to demonstrate the falsity of a proposition. This is an idea which
can be traced back to [Kleene 1945].
In intuitionistic logic falsity does not have a semantic status. The truth of the
negation of a proposition is explained as the presence of a method which shows
that any proof of this proposition leads to a contradiction. This intensional ex-
planation of negative information seems to be too limited to account for the only
possible constructive denial of a proposition in mathematics. Many constructive
falsifications in mathematical practice seem to be stronger than such intensional
argumentation, since they have a much more direct extensional capacity. Many
illustrations of such extensionally falsifying arguments in everyday mathematics
can be found in the proof-refutation dialogues on geometry of [Lakatos 1976].
In Nelson's formulation of constructible falsity, refutation is indeed taken to be
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stronger than proving the absurdity of a proposition. For this reason, Nelson's
logic has also been called intuitionistic logic with strong negation [Gurevich 1977].
It will be shown that this dominance of Nelson's negation over the intuitionistic
negation is a simple side effect of excluding falsity and truth of one propositionl.
Of course, we are not concerned with the foundations of mathematical rea-
soning, but we merely propagate Nelson's logic for technical reasons, as it is
a natural simple constructive extension of partial logic. Much of the seman-
tic techniques of Nelson's logic (e.g. [Thomason 1968] [Gurevich 1977] [Akama
1988] ) can be used to implement dynamic extensions of partial logic, and also
of partial modal logics in section 3.4.
The relatively easy model-theory of Nelson's logic incorporates truth, falsity
and undefinedness of propositions. F~om the perspective of Nelson's construc-
tivistic philosophy, a partial state represents a snap-shot of a mathematical rea-
soning agent on the way (see figure 1.4 on page 25). It registers an instantaneous
set of proofs and refutations of a certain agent. The propositions which are as-
signed true and false represent the personal mathematical knowledge, that is
his proofs and refutations, respectively. The undetermined part represents the
agent's current ignorance.
The propositional language of Nelson's logic is the language G~. By means of
the implication --~ the agent reasons about his future. As in intuitionistic logic,
a proof of a proposition of the form cp -~ z~ is considered to be a method to
transform any hypothetical proof of cp into a proof of ~i. Such method can be
thought of as a function which can be applied to every later hypothetical proof
of cp and which has as outcome a proof of the conclusion ~. In terms of possible
worlds, cp -~ ~i is known by the agent, if all extensions of the current information
state which contain cp, also contain ~. Refutation of an implication is interpreted
extensionally. It just means that the agent has a proof of the antecedent and a
refutation of the consequent.
Nelson models
The conceptual semantics of Nelson's logic which has been illustrated above can
be formalized by a certain class of partial Kripke models, which we will call
Nelson models2.
3.1. DEFINITION. A Nelson model is a triple M-(W, C, V), such that W is a
non-empty set of worlds, C is a pre-order over W, and V is a monotonic global
1 Some weaker variants of Nelson's logic omit thia dominance of the extensional strong
negation, e.g. [López-Escobar 1972] [Pearce 8c Wagner 1990] and [Wansing 1992a].
ZWe avoid the longer name Kripke models for Nelson's logic. The use of Kripke's possible
world semantics for Nelson's logic was introduced in [Thomason 1969], after Kripke's posaible
worlds analysis of intuitionistic logic ( see [Fitting 1969]). Thomasson gave a completeness
proof of a slightly different version of Nelson's predicate logical formulation of the logic of
constructible falsity (the system S in [Nelson 1959]). In [Akama 1988] the reader finds a
completeness proof of S. Akama used a monotonic differentiation of local domains of worlds,
which means that if x C y then the domain of x is contained in the domain of y. Thomasson
chose a fixed domain of individuals for the total universe of worlds.
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valuation function, i.e. V: W ---~ ~3 such that for all w, v E W if w G v then
also V(w) C V(v). The class of a11 Nelson models is denoted by ~7t. -
It is immediately clear that ~t is a proper subclass of ~JJ2. From the point of
view of this thesis, the relational pattern C should nevertheless be separated
sharply from the accessibility structure in ordinary partial Kripke models. The
information structure C is meant to describe the way information grows, and
it is used to model the dynamic aspect of reasoning. The accessibility pattern
in partial Kripke models defined in the previous chapter captures the set of
uncertainties of an agent. It represents a static description of the belief of an
agent. The combination of these two informational patterns has led to the
constructive modal logics of section 3.4.
The syntactic means of Nelson's logic consist of the language G~. The static
connectives 1, ~ and ~ are interpreted in the same way as they have been inter-
preted in the previous chapter ( see table 2.10 on page 51). Following Nelson's
concép~uál an~a. ysis~;bov~the correspoading~orma~interpretation of the im~i-




Note that only verification of the implication has a dynamic intensional reading.
Persistence of information
An important property of this interpretation of G~ is the persistence of the full
language with respect to the structural extension relation in Nelson models. This
corresponds to the underlying philosophy of the structure of Nelson models. The
persistence of information over G should be seen as a technical guarantee of the
infallibility of proofs and refutations. For model-theory of constructive math-
ematical reasoning this persistence is of course satisfactory, as the underlying
constructions entail only hard information.
Technically speaking, the persistence result is a simple consequence of the
persistence of G with respect to the extension relation over ~3 (theorem 2.6,
page 46) and the monotonicity of global valuation functions in Nelson models.
The preservation of persistence of the additional connective -. is obvious as
well. Falsity of cp -. ~ is a simple extensional proposition, while truth of such an
implication is a universal statement over the extensions of the current state. It is
therefore preserved by these extensions, due to the transitivity of the information
structure of extensions.
3.3. LEMMA. Let M-(W, G, V) be a Nelson model. For all ~p E G~ and for
allw,w'EW:
M,w~cpBewCw' ~ M,w'~cp.
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A very important corollary of the persistence property in the observation above
is the so-called deduction property.
3.4. LEtvttvlA. For all I' C G~ and cp, ~ E G~:
r,~v~~~ ~ r~~~--~~3.
Proof. The right-to-left direction of the equivalence is simply a consequence of the
reflexivity of the information order in Nelson models. Let w in M E 9i be some I', ~p-
world. If also I' ~~ cp ~~i, we obtain M, w~ ~p -~ ~i. Because w G w and M, w~ ~p,
we also have M, w~~i. In short, I', cp ~~ zG. -
The converse direction depends on the persistence of the full language G~ over the
information order in Nelson models. If I', cp ~~ ~, and w is an arbitrary world which
supports all I'-formulae in some Nelson model M, and v is some extension of w in
M which supports cp, then lemma 3.3 entails that v is also a I'-world and therefore
M, v~ zG. Because v has been chosen as an arbitrary extension of w in M, we conclude
M, w ~ cp --~ z~, and so I' ~ryt cp -~ ~i. ~
Yet another consequence of the persistence lemma is the so-called disjunction
property, a well known phenomenon in constructive logic. It says that if a
disjunction is tautological, then at least one of the disjuncts is tautological.
This peculiarity contrasts sharply with classical logic. It can be proved easily
by the following model-theoretic construction.
3.5. DEFINITION. Let ~I -{(Wi, G;)}tEl be a collection of Nelson frames
(I is some index-set). The amalgamation frame of ~I is the Nelson frame
F' -(W`, c') which consists of disjoint copies of the frames (W;, Ci) and one
additional world which is extended by every world in the family ~r. Technically,
W'-{wi ~wEWÉ}U{w`},
w; G` v~ q i- j and w Gi v, and
w`C'vforallvEW`.
The new world w' is called the root of the amalgamation frame.
The amalgamation of a collection of Nelson models ~J1t~ -{(W;,ci,Vi)}iEI is
a Nelson model M" -(W", C', V') such that (W', C") is the amalgamation
frame of {(Wt, Gt)};EI and for all i E I and w E Wi the valuation function V'
is identical to V2 and V' assigns an empty valuation to the root. Formally,
V'(wi)(p) - V;(w)(p) for all p E IP, and
~om(V'(w`) - 0.
3.6. OBSERVATION. Note that M' is a Nelson model. The new information
structure C' is a pre-order and V' is clearly monotonic. The definition above has
been taken from [Hughes 8c Cresswell 1984], which originates from well known
techniques in the theory of classical Krípke models and can be traced back to
[Lemmon 8e Scott 1977]. There's only a slight difference with our definition
3A definition of ~,n has been given implicitly in definition 2.12 on page 52
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above. We have chosen a fixed `empty' valuation in the root, which is of course
not possible in classical modal logic. In this case the definition of amalgamation
allows every total valuation in the root. The clear relation with lemma 3.3 is
that all information which is contained in the root persists in all models in the
amalgamation:
M',w' ~cp~Mi,w ~cpforalliEl,wE Wf and~pEG~.
This simple observation on amalgamations settles the disjunction property of
Nelson's logic. The following lemma presents a general formulation.
3.Í. I.EMMA. DISJUNCTION PROPERTY
Forall~CG~: 0~~0 t~ ~áE0:0~~tS4.
Proof. The ~-direction of the proof is trivial. The ~-direction can be demonstrated
by observation 3.8-on-amalgamations. Suppose~hat 0{~~-b for a1Ld E. -0.. This means
that for all these á E ~ there exists M6 E~i and w6 in M6 such that Má, w6 ~ b.
Let M' be the amalgamation of these counter-models {M6 ~ b E ~} with root w'.
Observation 3.6 shows that M", w" ~ b for all b E 0, and so w" is a non-~-world:
0~~0. ~
3.8. OBSERVATION. The result in lemma 3.7 only applies to tautological dis-
junctive information. This lemma does certainly not hold for non-empty as-
sumption sets. Nevertheless, replacement of 0 in lemma 3.7 is legitimate for
certain I' C G~. For example, if I' consists only of formulae of the form cp --~ ~,
then also -
P~~ 0~ I' ~~ b for certain b E 0.
In fact, this property holds for all I' which consists of formulae in G~ where
negations only appear immediately infront of atoms.
Proof. Let us give a sketch of the proof. It can be obtained by the amalgamation
technique of defintion 3.55. Suppose that P consists only of the above-mentioned set
of formulae, and let I' ~ryt b for all 6 E ~, and consider the counter-worlds of these
non-~-validities Mó,wói i.e. (M6,w6) E nyErQry~ry~ and Mó,w6 ~ 6. Without loss of
generality, we may assume that the worlds b E 0 are strong generators of the models
M6: w6 G6 w for all w in Mó. Let M-(W", C",V) be the model such that
(W', G") is the amalgamation frame of the frames of the models M6i
V coincides with V" with respect to the M6-worlds, and
1 ifV(w6)-lforallbE~,
V(w")(p) - 0 if V(w6) - 0 for all b E 0, and
undefined otherwise.
4In terms of disjunction, for all cp, ~i E G~: 0~~ ~p V~(i q(0 ~,n ~p or 0 ~sn ~i).
SIn [Jaspars 1991b] this amalgamation technique has been used for proving this stronger
formulation of the disjunction property for fragments of the classical modal logic S4. In
epistemic logic such disjunction properties are important in order to judge the so-called honesty
of formulae [Halpern 8t Moses 1984] [van der Hoek, Jaspars 8t Thijsse 1993].
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By, a simple induction on the construction of the restricted sublanguage, in which I' is
included, we can prove that M, w" ~ ry for all 7 E I'. Flirthermore, by the persistence
of all b, we have M, w" ~ b for all b E 0. 1
Axioms for Nelson's logic
Axiomatization of ~~ can be established by the addition of four rules for






r, ~v, ,~ ~ oI,' ~(~ ~ ~) ~ Q L-FALSE ~
I,~~~~ R-TRUE--~
r ~ ~, o r' ~- ,~, o,
r, r' ~ ,(~v -~ ~), o, o, R-FALSE -~
Intuitionistic logic can also be formalized easily in terms of the rules of P and
N. Its language is G~;v. Disappearance of the strong negation ~ prohibits the
use of FALSE rules for intuitionistic logic. On the other hand, it contains all the
TRUE rules, with the exception of L-TRUE ~, of course. Furthermore, it consists
of the TRUE rules for Ve and the TRUE rules for the constructive implication -~
above. In the sequel we will call this system H.
Note that for R-TRUE --~ we require that the conclusion set is a singleton.
The classically valid I', cp ~ z~, 0~ I' ~ cp --~ ~i, 0 is unsound with respect to
~T-validity. This can be demonstrated by the simple observation that p~~ q, p
but ~~ p-~ q, p. As a simple counter-model, take the Nelson model M with two
worlds, w and v, such that w C v, and let ~om(V(w)) - 0 and ~om(V (v)) -{p}
with V(v)(p) - 1. C1early M E~J2, M, w~ p-~ q and M, w~ p.
3.10. THEOREM. SOUNDNESS N
ForallI' ,ocG~: r~No~r~,~o.
Proof. The soundness of the FALSE -~ rules is immediately obtained from the ex-
tensional falsity conditions of the implication. They coincide with the truth conditions
of cp n -~~.
Soundness of R-TRUE -~ has been demonstrated above as the left-to-right direction of
the deduction property ( lemma 3.4).
What is left to show is the soundness of L-TRUE -~. Suppose
r, ~~~t 0(1) and I'' ~ot ~G, ~~ (2),
and let w in M E s1~i be a I' U I''-world. Suppose furthermore that w is a non-0 U 0'-
world. Because of (2), we obtain M, w ~ cp while ( 1) gives us M, w~ z~i. This shows
M, w~ ~p -~ ~. In other words, every I' U I''-world which verifies cp -~ ~ must also
verify at least one of the members of 0 U 0'. In short,
eWe need to include it explicitly because the strong negation is no longer present, and so
disjunction can no longer be defined.
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rur'u{~-~~}~~ouo'.
3.11. OBSERVATION. To make the L-TRUE -~ a bit more transparent, note that
modus ponens is a simple consequence of this rule:
~P,~P~~~N~G.
Take I' - cp, ~' -~ and I" - 0- Q~ ln L-TRUE -~ in table 3.9.
A remarkable absence is contra-position for -~:
~P~~~N~~-a~cP and ~~P~~~~}N~-'cP.
This can be demonstrated quite easily by two counter-models and the soundness
result above.
Another remarkable weakness of N is
~cr~V ~cTl -~ L i~p,r L. --
This reveals a basic difference between Nelson's negation and intuitionistic nega-
tion, which coincides with cp -. 1. It can be derived easily that ((cpV(cp --~ 1)) --~
1 ~-N 1. This principle also holds in intuitionistic logic7.
The consistency of (cp V~cp) -~ 1 in Nelson's logic is justified technically by the
fact that informationally maximal elements of Nelson models do not have to be
total. This means that an agent might be in a certain information stage such
that a proof or refutation of cp is not even conceivable.
Nelson's explicit negation is stronger than this intuitionistic negation. This can
be demonstrated easily through the following simple derivation in N.
1. tP i-N cp START 3. ~, ~~ ~N 1 R-MON
2. cp, ~cp ~-N 0 L-TRUE ~ 4. ~~p ~N cp -s 1 R-TRUE -~
Typical principles which distinguish N from H are the de Morgan equivalences




The Nelson models which have been introduced in the previous section have
been used extensively to represent the semantics of information based logical
formalisms. One area of application which we would like to mention is logic pro-
gramming. Nelson semantics presents suitable interpretation of what is called the
explicit negation among logic programmers. Apart from the very weak negation-
as-failure, which refers to the non-derivability of a proposition, there is a natural
demand for a negation which expresses that a logical database infers that some-
thing is not the case. Under the assumption that inference is interpreted as
7In fact all N-sequents with no occurrences of ~ are derivable in intuitionistic logic.
88 Chapter .i. Constructive Modal Logic
provability, refutability offers a good symmetric concept for inference of nega-
tive facts. Therefore the strong negation ~ in Nelson's logic has been proposed
as a suitable candidate to capture this explicit use of negations ( e.g. [Pearce 8c
Wagner 1990]). The weak negation ~, denoting that its argument is not true or
proved, is then the natural candidate for the negation-as-failure [Wagner 1991].
Let us take a look at the weak negation once more. If M E OT and w is world in
M, then
M,w~~cpqM,w~cp M,w~~cpqM,w~cp
Just as in partial logic, persistence with respect to the growth of information
is lost once we introduce this weak negation. As we saw in the previous section,
this means in terms of derivation that we have to give up the deduction property.
In the sequential formulation which we presented above, this loss comes down
to the unsoundness of R-TRUE -~. A demonstration of this unsoundness is given
by the following simple example.
p V 4, ~ p~~t~ q but N p~~t~ (p V 4) ~ 4 s
A counter-model is given by the two world model M -( {v, w}, G, V) with v C w
and p ~~om(V(v)) and V(w)(p) - 1. Clearly M,v ~N p, but M,v ~(pV q) -~
q.
The deductive repair of the defeated right hand introduction of the construc-
tive implication, R-TRUE ~, can be established by the following four rules, which











In the last rule cp -~ r is used as an abbreviation of {cp -f ry ~ y E r}.
The system of all the N-rules, with R-TRUE -~ replaced by the four weak intro-
duction rules for the implication, is called N-.
The new connective, the weak negation N, deductively acts the same way as
the negation does in classical logic. The sequential rules are similar to the intro-
duction rules for N in the system P~ and M~. We list them once more below.
8~~ti is ~i-validity extended for subsets of G~~~.
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rr ~~Q L-TRUE N I, ~~ ~ Q R-TRUE N
N
I,'r' ~~ ~ Q L-FALSE N I, ~~~'~ Q R-FALSE N
This explains formally the parasitic role of weak negation in constructive sys-
tems. Its own rules are maintained, while the original logic N has been affected.
The system N- with the additional rules above for weak negation is called N~.
3.13. THEOREM. SOUNDNESS N~
For all r , o c c~~~: r~-Nti o~ r~~~ o.
Proof. We prove only the rule R-TRUE-WEAK ~. The other induction steps are left
to the reader.
Suppose I', ~p ~~~ z~i (4), and M, w ~ cp -r ry for all ry E I'. Let v 1 w in M, such
that M, v~ ~p. This also yields M, v~ y~or a~ry Ë~. Accordm`g tó-(4) we ináy
conclude M, v~ z~i. Because v has been chosen arbitrarily as an extension of w in M
which verifies ~p, we know that M, w~ cp ~~. This means cp -~ I' ~~ti cp --~ ~. ~
3.14. OBSERVATION. Note that R-TRUE-WEAK -~ coincide5 with R-TRUE -~ lf
the assumption set r is empty: cp ~N~ ~~~Nti cp -~ ~.
A proposition cp does not longer mean the same as T-~ cp. The latter expresses
that cp will always hold during the enrichment of information. Of course, these
propositions are still semantic equivalent if cp E G~.
In general, N cp has another meaning than T --~~ cp. The former proposition
says that a proof of cp is currently missing. The latter proposition expresses the
non-provability of cp, and therefore coincides with the intuitionistic negation of
cp: cp -~ l. This equivalence can be derived in N~ in a quite easy manner.
3.15. ExAMPLE. The following derivation illustrates one direction of the last
equivalence: cp -~ 1~N~ T-~N cp.
1. -L. ~N~ 0
2. ~p ~N~ ~p




(~P -. 1), T ~N~,., ~
6. T -. (cp -~ 1) ~Nti T -~~. ~
7.
8.
cp -~ l ~N~ T ~ (cp -~ 1)







START and PERS -~
CUT (5,6)
Non-monotonic logic
In the field of non-monotonic logic, Nelson models have been re-introduced by
Turner [T~rner 1984]. The information order c in the models, is presented as
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a plausibility relation, saying that a larger state models a plausible extension
of a current theory. The underlying idea is to present a logic with an explicit
consistency-operator M, such that default rules, such as in Reiter's original de-
fault logic [Reiter 1980J9, can be interpreted as normal inference rules. The orig-
inal idea to use constructive logic for such a uniform logical analysis originates
from Gabbay [Gabbay 1982J; in this article the same idea has been performed
in intuitionistic logiclo
The consistency operator M is added to the syntax of the logic, it refers to
a situation where its argument can be consistently added to the current infor-
mation. In terms of the plausibility relation it says that there exists a plausible
extension of the current state which contains the argument of M. Formally, this
looks as follows:
M,w~M~pq~vlw:M,v~cp M,w~Mcpqdv~w:M,v~cp.
Clearly, this M-operator can be interpreted straightforwardly in N~. The lan-
guage of Turner's logic has less expressive capacity than G~~~. Nevertheless, a
sequential system for this logic can easily be defined. We take the system P and
add two modal rules for the M-operator, two rules for the persistence of literals
and two rules for the persistence of propositions of the form ~M~p. The first
two modal rules are the introduction rules for O in M, with O replaced by M
and t] by ~M~. The persistence rules are the same PERS IP and PEIts ~IP of
table 3.12, with cp -~ replaced by ~M~. The other persistence rules are
I'~Mcp ~ 0 I' f- Mcp, 0
I'~MMcp ~ Q and I' F- MMcp,p .
Data semantics
Nelson models have also been employed for constructive analysis of natural lan-
guage conditionals in Veltman's so-called data-semantics [Veltman 1981]. The
implication has been given the same denotation as in Nelson's logic when it
comes to verification. Falsification however is given a weaker intensional mean-
ing, which is close to the verification clause of Turner's M-operator. In order to
distinguish Veltman's implication from Nelson's, we use the symbol M. Inter-
pretation of this implication comes down to
M,w~cp~~q`dv1w:(M,v~cp~M,v~~) and
M,w~cp~~q~v~w: (M,v~cpB~M,v~~i).
Apart from the typical conditional implication data semantics uses a semantic
constraint on the class of Nelson models. This requirement can be understood as
a refinability constraint. It says that for every proposition cp in GM and for every
9In default logic, default rules are taken to be applicable if it does not lead to an inconsis-
tency with a current belief state with respect to the logic itself.
l0~rner does not use the constructive implication, but the stronger Kleene implication:
~P--~~-~~pb~i.
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world there exists an extension which determines a truth-value for cp. Formally,
forallM-(W,C,V)
d~pEGM`dwEW ~vEW:wCvBe(M,v~cporM,v~cp)11
In section 5.4 we will give a complete axiomatization, called sequential data
logic, for data semantics. The characteristic axiomatic addition provided by
refinability is that (cp v~cp) ti. 1~ 1. In other words, a condition of the form
cp V~cp is always an empty assumption. As we have seen in observation 3.11,
this principle does not hold in Nelson's logic.
3.3 Up and down
When we wish to model epistemic attitudes weaker than mathematical knowl-
edge, the persistence of factual information is far too idealistic. As explained in
chapter 1, we take a world to be an information carrier of evidencé ancVcounter--
evidence, instead of proofs and refutations. This weaker interpretation of the
underlying sources of truth and falsity, are not guaranteed to preserve their
quality for life. Informally, this means that agents not only move upwards in
the constructive direction of the structural extension order, but also may lose
information and fall back.
This wider `up-and-down' dynamic perspective has been propagated in arti-
ficial intelligence, as in the theory of truth ~naintenance [Doyle 1979], and in
formal philosophy, as in the logic of theory change and belief contraction and
revision [Alchourrón, Gá.rdenfors 8e Mackinson 1985] [G~,rdenfors 1988].
Loss of information by an agent is not hard to model in terms of the con-
structive models of Nelson's logic ~7t. Retraction of a proposition cp is an action,
modeled as a relation in the opposite direction of the extension order, such that
its output argument is a state where ~p does not hold. This relation is denoted by
a specific modal operator [~pJd . The proposition [cp]d ~, which says that ~ always
occurs after withdrawing cp from an information state w in a model M E~7t, has
the following truth-condition:
M,w~[cp]d~bbvCw:M,v~cp~M,v~~.
It simply says: "retraction of cp means ~i". In [van Benthem 1991b] and [de Rijke
1992] such kind of `downdate-operators' have been defined in terms of a two-
directional version of the classical modal logic S4.
Falsity of this downward implication [cp]dz~ with respect to such a state w,
means that it is possible to withdraw cp in such a way that ~ is false with
respect to the new state:
M, w~[cp]d ~i ~f ~v G w: M, v~ cp 8e M, v~ z~.
11Veltman also stipulates another model-theoretic constraint which he calls closedness. This
means that every chain over G contains a maximal element. This atronger requirement is
equivalent to refinability from the perspective of the underlying logic, i.e. they are completely
axiomatized by the same system (data logic).
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In other words, falsification of the downdate operators is contingently inter-
preted over ~p-impoverishments of the actual state. The update-operators are
defined in terms of the converse direction, but in the same intensional format.
As said before, the constructive implication carries the status of this opera-
tor. Truth of a proposition cp --~ ~ with respect to a state s means that every
cp-update of s leads to a state where ~ holds. The falsification of cp -. ~i in
Nelson's interpretation means the same as truth of cp n~~. This interpretation
does not seem the right candidate for falsification whenever we take ~(cp --~ ~)
to be a proposition which tells us something about cp-updates. Just like the
downdate-proposition, the falsity of the proposition that cp-updating a state s
means z~ is the same as that there exists a cp-enrichment of s which falsifies ~.
This means that our update operators coincide with the conditional implication
of Veltman's data semantics [Veltman 1985]. In other words, for M E~T and w
in M:
M, w~[cp]u ~ji ~`dv ~ w: M, v~ cp ~ M, v ~~, and
M,w~ [cp]u~~3v~w:M,v~cpBcM,v~~.
We also use abbreviations for the `possibility'-like dualities of these dynamic
operators: (~p)ti - ~[cp]u ~ and (cp)d - ~[cp]d ~. Furthermore [T]u and (T)u
are written as []u and ()u . The meaning of these operators are `after every
update' and `after some update'. For [-L]d and (1)d we use []d and ()d. They
stand for `after every retraction' and `after some retraction'.
The language which we will use is abbreviated by GT~1. If we were more
consequent we should use here G~ ~u ~ ~ ~d . Semantic consequence for Gj~l over
the class of Nelson models'JT is written as ~~r,~.
Minimal updates
Our use of the word update may be a bit misleading. In many texts on dynamic
semantics an update is taken to be minimal, that is its changing effect should
be as small as possible. Let us write such minimal updates as [cp]u in ~. Truth
of such a proposition with respect to a world w means that all smallest ~p-
enrichments of w verify ~i. Let's say, that w C~ v means that v is such a
smallest cp-extension of w: -
wC,~vqwCvBcM,v~cpBeM,u~cpforallv,withwCuGv.
The proper verification and falsification clause for such a minimal update are
M, w~(cp]u :n,~ q M, v ~ z~ for all v such that w C~ v, and
M, w~[cp]u tn ~ a M, v~ ~ for certain v such that w C,~ v.
Conversely, we could define a relation 1~ for the converse of the informa-
tion structure, holding between worlds and their minimal ~p-impoverishments.
Minimal downdate-operators can then be interpreted in the same way.
The main reason for us to exclude these minimal variants of the dynamic
operatros is merely technical. From a logical and meta-theoretical perspective
these operators are far more complicated than our arbitrary up- and downdate
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operators. A hard question, which remains to be solved, is whether a complete
axiomatization can be given, if we only add these minimal dynamic operators to
the language Gr~l. Our chances, as we may learn from classical modal approaches
to minimal change, are probably much better if we would further extend the
language. One way of doing so, is by incorporating the binary modal operators
like Since and Until, which are used in temporal logic. Another opportunity lies
in extending the relational expressivity of our language.
We have chosen to ignore these challenges. We think that the relatively weak
evidence that updates, which arise from communicative actions, are indeed min-
imal, do not relate to the technical overload of abstract modal logic which would
emerge from such an enterprise.
Anti-persistence
A non-persistent connective as the plausibility operator M of 1lirner reappears
as ()u . The proposition (~ cp is semantica~Iy equiv~a éri~wit~i C~p~u r and
simply means that the current information can consistently be updated with cp.
This type of information has a converse persistence property, which we will
call anti-persistence. It means that it can never be lost when we switch to
a poorer state. This sounds contradictory, but `poorer' is a relative notion
here. As explaíned earlier, it only means that factual information, i.e. literals,
is retracted. Formally, anti-persistence of a formula cp means that for every
M-(W,C,V) E9Tandv,wE W:
if M, w ~ cp and v C w then M, v~ cp.
Obviously, all information of the form (cp)u~ is anti-persistent. The same holds
for universal statements over downdates, i.e. information of the form [cp]d ~.
Anti-persistence of a proposition cp can also be described as its equivalence with
f )d~.
Just like the disjunction property for persistent information, we can stipulate
a conjunction property for anti-persistent information. The conjunction property
says that i: a set of anti-persistent formulae has no model, then there exists at
least one member of this set which has no model.
3.16. LEMMA. CONJUNCTION PROPERTY
Let I' C Gr~l be a set of anti-persistent formulae. Then
r~~r.l ~ b ry~~T.i ~ for certain ry E I'.
Proof. The G-direction is immediate. The ~-direction can be obtained by the same
amalgamation construction as in the proof of the disjunction property for G~ over ~7i
(lemma 3.7). If all ry's have a model, then we can amalgamate these models into one
model which verifies all ry's in its root, because all these formulae are anti-persistent.
In other words, this root is a I'-world, and thus I' ~~t,l 0. ~
The relevance of anti-persistence will become clear in the following subsection,
where explicit axioms have to be given to fix this property for certain fragments
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of the language. Anti-persistence need to be administered in the same way as
we did for persistence in the logic N-.
The system ud
In this subsection we develop a sequential derivation system for up-and-down
reasoning over Nelson models by means of the language GT~i. This system is
called ud.
The first set of ud-rules which we will present is the above-mentioned book-




PERSIP r~,p,o pE1Pr~[~] u p, o r~ [so]u,p, o PERS ~IP
r~[~lu x, ~ PERS r~- (~)d x, o
r~[~P]u [~]u X, 0
[]u r f- [~P]u (~)d X, 0
PERS ()d
Besides these persistence rules we need their contra-positional formulation as
well. These rules are necessary because of our choice of falsity assignment for
the operators (cp]u and [cp]d .
r, (~)u x~ o r, [~ld x~- o
r, (~P)u (~)u X ~ 0
C-PERS [ ]u
r, (~P)u [~]d X ~ 0
C-PERS ( )d
The following rules formulate the anti-persistence of the operators (cp)u and
[cp]d, and their contra-positions.
r F- (~)u x, o A-PERS r~[~G]d x, 0
r ~ [~P]d(~)u X, 0
( )u r ~ [~P]d[~]d X, ~
A-PERS [ ]d
r, (~]u X~ 0 r(~)d X~ ~
r, (~P)d [~]u X ~ ~
C-A-PERS ( ) u
r, (~G)d (~)d X ~ 0
C-A-PERS [ ]d
The following set of rules uncover the part of the logic which is more inspiring.
They present the TRUE and FALSE rules for the operators [~p]u and [cp]d.
3.18. TABLE.
r~~a,o r',~~o' 1 r,~v~~,,o
r, r ,~~PJu ~G ~ 0, 0
L-TRUE [ Ju
~~Plu r~~~GJu zG, ~l~Plu 0
R-TRUE ~]u
r, ~v,,~ ~ ,o r ~ ~, o r, ~ ,,~ o,
~~PJu r, ~I~PJu ~~~L~PJu 0
L-FALSE []u
r, r i- ~[~PJu TG, 0, ~
R-FALSE ~~u
r, ~ ~- o r~, ~ ~ o~ t r ~ ~, ~, ,o
r, r, I~GJd ~~ ~, 0
L-TRUE ~ 1d
~~PJd r I- [cPJd ~, ~L~PIu ~
R-TRUE []d
r, ,~ ~ ~, ,o r, ~ ~ o r~ ~ ,~, o,
~~PJd r, ~I~PJd ~ ~ ~L~GJd ~
L-FALSE ~ ~d
r, r ~ ~~cPJd ~, ~, ~
R-FALSE [ ]d
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In the sequel of the text we will freely use Ou and O d-variants of these
introduction rules. For example, R-TRUE ()u refers to
r~~,o r~-~,o
r ~ (~P)u ~G, 0
.
Unraveling ud
The []u- and []d-introduction rules may look dazzling. However, after some
meditation the beauty appears. The rule R-TRUE []u connects the right-hand
introduction of the implication in N and the combinatorics of the right-hand
introduction of the necessity operator in the minimal partial modal logic M. A
somewhat weaker version of this rule, which will be called R-TRUE' []u , clarifies
this structural interpretation.
r,~~-~,o
f ~-f, ~~u „i,-~ -)u ~ R-TRUE' lu .
The lotJhue~r rules inw't ~able 3.18 with a single condition, l.e. L-FALSE []u , R-TRUE
[)d and L-FALSE []d, are in fact permutation variants of R-TRUE []u. In order
to see this permutation variation, we list weaker marked versions of these rules
as well.
r ,~~-o 1
~ Ju r, ~~PJu ~ ~ ~ ~u 0
L-FALSE' ~ lu
r ~ cP, ~, ~ ,
~ ~d r ~ [~P~d ~, ~ ~d 0
R-TRUE [ ~d
r, ,~ ~ ~, o 1
~ Jd r, ~~~PJd ~ F~~d ~
L-FALSE' ~ Jd
We will refer to these weaker version of the R-TRUE and L-FALSE introduction
of the up- and downdate operators when we will discuss the meta-theory of up-
and-down logics in chapter 5 and 6 in part II. These rules can be derived by
means of the following general principle.
3.19. PROPOSITION. Let a, ,Q, cP E Ct'l.
If a ~-ud ,(j then a1S0 ~ [~]u
~ ~ud [a]u ~, (a)u ~ ~ud (Q)u ~e
[a]d ~ ~ud [~]d ~, (Ij)d ~P ~ud (a)d ~P
Proof. By way of illustration we show the first conclusion. It can be obtained by
the following simple derivation.
I. a~udQ
2- ~ Fud ~P
3. a, [p]u ,P Fud 'P
4. [a]u [Q]u'P ~ud (a]u ~P
assumption
START
L-TRUE ( ]u (1,2)
R-TRUE [ ]u (3)
5. (Q]u ~P ~ud (Q]u ~P
6. [Qlu w ~-ud [alu [Qlu ~v
7. [Q]u ~P ~ud (a]u ~P
START
PER9 ( ]u (5)
CUT (6,4)
The other three conclusions can be obtained by substitution of the appropriate intro-
duction rules and persistence or anti-persistence rules in the derivation rules above.
For example, if L- and R-TRUE []u are replaced by L- and R-TRUE []d , respectively,
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and PERS is replaced by A-PERS []d in the derivation above, one finds the derivation
for the third conclusion in the proposition above. (The other two conclusions require
some additional `double negation' reasoning). ~
3.20. COROLLARY. Substitution of the trivial ud-sequents cp ~ud T and 1 F-ud
cp in proposition 3.19 yields the following sequents:
[ ]u~ ~ud [~]u~ [ ]d~ ~ud [~P]d~
(~P~u~ ~ud ( )u~ (~P~d~ ~ud ( )d~
Application of CUT, the finiteness property of the system ud and corollary 3.20
establish the weaker marked version of the R-TRUE and L-FALSE 1ntrOduCtlOn
rules for the up- and downdate operators.
The rule L-TRUE []u yields again a modus ponens like variant: [cp]u z~, cp ~ud zj~.
The rules R-FALSE []u, L-TRUE []d and R-FALSE []d produce permutation
variants of this modus ponens (modulo double negation).
3.21. TASLE.
L-TRUE [ ]d [~P]d~ ~ud ~P, ~ R-FALSE [ ]u ~P, ~ ~ud (~P~u ~
R-FALSE [ ]d ~ ~ud (~~d~,~P
Some other important sequents are presented in the following examples. Most
of them will reappear in the first two chapters of part II.
3.22. EXAMPLE.
SIMPLIFICATION OF ~ )u AND [ ]d
(~P)u ~ -ud (~)u ~P -ud ( )u (~P n ~)
[~P]d ~ -ud [~]d ~P -ud [ ]d (~P V ~)
DUALITY PRINCIPLES
~ ~u [ ]d~P ~ud ~ ~ ~ud [ ]u ( )d~P
~ )d [ ]u ~ ~ud ~ ~ ~ud [ ]d ( ~u ~
MODALITY REDUCTIONS
[ ]u [~]u ~ -ud ( )d [~P]u ~ -ud [~P]u ~
[ ]d (~)u ~ -ud ( )u (~P~u ~ -ud (~P~u ~
[ ]d [~]d ~ -ud ( ~u [~P]d ~ -ud [~]d ~
[ ]u(~~d~ -ud ( )d(~P~d~ -ud (~G~d~
These duality principles are typical of `back and forth'-modal systems. For
example, they are used in temporal logics with `past' and `future' operators (see
e.g. [van Benthem 1983]).
The equivalences and ud-sequents in the example 3.22 in 3.22 can be demon-
strated by combining the persistence and anti-persistence rules with the sim-
ple `modus ponens permutations' of table 3.21. An illustrative derivation of
~P ~ud [ ]d ( )u ~P is presented below.
1. i'ud T R-TRUE Í
2. T,~P ~-ud ()u~p R-FALSE []u in table 3.21
3. ~P ~ud ( )u ~p cuT (1,2)
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4. ( )u cP ~-ud ( )u cP
5. ( )u ~Q ~ud [ ]d ( )u ~




The first two equivalences in example 3.22 require application of the R-TRUE
and L-FALSE introductions as well. Below we demonstrate a derivation of
~~~u ~ ~ud ~~)u ~-
1. ~P, ~ ~ud (~)u ~p R-FALSE []u in table 3.21
2. (cP)u ~ ~ud (~G)u (~)u ~G L-TRUE ( )u
3. (~G)u ~p ~ud (~)u ~p START
4. (~)u (~1)u ~ ~ud (~)u ~Q C-PERS ( )u
5. (~P)u ~ ~ud (~)u ~P cuT (2,4)
Dutifully, we wind up with the soundness result for the system ud.
3.23 . THEOREM. SOUNDNESS tld
Forallr,Oc,[rÍ,l: rf-ud0~r~~nt.10.
Proof. Soundness of the persistence and anti-persistence rules is straightforward.
The L-TRUE []u rule is the same as L-TRUE -a in N. R-TRUE []u does not completely
coincíde with R-TRUE -~. The conclusion side of the conditional sequent does not have
to be a singleton. This additional facility is due to the way the update modality is
falsified.
Just like all the other soundness proofs before, our strategy is a simple induction on
the length of derivations. Below we present the result of the L-FALSE []d rule. The
other cases are left to the suspicious, but diligent reader12.
Suppose I', ~z~i ~,nT, j cp, ~0 (5) and let w in M E~7i be a[cp]d I'-world. If M, w~
[cp]d ~ then there exists a ~p-impoverishment of w in M, say v, such that M, v~~.
Because all cp-impoverishments of w are I'-worlds, we know by (5) that M, v ~ b for
certain b E 0, which means M, w~[cp]d b. Summarizing this argumentation, we find
[~P]dr, ~[~P]d~ ~~tr.~ ~[~P]d 0. ~
3.4 Constructive modal logics
The constructive logics of the preceding sections are simple constructive dynamic
extensions of the minimal partial logic P. Their static part consists of single par-
tial worlds, which are shortcoming for modeling the kind of epistemic dynamics
which we have in mind. Just like in many epistemic logics, we take multiple pos-
sible worlds models to represent an epistemic state. As explained in chapter 1,
such multiple worlds representation is meant to capture an instantaneous set of
uncertainties.
1ZSomewhat easier to check are the weaker marked versions of the single conditioned rulea,
i.e. the R-TRUE and L-FALSE introductions.
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Our choice in favor of partial instead of total two-valued possible worlds rep-
resentation provides a constructive component to epistemic dynamics. In this
section we introduce the most elementary constructive extension of the minimal
partial modal logic M of chapter 2.
In the first paragraph we define the pure constructive extension of M. The
second subsection discusses the weaker minimal dynamic extension of M on the
basis of construction and elimination. In the third subsection we will introduce
the system Mud; this is a combination of the up-and-down logic ud and M on
the basis of the same construction-elimination dynamics. In the next chapter
we will discuss a multiple agent epistemic logic which is built on this dynamic
partial modal logic.
The system NM
F~om the viewpoint of deduction the most simple constructive extension of par-
tial modal logic is the system NM. This system consists of both the rules of M
and the TRUE- and FAI.sE-rules for the constructive implication -~ for N. The
semantic part of this system is the class of 9~1i-models. In this class of models
there are two relations present; one takes care of the modal dimension, while the
other ranges over the possible constructive extensions. All information persists
on the basis of a pure constructive dynamics. The persistence is structurally en-
forced by an interrelation of the modal accessibility and the extension structure
in ~Ji-models. In such a model this latter relation is taken to be a bisimula-
tion over the former relation. The monotonicity of the valuation function and
corollary 2.46 guarantees persistence of the full language Go~~.
3.24. DEFINITION. An 9~Jt-model is a quadruple (W, R, G, V) such that W~ 0,
R C W x W, C is a pre-order over W and V: W -~ ~3 with
CoRCRoC and 1oRCRo1,
andwCv~V(w)CV(v) forallw,vEW.
Technically speaking, the relation C is a bisimulation over the partial Kripke
model (W, R, V). As we have seen in the previous chapter, this bisimulation
constraint is not a precise characterization of the inclusion order between in-
formation contents of worlds. In chapter 5 we will prove that the bisimulation
definition is yet satisfactory from the perspective of the canonical model. This
means that from the axiomatic viewpoint, the bisimulation requirement of the
~tfi~t-class is perfectly satisfactory.
3.25. OBSERVATION. For all cp E Go~~ and for all M-(W, R, c, V) E~
( M,w~cpBzwCv )~M,v~cpforall w,vEW.
The proof can be obtained immediately from corollary 2.46 on page 70. A
soundness check of NM is left to the reader.
3.4. Constructive modal logics 99
The disjunction property for constructive modal logics
A model-theoretic technical question which arises is whether the NM has the
disjunction property. Just like N it is completely persistent. Nevertheless, a
simple counterexample can be given.
3.26. EXAMPLE. Clearly ~~~ OT, t71, but ~~~ OT and ~~~ ol. The




Clearly M, w ~ OT and M', w' ~ 01, and M, M' E~7t97i.
Wha í~-'s the déeper reasó~ this ~ai~uré? ~~ can be~larified by a short
retrospection of the amalgamation technique in the proof of lemma 3.7. It turns
out that we cannot define a unique root for amalgamations of the richer ~T-
models, as can be seen from the picture above. We cannot define a world which
is smaller than the two worlds in this figure. If a world is smaller then the
leftmost world in the picture then it should be a dead-end as well. If a world is
smaller than the rightmost world, it should at least have an accessible world.
A small extension of NM which has the disjunction property, is the system
NM f D, with D- I' ~ ~ ~[]I' ~- O~. This additional rule enforces seri-
ality of the accessibility relation (see also chapter 4); in this case we can define
a unique root. We simply take a world sharing the structure of the right-hand
world in the picture above. Furthermore, just like for 'J't-amalgamations, we
take its local valuation to be empty. This world satisfies the bisimulation exten-
sion constraint for every world in an arbitrary serial ~-model. This means,
on the basis of the persistence of the full language and the uniqueness of the
amalgamation technique, that this system must have the disjunction property.
The system NMo
The system NMo results from dropping the persistence claim for O. The un-
derlying idea is that factual knowledge should behave in a conservative manner,
while uncertainty might be eliminated. This means that the second claim for
the ~J2fit-models is skipped: ~ oR C Ro 1. This wider class will be denoted by~o - -
3.27. DEFirrtTtotv. A~to-model is a quadruple (W, R, C, V) such that (W, R,
V)E~tand(W,c,V)EsJ2andcoRCRoc,
The interrelational constraint c oR C Ro c is the precise formal description
of the construction-elimination dynamics which we have presented in chapter 1
(see page 34).
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3.28. ExAMPLE. This example gives a simple illustration of the loss of persis-
tence of the modal operator O. Consider the simple three world model in the
following figure:
The arrow denotes the only accessibility in the model. The vertical line denotes
the extension relation in the same way as in figure 2.27. Let furthermore the
two leftmost worlds have an empty valuation, and let the right-hand world verify
only p. It is not hard to show that the interrelational constraint on O~o holds,
and furthermore the global valuation function is perfectly monotonic. Therefore,
this model is a member of the class ~o. The lower left world verifies Op, but
its upper left extension does not. This pictures the loss of persistence of the
proposition p by putting O in front.
Validity over O~Jto is defined in the ordinary way. The corresponding notion
of derivability is ~N1yo . Like in the system N~ we have to replace R-TRUE
by the weaker nOn-perSlStent R-TRUE-WEAK ~-rules. This makes the basic
propositional language G and the constructive implication behave persistently.
Syntactically, this means that all cp E G~ are NMo-equivalent to T~ cp. In
order to axiomatize also the persistence preservation of necessity 0, we have to
add one more rule. This can be formulated by a permission to distribute the
necessity operator 0 over the implication -~.
r~~~~,,o
or ~- o~ ~ o~,, ~o~ R-DIS o-,
3.29. OBSERVATION. The last rule R-DIS ~-~ entails persistence preservation
of ~ indeed:
1, OT ~ Ocp ~NMo OT -~ Ocp START
2. ~T -~ OcP i-~rMo T-~ (~T -. Ocp)
3. F-NMo T
Q, f-(~r1Ko ~T
5. ~cp ~Nryo D~p
6. oT -~ Ocp ~nrlyo ~~p
7. T, OT -. Ocp ~NMo Ocp
8. T-~ (OT -1 D~p) ~NMo T~ ~~G
9. ~T -~ OtP ~Nlyo T-~ ~~p
10. T-~~pt-NMoT-~~p










R-DIS O -~ (10)
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12. a(T ~ cp) F-NMo T-~ ocp cuT (9,11)
This last NMo-sequent shows that if the persistence of a proposition cp can be
derived, cp ~,~,,yo T-~ cp, then also Ocp ~N,ya t](T -~ cp) by R-TRUE ~, and
subsequently ~cp I-NMo T--~ ~cp through application of CuT on 12 above and
the latter NMo-sequent. This captures the persistence of ~cp. The persistence
preservation of V and n can be derived in a much shorter way. The reader is
invited to check the validity the following principle by himself.
~P FNMB T ~ ~P ~ ~G ~NMo T -~ ~ ~ ~P V ~ ~NMo T -~ (~G V ~G~
~P ~NMB T -' ~P ~ ~ ~NMa T -~ ~G ~ ~P n ~G ~NMo T -~ (~P ~ ~G~
What is left to be proved is the soundness of the logic NMo.
3.30. THEOREM. SOUNDNESS NMo
For all I', 0 C Go'~:
- ~ FNMo~ ~ F ~~nfino d.
Proof. The soundness of all the rules of N- and M follows immediately from earlier
soundness results. What is left to show is the soundness of R-DIS ~-~.
Suppose I' ~~~o cp -~ ~, ~0 (6), and let w in M- ( W, R, G, V) E~11io be a
OI'-world and a non-~OD-world. These two latter assumption means that all worlds
which are accessible from w in M are I'-worlds and non-~0-worlds. What is left to
prove is M, w ~ ~cp ~ ~~.
If M, w ~ Ocp -~ ~~ we know that there exists an extension v of w in M such
that M, v ~ D~p and M, v ~ t7~. This means that there exists at least one world
u in M such that R(v, u) and M, u ~ z~. Clearly, ( G oR)(w, u). The interrelational
constraint for ~i~1io-models shows us that there exists u' in M such that R(w, u') and
u' G u ((Ro G)(w, u) ). Because u is a cp-world (R(v, u) and M, v~ Ocp) and a
non-z~i-world, we conclude M, u' ~ cp -~ ~i. This contradicts (6) (u' is a I'-world and a
non-~0-world), and therefore it must be the case that M, w~ Ocp -. O~. ~
The disjunction property for NMo
With respect to the class ~fi2o there exists an ultimate smallest model. It is
the model as in the left-most figure in example 3.26. Notice that it is allowed
for every world to have dead-end extensions, because they alway fulfill the single
structural constraint: G oR C Ro c. This does not automatically mean that
NMo has the disjunction property, since it is not fully persistent. Nevertheless,
an amalgamation technique, on the basis of the minimal model given above, can
be used to demonstrate the disjunction property for the persistent part.
3.31. PROPOSITION. Let 0 C Go'~ be a set of 02~1io-persistent formulae. If
~~~0 0 then also ~~~o S for certain b E 0.
Up and down with uncertainties: Mud
The basic modal formalism which we employ for dynamic epistemic reasoning is
based on the model class ~fi2o. This system, which is called Mud, is the modal
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extension of the propositional up and down system ud, but then interpreted over
~J2fito. This facilitates the kind of dynamic reasoning which we have in mind.
Information grows through elimination of uncertainty, or possible worlds, and
by constructive enrichment of these possibilities.
The language of the system Mud is Go~r~l :- Go~~ ~u ~~ ~d . The ordinary or
static modal operator D is interpreted in the normal way over the accessibility
relation in the ~2fito-models. The dynamic up- and downdate operators are
interpreted over the structural extension order in this class of models, just like
they have been interpreted for ud with respect to the Nelson class ~i. The
corresponding notion of validity is written as ~~~a,?,1.
The system Mud consists of the M-rules, the ud-rules, an additional imita-
tion of the rule R-DIS D -~ of the system NMo to establish the persistence
preservation of D, and an extra rule to capture the anti-persistence preservation
of ~D. This last rule is in fact a contra-positional variant of distribution of D
over updates. The following table presents these two `new' Mud-rules.
3.32. TABLE.
DIS D , [~P]u ~
~ ~0 [ ]u
r~ ~ u~' ~~ r ~ C-DIS D
Dr i- [Dcp]u D~, ~D~ [ ]u Dr, -~[Dcp]u D~ ~ ~DD
3.33. THEOREM. SOUNDNESS Mud
For aIt r, o c co,r,~: r~Mua o~ r~~~o.r,l o.
Proof. The soundness of DIS D[]u can be proved by an imitation of R-DIS D~
in the system NMo in the previous subsection. The soundness of all the other rules
follows from earlier soundness results of M and ud. Here we illustrate the soundness
of c-DIS D [ ]u .
Suppose that I', ~[cp]u ~ ~,n~o,1,1 ~0 (8), and let w in M-(W, R, G, V) E~o
be a DI'-world and a non-~D~-world. We need to show that M, w~(Dcp]u D~.
Suppose that this is not the case. This implies the existence of a world v E W
such that M, v ~ D~p and M, v~ Dz(~. This shows that there exists u E W such that
(G oR)(w, u) (R(v, u)) with M, u ~ cp and M, u~~i. The interrelational constraint of
the class s7i9Jio ensures (Ro G)(w,u), and so there exists u' E W such that R(w,u')
and u' C u. Clearly, M, u' ~[cp]u z(~ (9). Because w is a DI'-world and a non-~DD-
world, we know that u' must be a I'-world and a non-~0-world, and so (8) contradicts
(9). This proves that M, w~ [Dcp]u D~i cannot be the case. ~
3.34. OBSERVATION. In order to make C-DIS D[]u somewhat more transparent
we present a`O-version' of this rule:
r, (~)u ~G ~ 0 DIS D ( ) u .Dr, (D~)u o~ ~ o0
The persistence preservation of the modal operator D can be shown by means
of an analogous derivation to the one made in observation 3.29.
~P ~M„a [ ]u ~P ~ D~P ~ltifua [ ]u D~P
By means of the rule c-DIS D[]u we have settled the anti-persistence preser-
vation of O. Anti-persistence of a proposition cp in syntactic terms means
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~P ~Mud []d ~P. What we need to show is that the anti-persistence of Ocp can be




~ ~Mud ~ ]d ~
~Q, T ~Mud ~ ~d ~
( )u ~Q ~Mud ( ) u [ ]d ~
assumption
L-MON (1)
L-TRUE ( )u (i)
CUT (DUALITY,3)





4. ( )u ~ ~Mud ~
5. (t7T)u O~P ~Mud O~p
6. ~Mud T
7. ~Mud ~T
8. T I-Mud ~T




( )u O~Q ~Mud 1, Ocp R-MON (9~ -
[ ]d ( )u O~Q ~Mud [ ~d O~ L-TRUE [ ]d
O~ ~Mud [ ]d O~G CUT (DUALITY,11)
Intuitionistic modal logics
The constructive modal logics which have been discussed in this chapter are
relatively unknown. As far as we know, only [Routley 1974] discusses an S4-like
extension of Nelson's logic.
Intuitionistic modal logic however, has a relatively rich history. In [Prior
1979] a kind of intuitionistic S5 has already been discussed axiomatically. In
[Bull 1965] one finds algebraic semantics for these kind of systems. In [Fis-
cher Servi 1981] these logics have been provided a clear Kripke semantics. A
general framework for intuitionistic modal logics in terms of possible world se-
mantics has been proposed by Boiic and Do'sen [Bozic 8z Dosen 1984] [Do~en
1985] . In these papers different modal extensions of Heyting's logic H have
been proposed for ~ and O separately. These are elegant extensions, just like
NM, by full persistence requirements. The logic Ho consists of the system H
with an additional restrictive use of the modal rule R-TRUE ~ 13:
r~~
or ~- o~ ~
Its models coincide with ~o. Only the falsity conditions are omitted, as
falsity is not an intuitionistic concept. The logic Ho is the logic which consists
of H with a restrictive use of the rule L-TxuE O:
cpf-0
O~p~O~ '
13The axiomatization of the intuitionistic modal logics in [Bozié 8c Do"sen 1984J are in Hilbert-
style.
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Its corresponding semantics consists of constructive possible worlds models
with the other bisimulation requirement as the additional structural constraint:
~oRCRo~.
The combinatíon of both systems, the logic Hoo, evolves from enforcing the
complete bisimulation constraint on its possible world models, just like for the
class ~7t9Jt-models above. A sequential derivation system can be obtained by
putting H and the two modal rules R-TRUE t] and L-TRUE O together. From
an intuitionistic point of view this logic is not satisfactory, because it lacks the
disjunction property.
In [Plotkin Se Stirling 1986] a somewhat different system has been proposed,
by interpreting the necessity operator like a constructive intensional universal
quantifier. In intuitionistic logic a universal quantified statement `dx cp(x) is
taken to be true if there exists a function, which can be applied to every in-
dividual and then yields a proof for this object to have the property cp. Such
an individual does not have to be constructed on the moment that the proof
of t1x cp(x) has been found. The intensional status of such a function relies on
possibly `hypothetical' individuals in its domain. An analogous definition of
truth of a proposition Ocp is then given by the truth of cp with respect to all
future accessibilities. In our formalism, such interpretation of the necessity of a
proposition cp coincides with T~ ~cp.
The models of this logic coincide with the models for Ho, which guarantees
O-persistence. This logic obeys the disjunction property.
The logic of Plotkin and Stirling has further been studied in Simpson's thesis
[Simpson 1993~14. On the basis of earlier combinations of intuitionistic logic and
temporal logic [Ewald 1978] [Ewald 1986], an additional semantic constraint has
been motivated there: Ro GCG oR. This is a pure ideological matter. For
a minimal intuitionistic modal logic this additional constraint does not lead to
additional logical structure, while in the combination with temporal logic, where
`past'-operators range over the converse of the accessibility R, this additional
constraint yields persistence for existential propositions about the past.
In [Wijesekera 1990] one finds an intuitionistic modal logic which does not use
any model-theoretic relational constraints. Only the monotonicity of global valu-
ations is maintained. Nevertheless, the full language is persistent by interpreting
~cp in the same way as the universal quantifier in intuitionistic predicate logic,
while a proposition Ocp is interpreted as `for ever possibly ~p', which coincides
with our T -i Ocp.
An interesting application of intuitionistic modal logics can be found in [Stir-
ling 1987]. In this paper these kind of logics have been used to give a modal
characterization of certain process algebras. Intuitionistic modal logics have also
been proposed by for epistemic uses. Recent examples are [Aiello, Amati 8e Pirri
1991] and [Williamson 1992].
l4This dissertation contains a detailed overview of intuitionistic modal logics.
Appendix
3.~r ~r~sl~ti~~s of cons~~~ti~e ~egic~
The issue which we want to discuss in this appendix section is how partial
intensional systems can be translated into classical modal formalisms. A very
well-known example of such a translation is Gódel's [G~del 1933] embedding of
intuitionistic logic into the classical modal logic 54. This system consists of
the minimal classical modal logic K and two additional axioms: t]cp ~ cp and
o~ ~- oa~.
The first question which arises immediately, is whether such an embedding
is also possible for Nelson's system N. We will show that G~del's translation
function can be straightforwardly extended for this purpose. In fact, we will
define two translation functions, one for truth and one for falsity15. This section
gives an elaborate presentation of the embedding result.
What about the other logics which have been dealt with in the previous sec-
tions of this chapter? After the N-S4 result, we will shortly show that a very
straightforward extension of the translation procedure encodes N~ satisfacto-
rily into S4. Furthermore, we show a similar dichotomous translation for the
up-and-down system of ud into the `temporal' or `back-and-forth' version of S4
of [van Benthem 1991b]. Furthermore, we present how the constructive modal
logics NM and NMo can be interpreted into classical bi-modal logics of which
one of the modalities is an 54-operator. Finally, we will show a similar result
for Mud into a classical bi-modal logic with two `temporal' S4-operators.
The proofs of the translation procedures are fully model-theoretic. We trans-
form the models of the original logic into models of the embedding logic, and
show that this transformation preserves counter-models, which means that if a
counter-model can be given for a proposition ~p in the original class, then the
transformation of the counter-model is also counter-model of the translation of
cp. This procedure is then completed by a converse transformation which also
preserves counter-models with respect to the inverse translation.
15The same kind of dichotomous translation function has been given in [van Benthem 1986]
for embedding Veltman's data logic into the modal system S4.1, i.e. S4 ~- OO~p F O[J~p.
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A very simple model transformation for going from partial to total modal
logics, is the following notion of model completion.
3.35. DEFINITION. A co~npletion of a partial Kripke model M-(W, R, V) is a
total Kripke model Mt -(W, R, Vt) such that
V(w) C Vt(w) and Vt(w) E~ for all w E W.
3.36. OBSERVATION. Let M-(W, R, V) E fit and let Mt E .t; be a completion
ofM. ForallcpEGo:
M,w~cp~Mt,w~cp.
Proof. The identity relation Iw on W is a bisimulation between M and M`, and
for all w E W we have V(w) C VL(w). According corollary 2.46 this means that
M,w~cp~Mt,w~cpforall wEW. 1
Embedding N into S4
S4 embraces N in a natural way. The class of corresponding total Kripke models
have the same frame-structure as N: pre-orders.
3.37. DEFINITION. An C~4-model is a triple (W, R, V) E ft such that R is a
pre-order on W.
Note that C74 is not a subset of i7t. The monotonicity constraint is not required.
Apart from the frame structural similarity, there are also clear formal resem-
blances of the use of the two logics. Nelson's logic represents a logic of proofs
and refutations, while S4 has been used for classical epistemic logics [Hintikka
1962]. The Gddel-translation of intuitionistic logic relates the formulation of
proof in intuitionistic logic with the knowledge operator ~ in 54. The follow-
ing translation procedure extends this idea for Nelson's notion of refutation by
an additional `negative' translation function. The following table presents this
dichotomy as two functions t},t- : G~ -~ Go.
3.38. TABLE.
t}(p) - Op (p E~) t-(p) - C~p (p E~)
t}(1) - 1 t-(1) - T
t}(~~P) - t-(~G) t-(~~P) - t}(~P)
t}(~ n~) - t}(~) n t}(~) t-(~ n~) - t-(~) v t-(~)
t}(~ -~ ~G) - o(,t}(~) v t}(~)) t-(~v --~ ~G) - t~(~) ~ t-(~)
Completion of models preserves counter-models for the inverse of the translation
functions t} and t-.
3.39. LEMMA. Let M-(W, c, V) E 7t and let Mt be a completion of M. For
all cp E G~ :
M, w~ cp ~ Mt, w ~ tt(cp) and M, w~ cp ~ Mt, w~ t-(cp).
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Proof. By induction on the construction of Go-formulae. The basic step follows
immediately from the monotonicity of V.
Suppose M, w~ p. This means also V ( v) (p) - 1 for all v~ w. Therefore V~(p) - 1
for all v~ w. This implies Mt, w ~ Op - tt(p). The ~-case runs analogously.
The step 1 is immediate, and the cases ~ and n follow instantaneously from the
induction hypothesis. Also the ~-case for --~ is trivial. What is left to prove is the
~-case for -~.
Suppose M, w~ cp --. ~i. This means M, v~ ~p ~ M, v~~i for all v~ w. The
induction hypothesis establishes M`,v ~ tt(cp) ~ Mt,v ~ tt(cp) for all v~ w.
The totality of M~ guarantees Mt, v~~t}(~p) V tt(~i) for all v~ w, and therefore
M`,w ~ ~(~t}(~P) V t}(~G)) - t}(~P --~ ~).
-
~
For preserva,tion of counter-models in the other direction we use the following
model ~sansfoTmation..
3.40. DEFINITION. The constructification of an C74-model M-(W, G, V) is a
partial Kripke model M` -(W, C, V`) such that for all p E IP: -
1 M,w~[]p,
V`(w)(p) - 0 M, w~ o~p , and
undefined otherwise.
3.41. OBSERVATION. M E C̀~4 ~ M` E f7t for all Kripke models M. Fur-
thermore, an C74-model is always a totalization of its constructification.
Proof. Let M-(W, G, V) E C̀~4. In order to show the first claim, we only need
to ahow the monotonicity of V` over G. Suppose v G w, and let V`(v)(p) - 1.
According to the definition of V`, this means M, u~ p for all u~ v. If u' ~ w
then also M, u' ~ p, by the transitivity of G(u' ~ v). This entails M, w ~ Op and
V`(w)(p) - 1. V`(v)(p) - 0~ V`(w)(p) - 0 can be proved in the same way. In other
words, V`(v) C V`(w).
The second claim above can be proved by this monotonicity of V`. We leave it to the
reader. ~
3.42. LENINIA. Let M-(W,G,V) E C~4. For all cp E G~ and w E W
M, w ~ t} (cp) ~ M`, w~ cp and M, w~ t- (cp) ~ M`, w~ cp.
Proof. By induction again. We give only a short demonstration of ~-case in the
-.-step. All the other steps are straightforward.
Suppose M`, w~ cp -~ ~,. This means that there exists v ~ w such that M, v~~p
and M`, v~~i. The induction hypothesis tells us M, v ~ t} (-cji), while the previous
lemma shows M, v ~ tt(cp) ( M is a totalization of M`). The totality of M implies
M,v ~~t}(cp) V t}(~), and therefore M,w ~ ~(~t}(cp) V t}(~i)).
~
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Because M in lemma 3.42 above is also a totalization of M`, the converse
of this lemma also holds, due to lemma 3.39. The following definitions present
some simple transformations of models such that preservation of counter-models
from the class sJ't to the embedding class C~4 is guaranteed.
3.43. DEF~rrtT~otv. The doubling of a Nelson model M -(W, C, V) is the Nelson
model Mtt - (Wtt, ~rt Vtt) with
Wtt -{w} ~ wEW}U{w- ~ w EW},
Gtt- {(wx,v~) ~ w C v,x,y E{-}-,-}}
Vtt (,mx) - V(w) for all w E W and x E {~-, -}.
3.44. OssERVAT~o1v. This doubling of a Nelson model M is indeed a Nelson
model itself. The relation Ctt is a pre-order and Vtt is monotonic over Gtt.
Furthermore, all splitted worlds in the doubling have to contain the same infor-
mation as the original ones. Formally speaking, for all cp E G~:
M,w ~~P a Mtt,w} ~~P p Mtt,w- ~~P.
3.45. DEFirriTtorr. The doubling completion of a Nelson model M- (W, C, V)







if p E ~om(V(w))
otherwise.
if p E ~om(V(w))
otherwise.
3.46. OssERV.aTtoN. Doubling completion is a completion, and therefore, Md`E
C74. Moreover, (Md`)` - Mtt
The last equation in the observation above takes care of the above-mentioned
preservation of counter-models.
3.47. TxEOttENt. For all cp E G~ we obtain ~~ cp q~~a t}(cp).
Proof. Suppose ~~a t}(cp). This means that there exists a model M E C`~4 with
a non-t}(cp)-world w: M,w ~ tt(cp). Application of lemma 3.42 proves M`,w ~ cp,
and because M` E~i we obtain ~~ ~p.
Suppose ~~ cp. In other words M, w~ ~p for certain M E~i and w in M. Ac-
cording to observation 3.44 this implies MII , w} ~ cp. Observation 3.46 proves that
(Md`)`,w} ~ ~p. Lemma 3.42 completes the argument: Md`,w} ~ t}(~p), which
means ~-̀sa t}(cp) (Md` E C̀~4). ~
3.48. CoROLLARY. This conclusion can also be generalized to sets of formulae.
Let t}(I') :- {t}(7) ~ ry E I'} if I' C G~. This definition establishes for all
I', 0 C G~:
r~ry~ 0 4~ t~(r) ~C~a t}(0).
In chapter 5 we will prove the completeness of N with respect to ~t-validity.
From this forthcoming result, in combination with the translation result above,
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we conclude that the translation method also works for N-sequents:
I' ~-N ~~ t}(I') F-S 4t}(~).
1i~anslating N~ and ud
A straightforward continuation of the translation of N into S4 yields a similar
result for the system N~. The simple extension of the functions tt and t- with
two additional clauses: tt(~ cp) -~t}(cp) and t-(N cp) - t}(cp) is satisfactory.
It is not hard to verify that the constrv,ctification preserves N~-counter-models.
3.49. OBSER~ATiorr. For all M E C~4 and all cp E G~~~:
M,w~t}(cp) t~ M~,w ~cpforall w in M.
A translation by means of a similar extension of the translation function t}
and t- can be given for the system ud. The only difference is that we have to
ma.ke the-embedding-logic ~omewhat wider as well. For this pur~ose we use the
`temporal' bi-directional version of S4. This system is called 542, and has been
employed for up-and-down dynamic modal logics in [van Benthem 1991b] and
[de R.ijke 1992]. This system has two modal operators: []u~ and odown. The first
operator is interpreted the same way as [] over C~4. This is the universal `upward'
or `future' operator. The `downward' or `past' operator is interpreted in the same
way over the converse of the accessibility relation. In fact, it coincides with our
[]d-operator. The derivation systems consists of K for the two modal operators,
the two S4-axioms for []up and two temporal duality axioms: ~[],~P~(]down~P ~~P
and ~Odown~Dup~ ~ ~.
The translation function for embedding ud needs the following supplement.
3.50. TABLE.
t}([~v]u~G) - oup(,t}(~) ~ t}(~)) t-([~vlu~) -,aup(,t~(~) ~,t-(~))
t}([~]d Y~) - ~down(t}(~) V t}(W)) t-([~]d~) -~~down(t}(~) V~t-(~))
3.51. OBSERVAT~oN. For all M E C~4 and all ~p E GT~1:
M, w~ t} (cp) q M`, w ~ ~p for all w in M.
1~anslations of constructive modal logics
The constructive modal logics NM, NMo and Mud can be encoded in terms
of classical bi-modal logics, of which one modal operator is S4-like in order
to catch the constructive part of these systems. We write this latter operator
as ~uP and the other as O. The structural interplay between these operators
depends on the interrelation of accessibility and the information structure of the
models of the logic which we wish to translate. The translation functions are
straightforward extensions of the translations in the preceding subsections. The
additional clauses are t}(ocp) - ~tt(cp) and t-(ocp) - ~ot}(cp).
The embedding of the fully persistent system NM is a classical bi-modal logic
with two additional S4-axioms for ~up and two axioms for catching the bisimu-
lation restriction for the information structure of ~t-models: oDu~cp f- []„POcp
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and OupDcp ~ DO~PCp. NMo can be embedded into the system which drops the
last axiom, and finally, Mud can be translated into the same strengthening of
542. The following table pictures the precise embedding results.
3.52. TABLE.
NM K~ S4 ~- DDup ~ DupD } OupD ~ DOup
NMo K ~ S4 } DDup ~ aupa
Mud K ~ 542 -{- DDup ~ DuPD
These translation results can be established by the same model-theoretic con-
structions as in the previous subsections.
Chapter 4
Constructive Communication
In this final chapter of part I we will present epistemic dynamic systems on the
basis of the modal formalisms of the previous chapters. As argued in section 1.3,
these systems are meant as formal calculi for logics of ineasuring the epistemic
effects of communicative actions between agents. According to dynamic seman-
ticists, the meaning of an utterance is the same as such an effect.
Most dynamic semantic theories deal with only one interpreting agent, that
is they model the cognitive changes that an agent makes during the input of
a text or message. In this chapter we present dynamic logics in a communica-
tive setting. The basic dynamics of these logics is the elimination-construction
dynamics of the constructive modal systems NMo and Mud of the previous
chapter. The dynamic meaning of a message is then no longer restricted to the
cognitive effect on a single agent, but is captured as the full distributive effect on
the group of communicating partners. As we already explained in chapter 1, even
the interpretation of a simple assertion by an agent to another agent requires
administration of the epistemic effect on the receiver and the sender.
We will start with a simple static epistemic logic. This modal formalism is a
straightforward multiple agent, or poly-modal, extension of the elementary par-
tial modal logic M. It is a full introspective extension of M with individualized
modalities. This system is called EA, which is in fact a partial variant of the
poly-modal extension of standard modal logic KD45.
The basic dyna.mic or constructive epistemic system is an up-down extension
of this system EA. As a matter of fact it is a full introspective multiple agent
variation of the system Mud. This system is called CCC, or shorter C3, after
the title of this thesis. These systems E,y and C3 will be presented in section 4.1.
The other sections of this chapter present a family of C3-extensions. They
conta.in extra technical facilities which are specially meant for interpretation of
communicative actions. In section 4.2 we focus on the two essential additional
modalities which have been discussed earlier in section 1.4. First, we establish
an extension with additional mutual belief operators (C3'). These operators
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are meant to describe ideal transfer of information. The epistemic effect of an
assertion cp of a sender a to a receiver b is then identified as the new mutual
belief of the group {a, b} of the information cp.
The second modal extension, which we will meet in section 4.3, contains inten-
tional operators (C3). These modalities are essential for sensible comprehension
of questions and also for more skeptical interpretation of assertions. This addi-
tional modality is interpreted over individual preferential states of information.
Such preferential modalities are needed to give more plausible interpretations
of communicative actions. In the mutual belief interpretation of assertion given
above, we have maximized the epistemic effect but totally ignored the intentional
effect of the message. In real-life dialogues, transferred intentions are not less
important than the epistemic conveyance. Communicative actions like questions
illustrate this clearly. Even a pure formalistic approach as ours cannot ignore
the importance of intentions, if we wish to assign a sensible dynamic denotation
to actions which are in principle meant to convey the goals of the performer or
to fulfill the goals of the receiver.
In fact, all communicative actions should be interpreted in terms of the motives
of the dialogue partners. Even the simple assertion example above, could further
be constrained by the precondition that the sender also intended to bring the
message into the mutual belief of him and the receiver.
Of course, these kind of elaboration of the modal framework can become
very entangling. We will try to avoid such confusion here, and we will restrict
ourselves in pointing out how different dynamic denotations of communicative
actions can be stipulated in terms of our partial modal framework.
In the last section we will discuss such different axiomatic extensions of the ba-
sic C3-calculi. These axioms are meant to capture different pragmatic principles
of cooperative communicative behavior. They are postulates of the interrelation
of intentions and beliefs, and we will show how such axioms enforce semantic
constraints. They restrain the interplay of doxastic alternatives, the dynamic
information structure and preferential worlds.
We will illustrate that the use of partial worlds for encoding pragmatic prin-
ciples is an advantage. The structural flexibility of partial worlds makes it pos-
sible to formulate sensible weakenings of well-known postulates of cooperation
between dialogue partners.
The last item of this section is devoted to two other C3-extensions, C3R and
C~, where a non-empty set of total worlds is added to the partial possible world
models. In C3R these total worlds are meant to distinguish a real physical world
as well. The system C~ is meant to deal with one extraordinary agent St. This
agent knows everything which holds in the real world, that is, he is omniscient
with respect to ontological information. However, it may be ignorant with re-
spect to the epistemic information which belongs to other communicating agents.
This logic is meant as a contribution to the formalization of human-machine com-
munication, or data-base querying, where such ontological omniscient capacity
is often attributed to the machine. In such a case, the real world consists just
of some database, of which the machine has complete knowledge, and the user
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wants to retrieve some information from this database by communication with
the machine. Of course, this machine does not have complete knowledge of how
much information the user has.
This final chapter of part I will be wound up with some general remarks and
speculations about possible other directions for partial modal logics to achieve
more fine-grained interpretations of communication.
4.1 Partial and constructive epistemic logics
Multiple agent epistemic reasoning on the basis of modal logics is normally ac-
commodated through allowing several accessibility relations, one for each agent,
in the possible worlds models. The underlying logics are called poly-modal log-
ics, and contain multiple modal operators Da which are meant to keep track of
the beliefs of an agent a.
Partial poly-modal logic
Let us first briefly present the minimal partial poly-modal logic. The following
definition gives the formal picture of its semantics.
4.1. DEFIrrITlolv. A poly-modal partial Kripke model is a triple of the form M-
(W,{Ra}QEA, V) with A being a non-empty finite set and Ma :- (W, RQ, V) E~JI
for all a E A. The collection of poly-modal Kripke models is denoted by fiT~.
The set A should here be thought of as a set of agentsl. The language of partial
poly-modal logics is GA, which is an abbreviation of G{oa}aE". The proposition
Oacp denotes ~~a~cp. For all non-empty subsets X of A we use ~Xcp as an
abbreviation of ~QEX t]acp. OXcp abbreviates ~t]X~cp. t]Xcp means that all
agents of the group X believe cp, while ~t]XCp means that at least one of the
agents of this group has a counter-model of cp in mind (actively disbelieves y~).
4.2. TASLE. The modalities ~a are all interpreted in the same way as the
singular t]-operator in terms of the single accessibility in the models in fii:
M,w~~acpa`dvEW:Ra(w,v)~M,v~cp,and
M,w~~acpt~~vEW:Ra(w,v)BcM,v~cp.
The corresponding derivation system, the minimal partial poly-modal system, is
called MA.
4.3. TASLE. The minimal poly-modal system MA is the system consisting of
the rules for P and the individualized versions of the modal rules of the system
M:
I',~cp~-~0 aEA
t]ar~ ~l]a(P ~ ~l]a0
L-FALSE On Qar, ~'~ ~' a ~QQ R-TRUE t]a
lAnother application might be a partial variant of Pratt's propositional dynamic logic. In
such a case, the set A stands for a set of atomic programs. See also observation 4.25 later on.
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In the rules for the poly-modal formalisms in the sequel of this chapter, we will
no longer specify a E A in the conditional part of the rule. If a appears in a
rule, we take it to be an arbitrary member of A. For arbitrary non-empty sets
of agents (C A) we will use X. For such a group of agents we will also use the
following introduction rules of ~X. They are derivable in the system MA.
r, ,~ ~ ,o
oXr, ~oX~ ~ ~aXo L-FALSE OX ~XI, ~ ~X~P~ ~OX~
r~-~,,o
R-TRUE OX
We also make use of reformulations of these rules, where the ~~ occurrences are
replaced by O-operators. For example, r,cp ~ 0 ~ OXr,OXcp ~ OXO (L-
TRUE OX).
Static partial epistemic logic
The subclass of ~JR~ which is selected for static multiple agent epistemic repre-
sentation is described formally in the following definition.
4.4. DEFINITION. A partial epistemic model is a triple M-(W, {Ra}aEA, V)
such that M E~T~ and
b'x E W 3y E W: Ra(x, y), and
b'x, y, z E W: Rn(x, y) ~(Ra(x, z) q Ra(y, z)) for all a E A.
The first requirement is called seriality. The second constraint, which in fact
summarizes transitivity and Euclidicity of the relations Ra, will be called full
introspection. The class of partial epistemic models is denoted by é~. The
partial Kripke models with only a single accessibility relation, which satisfies
the two constraints above, is called é.
Seriality takes care of the consistency of beliefs of all the agents: oacp ~ Da~cp
can never be verified in a serial model.
4.5. OBSERVATION. [~a~ n oa~cp~éa - ~ and (]acp ~é~ Oacp.
Technically speaking, full introspection means that if y is accessible from x, then
the set of accessible worlds from y coincides with the set of worlds which are
accessible from x. As we will see, it settles the axiomatic principles of positive
introspection and negative introspection for the underlying derivational system
EA.
4.6. ~BSERVATION. Oacp tié~ OQOacp ~éa Oa~acp and
~acp :..~a OaOacp ,:éa DaOacP.
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, full introspection is philosophically
tenable for partial modal logics. The proposition ~[]Qcp means that the agent a
has a counter-model of cp in mind, which dífFers from the classical interpretation
that the agent a has access to some model where the truth of cp is absent. This
stronger active disbelief interpretation in partial modal logic of ~OQcp, makes
the conclusion ~a~~acp acceptable, i.e. a believes that he has a counter-model
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in mind. The contra-position of this negative introspection, ~[]a~Dacp ~[]acp,
which is logically independent of the principle of negative introspection in partial
modal logic, is also accepted. It means that if a believes a proposition cp in one
of his possible interpretations of the real world, then he must believe ~p as well.
An agent a cannot be uncertain about his own beliefs. This explains the ~~-
equivalence of Oacp and ~a0acp in observation 4.6.
Rules for static partial epistemic logic
The system EA consists of MA together with the following set of rules.
4.Í. TABLE. r~-o D
Dar ~ Oa0
-r ~oQo. 4-0 oar ~ o




r~ ~a0a0 5-O OQOar ~ 0
5-O
The first rule encodes the consistency of beliefs. It has been called D because it
is an equivalent reformulation of the axiom D: oacp ~ Oacp, which is known from
classical modal logic [Chellas 1980] [Hughes óc Cresswell 1984]. Other equivalent
formulations of D are r F- 0~ ~r ~ 0 and 0~ ~~ 0 I- O0.
The classical modal system KD45 can be obtained from EA and the classical
rule R-TRUE ~. 50, EA can be seen as a partial poly-modal variant of KD45.
The full system EA is very strong. The 4- and 5-rules cause every iteration of
modal operators of the same type a to be reducible to a formula with only one
a-modal operator in front.
4.8. EXAMPLE.
~a~ -Ep ~a~a~ ~a~ -Ea Da~a~
~a~ -Ea ~aDa~ Da~ -Ep ~a~a~
We will use these equivalences far more often then the underlying sequential rules
in table 4.7. In the sequel of the text we use a systematic abbreviation for the
different directions of the equivalences above. If C1,a...C~,acp ~Ea D1,a...D.,,,,acp
for arbitrary cp E GA with C„Dl E{0, O, ~O}, then we use C1...C~ ~ D1...D,,,,
as a short reference. 50, [][] ~ o refers to []aoacp FEa oacp. By way of
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In the examples above the strength of EA has been shown in the way it
reduces stacks of modalities of the same type. In the following proposition we
show some important distributive effects of the strength of EA. These results
show that much of the deductive capacity of classical 45-logics are adopted by
this partial variant.
4.9. EXAMPLE. !]a(Oaa V Q) -EA ~aa V (]aa
Oa(Oaa n Q) -EA Oaa n OaQ
Proof. The derivation runs the same as for classical 45-logics. We present the
derivation of the first equivalence below.
1. Oaa ~EA Daa START
2. Q FgA Q START
3. Oaa V Q FEA ~aa,~3 L-TRUE V(1,2)
4. Oa(~aa V,Q) F-gA OaOaa, ~aQ R-TRUE Oa (3)
5. Oa~aa FEA Oaa OO ~ O
6. ~a(Oaa V Q) FEA Oaa, Oa(3 CUT (4,5)
7. ~a(Oaa V~i) ~EA Oaa V Oa~i R-TRUE V(6)
1. Q ~Ep ~aa,Q
2. Q F-E~ ~a a V Q
3. ~aQ ~EA Oa(~aa V Q)
4. Daa FEq ~aa,Q
5. Daa FEA Oaa V Q
6. OaDaa i-Eq ~a(~aa V Q)
7. Oaa FEA OaOaa
8. Oaa ~Eq ~a(DaCY V Q)










The other equivalence is left to the reader. They require the use of 00 ~ O and
O ~ 00. 1
4.10. CoROLLARY. Example 4.8 shows that iterations of the same type of
modal operators can be reduced to single occurrences of such a modal oper-
ator. On the basis of example 4.9 we can even reduce every formula to an
EA-equivalent formula having a so-called A-modal depth which is not larger
than 1.
4.11. DEF~tviT~oN. The a-modal depth mda(cp) of a proposition cp E GA is de-
termined through the following induction.
mda(p) - 0(p E IP) mdQ(1) - 0
mda(~cp) - md(cp) mda(cp n z~) - max {mdacp, mda~}
mdQ(oacp) - rnda(~p) f 1 mda(ab~p) - 0(b ~ a)
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The A-modal depth mdA(cp) of a formula cp E GA is maxmdacp.
aEA
The formulae of A-modal depth 1 are formulae in which every modal operator
of type a has only scope over formulae which are propositionally connected atoms
and formulae of the form Dycp with b~ a. This derivational strength of EA is
analogous to the classical 45-logics.
Dynamic epistemic systems can be built from the basic constructive modal
logics of chapter 3 in the same way as the static partial epistemic logic EA has
been constructed from the minimal partial modal logic M of chapter 2. We will
shortly discuss epistemic extensions of the basic constructive modal logics and
we will then present the system C3. On the basis of this system we will present
some extensions for modeling communicative actions.
Constructive extensions of EA
4.12. DEFINITION. The poly-modal generalization of ~2fiT is the class ~~,
which consists of models M-(W, {Ra}aEA, C, V) such that A is a non-empty
finite set and (W, Ra, C, V) E~7T for all a E A.
The poly-modal generalization of ~Ro is the class ~t~, which consists of
models M-(W, {Ra}aEA, C, V) such that A is a non-empty finite set and
(W, Ra, C, V) E~fito for all a E A.
The corresponding minimal constructive poly-modal logics are the systems
NMA and NMÁ. The former derivation system is interpreted over the model
class s7tfi2~, and the latter over ~t~. The former system contains the rules
of N and MA together. The latter is the combination of N- and MA with an
additional poly-modal version of R-DIS o-i:
r~~-~~,,o
~al~ ~ aacp -~ ~a~{', ~~a~
R-DIS ~a -~.
For defining constructive epistemic systems we simply combine the systems
NMA and NMÁ with the static system EA, respectively. The sum of these
systems are called NEA and NEÁ, respectively. Appropriate models can be
defined by simply substituting ~ for fit in definition 4.12 above.
4.13. DEFINITION.
~t~~ -{(W, {Ra}aEA, G, V) E~i~rt ~ `da E A:(W, Ra, V) E~}
~3 -{(W,{Ra}aEA,G,V) E~o ~ b'a E A : (W,Ra,V) E é}
'7t~~ as a name for the latter model class would have been more in line with
our nomenclature of model classes. The name ~3 has been chosen irregularly
on purpose. It contains the basic epistemic and dynamic ingredients of the
communication calculi which are going to be presented in this chapter. It is the
essential model-theory which we have chosen for dynamic epistemic reasoning,
with the information structure G as the dynamic parameter and the epistemic
accessibilities as the static representation of beliefs of the communicating agents.
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This explains why it has been given the abbreviation of the title of this thesis
as its name.
As already explained in the previous chapter, the choice of ~3 as a subclass of
~~ provides a formal interpretation of the growth of epistemic information.
It captures growth as a combination of construction and elimination, which
is formalized by the interrelational constraint of the class 9~7t~ between the
accessibility relation Ra and the information structure G(see definition 3.27 on
page 99). -
4.14. Ex.aivlPLE. The cognitive progress, on the basis of elimination and con-
struction, of a single agent which has been depicted in figure 1.7 (page 30) can
be formally interpreted in terms of the ~3-models. Let M-( W, R, G, V) be of






The vertical lines represent the information order G as in figure 2.36 ( page 66
and figure 3.28 (page 100). The epistemic accessibility relation is represented by
the arrows. It is not hard to verify that M E~3.
The seriality of R can be seen immediately. All worlds have an outgoing
arrow.
The full introspection of R can be scanned by checking whether all worlds
which have an incoming arrow, starting from the same world, are mutually
accessible. This also means that worlds with an incoming arrow have to be
reflexive.
The valuation function in M is indeed monotonic.
What is left to prove is the construction-elimination dynamics of M: G oR C
Ro C. The reader may check for himself that -
Ro C-C oR u{(5, 7)}.
Conclusion: M E ~3. However, M ~ s7té. The second bisimulation constraint
does not hold for this model: ~ oR g Ro 1. We have (~ oR)(7, 5), but not
(Ro ~)(7, 5). - - -
The model M' which describes the first cognitive step, i.e. the model M re-
stricted to the worlds 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 is a member of ~7t~. This explains that this
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first step is purely constructive. The second step in M has an eliminative part:
alternative 5 has been eliminated.
Up and down extension of EA
The basic dynamic epistemic derivation systems which we use is a combination
of the modal version of the up and down logic of chapter 3(Mud) and EA,
which is interpreted over the model class ~3. This system is called C3. The only
additional derivational adjustment is an individualized version of the rule DIS
t7[ ]u and its contra-position c-DIS []u .
4.15. TABLE.
I, ~ [~]u ~Ve ~~
DIS ~a[ ]u
~al, ~ [~a~]u ~a4~, ~~a~
I',~(pu ~~~ - -
~ar, ~[~a~lu ~a W~~aa0
C-DIS ~a[ ]n .
Latent belief and disbelief
In the introduction of this thesis we have distinguished two kinds of disbelief.
Active disbelief of a proposition cp refers to a situation where a counter-model, or
counter-world, of cp is epistemically accessible. Passive disbelief of cp refers to a
situation where cp has no truth-value in the current set of epistemic alternatives.
Yet another kind of disbelief can be described by means of a dynamic intensional
reading. This is what we call latent disbelief, and it refers to a situation where
at least one of the current epistemic alternatives can be extended to a counter-
world of the content of this disbelief. For example, in 4.14 in stage 1, the agent
latently disbelieves q.
Latent disbelief of a proposition cp by an agent a can be described in GÁ 1 as
(~t]acp).~ T. An ~3-equivalent formulation of this proposition of latent disbelief
of cp is Ou ~t]acp. Informally speaking, telling the agent a that cp is possibly
false would not lead necessarily lead to actual progress of his belief. If he was not
aware of the proposition cp, this assertion only broadens his epistemic outlook.
In the same way we can describe latent beliefs. Latent belief of a proposition
cp means that updating with a counter-world of cp is impossible, given the cur-
rent range of epistemic alternatives. In other words, ~Oa~p is inconstructible.
Formally speaking, this interpretation comes down to [~t]acp]u 12.
In fact, this latent belief is a certain `re-classicalization' of our belief operator.
Every classical propositional tautology is latently believed. In semantic terms,
if a proposition cp E G is verified by all total valuations, then cp is always latently
believed. This property can also be strengthened to the classical variant KD45A
of EA.
ZIn terms of constructive logics, this is the intuitionistic negation of the proposition ~~acp.
This combination of the extensional negation of Nelson and Brouwer's intensional reading of
negative information shows the use of their collaboration in C3.
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4.16. OBSERVATION. If cp E Go and all total models in é~ verify cp, then cp is
always latently believed by all the agents: [~~ncp]u 1-:
~KD45a ~ ~ FC3 [~l]a~]u l.
In epistemic logic different approaches have been suggested for distinguishing
these kinds of belief [Levesque 1984] [Fagin 8z Halpern 1988], better known as
the distinction between implicit and e~plicit belief. The distinction has been
proposed as an approach to the problem of logicad omniscience, which is inherited
by the classical modal approach towards logical belief representation as in the
early work of Hintikka [Hintikka 1962]. This omniscience refers to the logical
idealization of deductive closure of the beliefs of epistemic agents. Hintikka's
philosophical defense of using this strength of classical modal logic was that his
models were meant to represent implicit beliefs. The obvious suggestion is that
we should find models of explicit belief, which avoid this logical omniscience.
In [Fagin 8s Halpern 1988] awareness has been introduced as a formal concept
in order to establish a formal distinction of explicit and implicit belief. They
present different proposals, of which the logic of special awareness comes close
to partialization of classical Kripke models. They define an awareness-function
on worlds. This function determines for every world a fixed domain of atoms
in the accessible worlds. This means, that all worlds which are seen from the
current situation are mutually just as partial.
Of course, this is certainly not the case in partial modal logics such as EA.
However, by means of our description of latent beliefs and disbeliefs such aware-
ness can be imitated. We could say that an agent a is aware of a proposition cp,
if he has access to a world which determines a truth value for this proposition:
Oncp V On~cp. The notion of explicit belief of a proposition cp can then be cap-
tured as being aware of ~p and the range of current doxastic alternatives cannot
be extended with possible counter-evidence against cp. Formally,
On~ n L~~a~]u 1..
The last conjunct coincides with our notion of latent belief above. In the termi-
nology of awareness this latent belief might be seen as implicit belief: it indicates
a certain triviality of its content. Nevertheless, the proposition cp may be outside
the scope of the awareness of the agent a.
In section 4.3 we will use this notion of `updatability' as latent disbelief again.
Just like in Turner's constructive formulation of default logic, we use this notion
of constructibility to specify weak preconditions. A proposition of the form
(~~ncp)u 1, or C3-equivalently ~Da[ ]u ~cp, tells us that the agent a attributes
an informational content to the proposition cp. This kind of non-triviality of
a proposition with respect to the agent a, will reappear as a requirement of
contribution, which is one of the preconditions of this agent to communicate
about this proposition.
Now that we have fully specified our logical means for dynamic epistemic
reasoning, the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to additional decoration of




Mutual belief of a group of agents X that cp holds means that all members of
the group X believe that cp, and all members of X believe that all members of X
believe that cp, and all members of X believe that all members of X believe that
all members of X believe that cp, and so on. Formally speaking, by the mutual
belief of X that cp we refer to the set of formulae:
{~Xcp ~ n E IN ` {0}} (1).
Such mutual beliefs are particularly important for formal interpretation of
communication. They represent a`common ground' of a group of interacting
agents. Such information can be used freely as presuppositions during commu-
nication. If a and b are members of a group X which mutually believe ~p, then
cp can be used as `silent' background information when a and b are talking with
~acb~ther~or example, ifzc and -lr-are ~utehm~ thea -they m~y freel~use
the name `Beatrix' without any explicit reference. However, if one of them were
non-Dutch, then the user of this name should explain that Holland has a queen
and that `Beatrix' is her name.
Such mutual beliefs are not restricted to linguistic use. Also in theories of
social behavior such belief representations show up. For planning activities,
intelligent agents make use of all kind of social conventions, which are in fact
mutual beliefs about the behavior of cooperating agents in a group. Many of
our own social strategies utilize information which we have about the behavior
of others [Lewis 1969].
The representation of mutual beliefs in (1) above can be seen as the most ideal
acceptance of information of an interacting group X. In most situations a small
finite part of the set in (1), i.e. up to a certain n E IN ` {0}, seems to be enough
for decision on new actions. Such a pragmatic upper bound to the epistemic
nesting of information seems to relate to the importance or risks of the decisions
which are to be made on the basis of this information.
An instructive example comes from [Halpern 8e Moses 1990] and deals with
risky military decision making, which is known as the Byzantine agreement prob-
lem. They describe a situation where two collaborating armies want to attack
a hostile town. The problem is that the two armies are at opposite sides of the
town, and there is no way that the two generals in charge, let's call them a and
b, can communicate face-to-face and reach agreement about the time of a joint
attack. The only way to communicate is by sending a courier c through the town
to the other side.
Let us say that general a is the initiator of this long distance conversation and
sends c with the information p, which is the time of attack, to the other general
b. If c reaches b safely, then b has got the information that p, but nevertheless
this information is not sufficient for a decision of b to attack the town at p. He
also needs to ensure a of the fact that the messenger c arrived, such that a is
certain of the fact that b has the information p. So, he sends c back to a with
the information ~bp. If c succeeds again, we have a new information state which
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contains ~ap~ ~bp~ ~a~bp. Again, a needs to send c back with the information
oaabp, because b needs to be sure that a is sure that b will indeed attack at p.
This communication protocol never reaches a completely safe fulfilling of the
preconditions of an attack. In more usual communicative situations where the
risks of decísions on the basis of incoming messages are considerably lower, a
partial fulfilling of a mutual belief precondition is taken to be sufficient. Even
in face-to-face dialogues, we are never sure of reaching a state of mutual belief.
When an assertion is transferred a simple nodding of the receiver, as a sign of
affirmation or acceptance of the information, seems to be satisfactory to continue
the conversation or undertake a certain new action. If communicating agents
would insist on reaching real mutual beliefs by assertion, then any successful
dialogue would lead to an infinite nodding procedure. Nevertheless, we wish to
describe the ideal epistemic force of assertions and leave it to others to speculate
on more realistic empirical approximation of such update effects which do not
neglect the `Byzantine noise'.
In the next subsection we will introduce the system EÁ and its construction-
elimination dynamic extension C3'. They contain additional mutual belief op-
erators for every subset of agents. These systems are proper extensions of the
epistemic systems of the previous section. The infinite set in (1) can not be
expressed as a single proposition in their languages GA and GÁ 1
A formal interpretation of mutual beliefs
The system EÁ is the static partial epistemic logic extended with additional
modal operators ~X for all X C A. Its language is called GÁ. A proposition
of the form ~Xcp says that every proposition of the form ~a,~a2...~a„cp holds
(if n- 0 this proposition equals cp) for all ai E X. These operators are inter-
preted by means of the reflexive transitive closure of the union of the individual
accessibility relations of the different agents in X.
4.17. DEFINITION. Let M-(W, {Ra}aEA, V) E~~. We use the following
notation for all non-empty subsets X of A:
Rx - U Ra,
aEX
RX -{(x,y) E W2 ~~n E IN : RX(x,y)} and
RX - RX o RX .
The last relation RtX is the transitive closure of RX and RX is the re,flexive
transitive closure of RX .
4.18. TASI.E. Let M-(W, {Ra}aE,q, V) E~~. The OX-operators are inter-
preted with respect to M along the relation RX.
M,w~oX~pbdvEW:(RX(w,v)~M,v~~p)
M,w~oX~p~3vEW:(RX(w,v)BzM,v~~p)
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The falsity of ~X with respect to a world w in a model M E ~~, says that there
exists a sequence al, ..., an in X such that ~a, ...~a~ cp is falsified with respect to
w in M. Instead of ~~X~cp, we will also write OXcp. Such a proposition says
that cp holds in some world at some X-distance.
4.19. OssERUwT~orr. Notice that this interpretation is correct with respect to
the earlier intuitive description. Let M-(W, {Ra }QEA, V) E é~, and w E W
andXCA.
M, w~ OXcp ~ M, w ~ OQ,...~a„ cp for all finite sequence al, ..., an E X.
The falsification of ~XCp obtains the interpretation which has been mentioned
above:
M, w~ OXcp ~ M, w~ []al...Oancp for certain sequence al, ..., an E X.
Note that if n- 0 then M, w~ cp.
-4:20. BE~t~~oN. -Mutual-belief of-a prc~positiom5v among a-graup JLof agenis,
is expressed by ~X~Xcp, which is abbreviated by CXcp.
4.21. OssERVATtoN. Notice that CXcp is interpreted in the same way as ~XCp,
with RX replaced by RtX in the truth-value conditions above.
4.22. OssERVAT}orr. Combination of observation 4.19 above and example 4.8
shows that
QC{a,b}~P~éa - n Q~al...~a„cP~éa (with n~ 1).
(al,..,a,i)E{a,6}n
a:~a;~i
The somewhat complicated subscript tells us that the sequences al, .., an con-
sist only of a's and b's, such that a and b occur alternately. This means that the
mutual belief of a and b of cp is the same as that a believes that cp, b believes
that cp, a believes that b believes that ~p, b believes that a that ~p, etcetera.
4.23. OssERVnT~otv. A negative property of ~é~ and ~e3 is their loss of com-
pactness. This means there exist infinite I' C GÁ such that I' ~éa cp, while for
every finite I" C I' the proposition cp is not a valid ~~(-consequence: I" ~éa cp.
A simple example is obtained by taking I' to be same as { o X p ~ 0 ~ X C A}
and by substituting ~Xp for certain p E IP. For all finite I" C I' -
r' ~é~ ~Xp~
The non-compactness of these logics indicate their meta-theoretical tough-
ness, when we compare them to the logics which we have met in the preceding
chapters. In the following subsection we will give derivation systems for their
underlying calculi. All these calculi have the straightforward finiteness property,
which means that they are incomplete with respect to the full class of sequents.
Nevertheless, we obtain a satisfactory completeness result in chapter 6 for these
systems. Their derivational capacity is still complete with respect to the class
of finite sequents.
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A derivation system for mutual beliefs
We need a considerable sequential extension of the basic static epistemic logic
EA in order to obtain a suitable axiomatization for the operators oX. This
system is called EÁ. EÁ consists of EA and the following additional rules for
the ~X-operators.
4.24. TABLE.
RULES FOR 0 j{
r ~~o
I,' ~X~ ~ Q L-TRUE C] jt
r,~v ~ oX~,,o r~ ~ ~ o~
oXr,r~ ~ oX~v,,oXo,o'
r, ~(]Xcp ~ ~cp, ~0 r~, ~cp ~ 0~ L-FALSE []"oXr, r~,,oX~ ~ ,oXo, o~ X
r~,~v,oI, ~~~X~' Q R-FALSE 0j{
r ~ oX~,o , r,,oX~ ~ o
r~ OXC]XcP,O
R-TRUE OXOX I`,~OX~Xcp ~ 0
R-TRUE ~X
L-FALSE (]XC] j~
4.25. OBSERVATION. The system MÁ consists of the rules of MA and the
rules for OX above. Apart from propositional tests, this system axiomatizes the
minimal partial variant of Pratt's propositional dynamic logic [Pratt 1980]. The
modal indices A should in this case be interpreted as a set of atomic programs.
The ~X-operator refers then to the program which executes an arbitrary number
of times the program sequence X.
4.26. OBSERVATION. The relatlVely eaSy rules L-TRUE ~X arid R-FALSE ~X
are used in the sequel of the text by a reformulation as t]` ~ and ~ O' rules:
~jtcp ~EÁ cp O' ~ and cp ~EÁ O'cp ~ 0".
F~rthermore, we use []" ~[]0" and 00` ~ O' as names for []Xcp ~Eq OX[]Xcp
and OXOX~p ~E~ OXcp. They are reformulations of R-TRUE OXOX and L-FALSE
oXaX, respectively.
The rules R-TRUE OX and L-FALSE ~X look complicated at first sight. Re-
duction of the surrounding sets, the r's and the 0's, helps to get a better
comprehension. In fact, these rules are sequential formulations of induction
principles.
4.2~T. OBSERVATION. cp F-E~ ~X~P ~~P ~E~ ~jt~P R-IND and
~Xcp ~EA c0 ~ ~j,~cp ~EÁ cp L-IND
Proofs of these more pleasant induction formulations are obtained by taking
r-0-~'-~andr' - {cp}inR-TRUEOX,andr-0-r' -0and
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~' -{cp} in L-FALSE ~X, respectively.
Important EÁ-sequents which capture this induction effect as well, are:
t]XOXtp, cQ ~EÁ (]XcP R-IND' and
~X~P ~EÁ ~P,~jt~X~P L-IND'.
Proof. These induction principles can be obtained very easily from the R-TRUE ~X
and L-FALSE OX. The following simple three steps derivation establishes the first EÁ-
sequent.
1. Ox~, tp i-EÁ OxtP START
2. cp ~EÁ cp START
3- ~X~X~P,~P~EÁ OXW R-TRUE OX3
Other derivations are left to the reader. ~
4.28. OBSERVATION. COmbination of the induction principles and the easier
rules of observation 4.26 entails yet other important principles such as the equiv-
alences OXcp -E,, OX~Xcp and OXcp -EA OXOXCp, and the reversed version of
the induction principles above: []Xcp ~EA cp, oX[]X~p and OXOXcp, cp ~EA OX~p.
Proof.
1. OX~P~E' ~X~jt~GA
2. OX`G FEÁ ~jr~jc'G
3. ~jrOj~`P FEÁ ~jr~G
o" ~ oo"
R-IND
CJ" ~ for ~jr ~p
F~om this "O` - O"O'-property we can derive OXcp ~E~ OXOXcp, O" - O"O'
establishes the contra-positional version of this latter sequent: OXOx~p ~E;~ 4x~p.
4. OX~p FEÁ cP




9. C7X~P, ~X ~P FEÁ ~X ~X ~G
~' ~





10. OXOX,p,OX,p ~EÁ OjrOX~G R-TRUE OX (9, OX~p f-EÁ ~X~P)
11. Ojt~p,OXcp~E~ ~j~~XrP CUT (2,10)
12. ~XOXcp ~EÁ OXcp R-TRUE OX (4)
13. OX~p FEÁ OX~p CUT (1,12)
14. OX~p F-EA ~XOx~p cuT (11,13)
~
4.29. OBSERVATION. The operators ~X behave also as modal normal opera-
tors, that is the normal R-TRUE and L-FALSE for ~ and Oa, can be derived in
the system EÁ:
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r~EÁ ~, o~ oXr ~E~ oX~, oXo, and
r, ~~EA o~ aXr, oX~ ~-EA oXo.
Proof. We show the first implication below.
1. r~E~ ~p, 0 assumption
2. OXr~EÁ ~X~p,OXO R-TRUE OX (1)
3. OXr,~G~EÁ ~X~G,oX~ L-MON (2)
4. OXOXr,r~EÁ OX~P,OXO,OXO R-TRUE ~X (1,3)
5. oXr,r ~EA aX~p,OX0,0 o'o ~ 04 and O' ~ O'O
6. OXr ~E;~ ~XCp,OXO ~' ~ and ~ O'
~
In the sequel of this text we will ca11 these weaker version of ~X-introduction
R-MOD-TRUE ~X and L-MOD-FALSE ~X, respectively.
4.30. THEOREM. SOUNDNESS EÁ
For au r, 0 c GA: r 1-E~ 0~ r~~a ~.
Proof. We will show the soundness of R-TRUE OX. Suppose r, cp ~é~ OXcp, 0 (1)
and r F-Eq ~p, 0(2). Let M-(W, {Ra}aEq, V) E é~ and w E W such that
M,w~[7XryandM,w~ry' forallryErandry'Er'(3),and
M,w~~OXbandM,w~b'forallbE~andb'EO' (4).
The assumption (3) means that M, v~ b for all v E W with RX (w, v). We will prove
by an induction on n that
b'nE1N`dvEW:RX(w,v)~M,v~~p(5).
This conclusion would establish M,w ~ l7Xcp.
If n- 0 the conclusion immediately follows from (2) and (4).
Let n~ 0 and RX (w, v). This means that there exists a world u E W such
that RX 1(w, u) and Rx (u, v) (7). The induction hypothesis entails M, u~~p.
Combination of (1), (3) and this last conclusion entails M, u~ OXcp, and therefore
M, v ~ ~p (7).
Because w has been chosen freely as oXr u r'-world, we may conclude that the as-
sumptions (1) and (2) lead to
M, w ~ ~X~p or
M,w ~ OXb for certain b E 0, or
M, w~ b' for certain 6' E 0'.
In other words, (1) and (2) imply OXr, r' ~é~ []z~P~ ~~z0~ 0~. ~
4.2. Mutv,al beliefs 127
Ideal assertion
As explained in the introduction of this chapter, we will take an idealistic position
on the interpretation of assertions. The dynamic epistemic effect of an assertion
is the mutual belief of the content of the assertion by the sender and the receiver,
or group of receivers.
Furthermore, we need to stipulate a precondition for assertions. The simplest
precondition of an assertion is that its sender believes the content himself. This
establishes a first interpretation for assertion. We will write an assertion as an
expression of the form a assert ~p) X with a E A, 0 ~ X C A and cp E GÁ1''.
The agent a is the sender, X is the non-empty group of receiving agents and
cp is the content of the assertion. 5uch a communicative action is a complex
dynamic operator. It takes a proposition ~ E GÁl'}, to make a proposition
a assert ~p) X zG, where ~ is a consequence of the assertion. Our first proposal
for inter~ etation of such an assertion proposition is the following:
I a assert cp) X
c assert Cpn ) ~n
Here we presumed that all members of the receiving group X are aware of
the other receiving agents. This is typically not an interpretation of mass-
communication4 .
In terms of this interpretation, the Byzantine protocol does not have finite
success. Let cpo be the crucial proposition, and let cp; - ~acpi-1 if i is even, and
cpi - ~bcp,-1 if i is odd. For all n E IN:
~C3. c assert cpo ) ~o C{a,b}~0.
4.31. Os5Eltv.aTlolv. Another simple observation on this interpretation of as-
sertion is the following:
a assert cp) X
~aa~,
~ - ~a~ n [C{a}Ux~lu `~~
~i ~aX ~C3.
a assert cp) X
a assert ~p n X) X
iG ~(~3. 1.
The first C3-sequent can be put more general:
X~Cs. cp ~ I a assert cp) X I ~, DaX ~C3.
An obvious non-C3-sequent is:
a assert cp) X ~, a assert X) X zli Fi`c'i3.
~, and
a assert X) X
a assert cp V X) X ~.
Take cp - p,~ - q E IP and let b E X. If t]ap and oaq both hold, then also
a assert p) X
Nevertheless,
(~6T~ V ~64) and
a assert p V q) X
a assert q ) X (Obp V ~6q).
(Obp V Obq) is certainly not guaranteed.
4If all agents in X were in isolation, the update effect would be nbEX C{a,6}~P.
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Bunt [Bunt 1989J, in line with [Searle 1969], took the epistemic update effect
of any communicative action to be identical to the mutual belief of the precon-
ditions by the sender and receiver(s). This means that the meaning of such an
action is fully determined by these preconditions and stipulates in the case of
assertion a weaker interpretation.
a assert cp) X ~ - ~a~ n [C{a}ux0a~lu~-
Indeed, such an interpretation seems to be more realistic. The members of X
rather learn that a believes cp rather than the content cp itself. So, in this case we
do not have f-C3. I a assert cp) X I ~xcp, but still i-Cs. I a assert ~p) X I Ox[]acp.
Nevertheless, this interpretation is rather weak. The cautiousness of this inter-
pretation does not cause any factual update of other believers.
A more `pragmatic' interpretation of a cp-assertion can be stipulated by further
strengthening of the precondition. A reasonable one is that the sender a keeps
open the possibility that at least one of the receivers actively disbelieves cp.
In terms of the C3-models, a has access to some possible world which can be
enriched in such a way that at least one agent of the group X has access to a
counter-model of cp. This additional constraint tells us in fact that a expects
that his assertion has some informational effect on - or is a non-trivial update
for - the group X. This contingent `contribution'-requirement with respect to
the content cp of the assertion leads to the following interpretation:
a assert ~p) X 4~ - On~ ~ oa( )u ~ax~ n [~{n}ux~lu ~-
Somewhat stronger contribution conditions, like ~a( )u ~Oxcp or Oa(( )u Oxcp
n( )u ~Oxcp), seem reasonable as well. Note that the ()u operators express
a certain consistency with respect to worlds. Their interpretation coincides
with M-operator of Turner (see page 89). Such a consistency claim gives the
interpretation of a communicative action a certain `default' flavor, which has
also been advocated in [Perrault 1989] and [Beun 1989].
4.32. OBSERVATION. The contribution requirement above forbids trivial up-
dates:
F-~3. (p ~ a assert cp ) X 1~1 ~C3~ L.
Another weaker interpretation of the contribution-requirement is a replace-
ment of this disbelief of X of cp by the falsity of the epistemic effect C{a}ux~P.
It might be the case that a yet believes that all members of X believe that ~p,
but nevertheless wants to inform them of the fact that a shares this belief. So,
yet a fourth interpretation is the following:
a assert cp) X ~, - oa~p n oQ( )u ~C{a}ux~P ~ [C{a}ux~P]u ~G.
One might claim that this last interpretation is principally another action.
We want to point out that a more cautious contribution requirement as above
is just more tolerant, and deals satisfactorily with assertions which are meant to
update only deeper layers of belief.
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In fact, we will extend this style of interpretation structure for other commu-
nicative actions. If the intended epistemic effect of an action, performed by a,
is X, the contribution requirement equals Oa( )u ~X. For appropriate specifica-
tion of such an effect X for difFerent communicative action we need additional
expressivity. This is the topic of the next section, which discusses intentional
modalities for interpretation of actions like questions.
4.3 Intentions
Individual preferences of communicating agents are very important for inter-
pretation of communicative actions. Such actions also express an intention of
agents to reach new information states and the wish of cooperation by the other
interactors in order to achieve this together.
These preferences are interpreted over a set of preferential worlds for ev-
ery world in t~e ~els- T ííl~s approach~á;s a~, s~ been advacat~d in~ohen
8~ Levesque 1990]. A multiple world interpretation is meant to comprehend
possible contradictory preferences. It might very well be the case that different
preferences can not be fulfilled in one single worlds.
4.33. DEFINITION. A~3'-model is a quintuple ( W, {Ra}aEA, {Pa}aEA, c,V),
where A is a non-empty finite set, and
(W~~Ra~aEA~CvV) E ~3e
(Wi iPaJaEA~V) E ~2(.
The new relations Pa are the individual preference relations.
The arbitrary multiple world interpretation of preferential worlds is rather
minimal. Below we will discuss different possible restrictions for the preference
relations and their interplay with the doxastic accessibilities.
To begin with, we need an additional preference operator [p]a for every agent
a E A. A proposition of the form [p]acp refers to situations where cp holds in all
preferential worlds which belong to the agent a. In other words, a's preferences
agree on the truth of cp. This additional operator is added to the language
SPreferences also appear in other parts ofdynamic logic. An example is Veltman's definition
of expectation patterns over worlds [Veltman 1991]. These expectation patterns are meant to
interpret default information in a dynamic setting. Preferential worlds or models stem from
the field of non-monotonic logic [Shoham 1988]. In this field, they are used to model reasoning
on the basis of absent information, where only a limited non-monotonic consequence relation
over the maximally preferential worlds is used to compensate this lack of information. The
clear difference with our pure selection of sets of preferential worlds, is that these logics use
the more delicate notion of orders on worlds. In the terminology of preferential semantics, we
abstract away from these orders and act as if the maximal preferential worlds are determined
beforehand. For a modal approach to preferential semantics see [van Benthem, van Eijck 8t
Frolova 1993].
eIn [Appelt 1985] the fused possible world semantics have been used in order to deal with
incoherent preferences. See appendix 2.5 for a partial interpretation of fused possible world
semantics.
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GÁ1. For this language we use the abbreviation GÁ1'~p~. The semantics of the
preference operator in terms of the ~3` is the following.
4.34. TABLE.
M, w ~[p]ncp q`dv E W: Pn(w, v) ~ M, v~ cp
M,w~[p]ncpq~vEW:Pn(w,v) BzM,v~cp
Instead of ~[p]n~cp, we will use (p)ncp. It says that cp holds with respect to at
least one of the situations which are preferred by the agent a.
The underlying system is very simple because we have left the preference
relations completely free in definition 4.33. The system C3 is simply C3 with
the minimal modal rules R-TItuE o and L-FALSE ~ for the operators [p]n. The
system Ci` is the system C3` with these additional rules for [p]n. Of course,
such systems are much too liberal for reasoning about individual preferences.
We now turn to possible constraints on the infrastructure of these preferential
worlds.
Realistic preferences
We first consider constraints corresponding to principles of introspection. Just
like for the epistemic modality we accept full íntrospection on the preferen-
tial worlds. In other words, every agent is completely certain about his own
preferences. The set of preferential worlds of an agent a is identical with the
set of preferential worlds of a in all his doxastic alternatives. Formally, for all
M-(W, {Rn}nEAi {Pn}nEA~ V) E~3` we take
t1~, y, x E W: Ra(x, y) ~ (Pn(~, z) q Pn(y, z)) for all a E A.
The corresponding dynamic epistemic inference system can be established by
means of the following additional axioms to the systems C; and C3'.
4.35. TABLE. On[P]n~P - ~n[P]a~P - [P]n~P
~a(P)n~P - Da(P)a~P - (P)a~P
We do not venture to postulate these kind of doubling principles for the pref-
erence relation itself. Philosophically speaking, such axioms are pretty risky. If
we would use the 45-rules for the operator [p]n, then we would accept a perfect
satisfaction of every agent with his own preferences. Such `free will'-principles
are disputable in many ways. For example, it expresses complete satisfaction
of agents with their own basic biological and psychological motives. We there-
fore simply avoid such dangerous principles, and determine no pure preference
constraints7 .
Further restriction of the interplay of doxastic and preferential worlds depends
heavily on the intended application. For example, in [Cohen 8c Levesque 1990]
~Even an axiom F[p]aT, which means that every agent a has at least one preferential
world, seems to be too strong. We do not exclude complete apathetic agents. Any reader who
wishes to postulate a pure preference principle of the Geach format ( p)á[p]á~p F[p]á (p)n is
invited to stipulate a semantic constraint for preferential worlds. In chapter 7 this reader can
find enough information to capture such a principle model-theoretically.
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preferential operators are used as goal-worlds. This means that an agent attach
a certain contingency to these worlds. In a two-valued classical modal logic, this
comes down to the constraint that all goal-worlds should be doxastic alternatives
as well: Pa C Ra. The corresponding axiom is t]a~p I- [p]acp, which is called the
principle of realism in [Cohen 8c Levesque 1990]8. In partial or constructive
modal logic, such a subset relation has to be encoded by an additional contra-
position of the last axiom as well.
REALISM ~p~acP ~ ~acp óL DacO ~ [p]acP
This principle is very strong. For example, if the agent a has a goal-world in
which a believes a certain proposition cp, then a factually believes it:
~p)a~a~P ~ ~n~a~P ~ ~a~G.
In other words, the complete use of the principle of realism implies a certain un-
willingness of agents to learn new things. In [Cohen 8~ Levesque 1990]9 stronger
:atree~ti~fls-c ats~ue~ B ~~ 0J ~8 ~ avereomethis
epistemic rigidity.
In partial modal logics it is possible to relativiae such a principle of realism.
As we have no contra-position, we can simply dump the unwanted negative part
of this principle. We will also limit our use of the REALISM principle. A complete
employment of []acp ~[p]acp would also lead to unwanted effects. For example,
if it is applied to active disbelief, we obtain:
~aa~ ~- oa, []acp ~ [P]a~t]acp.
It tells us that we prefer all our active disbeliefs unambiguously. Of course, this
is not what we had in mind. Agents want to move upwards, and one way of
doing so is deletion of doubts.
Another problem arises when the REALISM principle is applied to beliefs of
others: oQ[]bcp ~[p]aobcp. This means that if an agent a believes something
about b's beliefs, then a is completely satisfied with these beliefs of b. This
extreme tolerance would remove much of the motives of agents to communicate.
Of course, it should be possible to model intentions of agents to remove or revise
beliefs of other agents. What is left of the principle of realism is the following
cautious formulation.
CAUTIOUS REALISM Oacp ~[p]dcp for all ~p E G.
This means that we only apply it to extensional information. This yields the
following model-theoretic constraint for models M-(W, {Ra}aEA, {Pa}aEA, C
, V):
bx, y : Pa(x, y) ~~z : Ra(x, z) 8c V(z) C V(y).
It means that all preferential worlds of an agent have more atomic - and propo-
sitional - content than at least one of his doxastic alternatives. This does not
SSuch realism towards your own goals can also be found in formal distinction between
wishes and intentions [Appelt 1985] [Devlin 1991].
9They employ the logic KD45 as the underlying epistemic logic. So, this inference can be
made in their systems as well.
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mean that all these alternatives are preserved in some preferential world. This
removes the contra-positional effect of the ItEALtstvt postulatelo
Preferences and the beliefs of others
Principles of cooperative behavior can formally be comprehended as constraints
on the structural interplay between doxastic alternatives of an agent a and his
preferences about the doxastic alternatives of other agents.
An important principle in formal pragmatics of natural language is Grice's
maxim of quality [Grice 1975J. It says that, if an agent a aims at a situation
where the agent b believes a certain proposition cp, then a should also be con-
vinced of this information himself. In formal notation:
QUALITY 1 [pJal]bcp f- t]Qcp for all cp E G.
A similar interpretation has also been stipulated in [Beun 1989J. Again, we avoid
unwanted mixture of this principle with intensional information, and apply the
rule only to extensional information. The corresponding constraint for a model
M-(W, {Ra}aEA, {Pa}aEAi C, V~ is the following
b'x, y: Ra(x, y) 8z Ra(x, z) ~
~z, z' : Pa(x, z) 8s Rb(z, z') 8c V(z') C V(y).
The converse of this integrity constraint yields a kind of arrogant commu-
nicative attitude. It entails obtrusive agents: t]acp f- [pJat7ócp for all cp E G. It
says that if an agent a prefers worlds where everybody shares his beliefs. This
arrogance postulate corresponds to the following semantic constraint
b'x, y, z: Pa(x, y) 8L R6(y, z) ~~z' : Ra(y, z') ~ V(z') C V(z).
Relativizing this principle of arrogance, by moving the negation in the conclusion
to the right hand side yields a socially more acceptable postulate:
QUALITY 2 Oacp, ~p)aOb~cp I- 1 for all cp E G.
In partial logic, this principle is independent of the pushy principle above. Its
denotation is also much more sensible. It says that if an agents a believes cp then
he may never prefer a situation where another agent has a counter-model of cp in
mind. This postulate can semantically be characterized by the coherence relation
~ on partial valuations. A simple substitution of ~ for C in the `arrogant' models
above entails the satisfactory model-theoretic constraintll
Of course, a principle like QUALITY 2 is equivalent with the principle of ar-
rogance in classical modal logic. The flexibility of partial modal logic, which
separates such intuitively different principles, turns out to be an advantage by
loChapter 7 focuses on this non-contra-positional partial modal logics.
11For modal correspondences of the coherence relation we refer the reader to chapter 7.
In the same way we can relativize other principle. For example, the principle of cautious
realism can be transformed into the principle of VERY CAUTIOUS REALISM: ~acp, ~p~a~~p F 1
for all cp E G. The corresponding semantic constraint is obtained by replacing C by ~ in the
characteristics of models for CAUTIOUS REALISM.
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its application to interpret rational communicative behavior. We therefore add
it to our list of reasons to use partial modal logic instead of classical modal
logic, which have been presented in section 1.3. Obviously, this advantage is a
side effect of the freeness of contra-position of partial logics, which we already
discussed in that section.
Ideal questions
An important facility of additional preferential semantics to the C3-style of log-
ics, is that other communicative actions can be interpreted. Questions are such
actions that require `intentional' reasoning. Furthermore, more skeptical inter-
pretations of assertions than the ultimate mutual belief updates in section 4.2,
can be stipulated by means of preferential worlds. On the basis of preferential
operators different utterances, classified by their epistemic and intentional force,
can be distinguished semantically.
If we wou~assign to questions íhe sáme idea3 dynamic interpretation as~ve
have done for assertions, the epistemic effect of a question cp of a sender a
to a group of receivers X is [C{a}ux[Pla(~a~P V[]a~cp)Ju. This means that it
becomes mutual belief of the group {a} U X that a prefers to know the truth-
value of the proposition cp. Preconditions of questions includes a weak contri-
bution requirement, namely a's conceiving of the non-triviality of the utterance:
~a( )u ~C{a}ux[Pla(Da~P V oa~cp), and furthermore we require the non-triviality
of a possible answer to the question: Oa( )u cp n Oa( )u ~cp. In short,
a question cp) X w-~a( )u~nDa( )a~~noa( )v,~xn[xluW
with x- C{a}UX[P]a(Da~G V ~a~~P).
Of course, we could speculate on many other interpretations of questions, or
distinguish different types of questions. An example here is a test action. Such
a communicative action should have another dynamic meaning. Suppose that
an agent b were testing a group X on the information cp. The epistemic effect is
clearly diffzrent. The agent b wants to find out, for instance, whether one agent
of the group X has information on the truth value of cp. In an ideal interpretation
we get the following epistemic effect:
X -- C{t}ux[P]bP with
P;- Ob(VaEX ~a~ V VaEX ~a~~) V 06~(VaEX ~a~ V VaEX Da~~)
The interpretation of this test action is then.
b test ~p ) X ~ - (~6cP V 06-,c~) n ob( )u ~x n [xlu ~.
As mentioned above, we could also differentiate on assertions. Substitution
of [pJa~xcp for cp in the epistemic effect of the ideal assertion interpretation in
section 4.2 yields a much more skeptical interpretation for such assertions. For
example, we could distinguish informing from telling.
We will not further speculate on different communicative actions. We think
that deeper analysis would disturb the formal presentation here. We leave it to
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the reader to make up his own favorite interpretations. It is not our intention
to claim the correctness of certain pragmatic postulates, but instead we have
shown how such principles can be encoded, and that the machinery of partial
and constructive modal logics is a sensible framework for doing so.
Intentions and preferences
A last remark which we should nevertheless make about our framework for com-
municative interpretation is the formal distinction between intentions and prefer-
ences. Somewhat misleading, we have used intentions in the title of this section,
while we spoke only about preferences. Of course, the connection is very close,
but because formal pragmatics speaks more about intentions than about prefer-
ences, a sharp definition of intention is still required.
We follow [Cohen óc Levesque 1990] who define intentions in terms of prefer-
ential worlds. We take intentions to be defined over actions, such as assert and
QuEST~oN. If an action is defined in terms of its preconditions and its dynamic
effect, then we say that the intention of an agent a to perform such an action is
the same as that a beliefs that the preconditions are fulfilled and prefers a state
where the content of the dynamic effect of the action holds.
Let ACT be the set of communicative actions which the agent may use. And
let prec : ACT x GÁl'`'~p~ -~ GAl'`'~p~ and epi : ACT x GA1'~`'~p~ --~ GAl'~'~p~
be the functions which specify for every action in ACT and every proposition cp E
GÁl,~,fp] which is conveyed by the action, its precondition(s) and its epistemic
effect, respectively. If act E ACT, then
a act cp~ X z~i - prec(act, cp) n[epi(act, cp)]u z~.
The intention of an agent a to perform the action act with content cp, and with
X as the set of receivers, can then be specified formally in the following way:
~aprec(act, cp) ~ [p]Qepi(act, cp).
Most often, just as in many interpretations given above, one of the precon-
ditions of an action is a contribution requirement. This makes sure that if an
agent a intends to perform an action action, then a believes also its contribu-
tion requirement, which yields that intentions are meant to change the current
information state.
4.4 Communication with the physical world
So far, we have only considered partial models in our dynamic epistemic for-
malisms. All relevant information for the proposals for interpretation of com-
municative action in the previous section is nested by modal epistemic and pref-
erence operators, and therefore refers to individual accessible worlds, such as
doxastic and preferential worlds, and these worlds are partial, from our point of
view.
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But what about the real world? Is this a total world, or should we choose for
a puritan position? In fact, in this thesis we will avoid philosophical deliberation
on this topic. But still, we want to explain what it means technically if an outer
total world would be accepted in a theory of partial possible worlds.
Outer worlds
For the model-theory, it is not hard to embed a specific total bi-valent reality. We
simply add a set of total possible worlds, which perform the role of a changing
physical world. Nevertheless, we take the factual information, i.e. literals, to
have a constant truth-value. This choice leads to the following model class ~3~.
4.36. DEFINITION. A~3~-model is a quintuple (W, S, {Ra}aEAv C, V) such that




V(s)(p) - V(t)(p) for all s, t E S and p E IP.
The last requirement fixes the factual outer world. The notion of validity is
different. We judge propositions of GÁ 1'' only on the basis of the configuration
of the real world.
~cpD~,~ - {(M, s) ~ M, s~ cp}
r~~;~ o a n Q~D~3~ c U QsD~3~
7Er 6E0
The underlying system C3R is a straightforward extension of C3, with some
supplementary classical rules. The first additional rule is a partial acceptance of
R-TRUE ~ from classical logic.
tl
4.3Í. TABLE. r' ~~ ~~ ~
E G'
R-TRUE ~ FOR Gt'1
~~ 0
This rule is sound because of the totality of the realities in the models. This
means that the local extensional logic in these totalities is classical. Furthermore,
the meaning of dynamic intensional information which does not contain individ-
ual modal, i.e. Da- and (p)a-, operators collapses into extensional information.
In other words, they are equivalent to formulae in G.
The other partial re-classicalization of the logic consists of strengthening the
R-TRUE introduction of the update operator and the L-FALSE introduction of
the downdate operator. These rules may be applied if the contextual sequential
parameters are subsets of the sublanguage Gt,l,
4.38. TABLE.
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r, ,~ ~~, o r, o c Gr,l
r' ~[~]d~ ~ Q L-STRONG-FALSE [ ]d
In fact, these rules re-establish the classical -~-introduction for the update
operator in purely G?~1 sequential contexts. Note furthermore that these rules
also settle sTRONG versions for L-FALSE and R-TRUE for updates and downdates,
respectively. We furthermore obtain a complete extensional flattening of the
language Gj~l in G.
4.39. OBSERVATION. For all cp E GT~1
~P -C3R ( I u ~P -C3R [ ]u ~P [~G]u ~ -C3R ~~G V ~ [T]á ~G -C3R ~P V i~7
~G -C3R ( Í d ~P -C3R [ ]d ~P (~P~u ~G -C3R 'P n ~ (~Piá W -C3R ~~P n ~
Extensionally omniscient machines
A more practical use of total realities is human-machine communication, es-
pecially in intelligent systems of information retrieval and database querying.
In such a dialogue configuration we deal, in principle, with two communicat-
ing agents: the system and the user. The reality is the factual internal data
of the machine. The system knows what is in this database, but typically has
incomplete knowledge of the user's information. In computer terminology: the
database is total, while the usermodel is incomplete. Furthermore, the machine
is also omniscient with regard to its own data. In the possible worlds terminology,
this means that the doxastic worlds of S2 contain the same factual information
as the database, i.e. they are realities. This leads to the following subclass of
~3~
4.40. DEFINITION. A~n model is a~3~-model M-(W, S, {R}QEq, C, V) with
A - {St, u} and
`dsES:Rc(s,t)~tES.
The system C~ is similar to C3R, with a bit more of classical freedom. The
rules R-TRUE ~, R-TRUE-STRONG []u and L-FALSE-STRONG []d may now be
applied to all formulae of G~ 1.
Furthermore, due to the partial omniscience of SZ, we acquire an equivalence
of ~p, Oncp and o~cp for the same part of the language. In the sequential style,
this boils down to the following rules:
r,~cp~0 cpEG~,l r~cQ ~ cpEG~l
r I- on~P,O r,,o~~p ~ 0
4.41. OBSERVATION. cP -cn O~~p -C~ a~~p for all ~p E G~1.
Proof. We only prove the first equivalence. Let cp E Gn1.
1. cp I-C~ ~ START
2. ~cn ~~p, ~p R-TRUE ~ (1)
3. On~p ~cn ~p table above (2) ,
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4. Oncp I-cn Oncp D(1)
5. cp, ~tp ~cn 0 L-TRUE -~ (1)
6. cp ~pa I]ncp left rule in table above (5)n
7. ~p ~~a On~p cuT (4,6)
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The other equivalences are left to the reader. The equivalence of O~cp and Oncp can
be obtained by using the rules above in combination with the rules of introspection,
i.e. the 45-rules. ~
The rules for Cn lead to the same extensional flattening of G~ 1 into G as
which we have found for Gr~l in C3R in observation 4.39.
4.5 Conclusions and reflections
-In t~ chapter we háve s~iown iiow~he machinéiy o~ par~ial ~odaríogics-anz~
their constructive extensions can be employed for distributive dynamic interpre-
tations of communicative actions. As argued in the introductory chapter, we
prefer to combine constructive and eliminative dynamics in one uniform logical
framework. Above, we have illustrated how such a two-dimensional dynamics
can be used in a general setting of theories of communication.
We have kept our presentation free from severe discussions on the legitimacy
of different kinds of interpretations of communicative actions. It has been our
aim to show that partial and constructive modal logics can be used for describing
such interpretations. Furthermore, the logical weakness of these systems turned
out to be advantageous for relativizing pragmatic principles.
As a consequence, we have broken off our outline rather abruptly. This has
been done on purpose. Further philosophical speculation would simply reach
above the limits of the mathematical skies of this thesis. The point of return
has come, and we will get back to the mathematics of these dynamic logics over
partial states in the forthcoming part II.
As we have focussed on the alternative prospects of partial worlds for dynamic
logics, we did not investigate many relevant additional tools for modeling com-
munication which are known from classical modal logics. We have only focussed
on essential ext~nsions by means of mutual belief and preferential operators.
As mentioned in chapter 1, further scaling of modal information would con-
tribute to theories of communication in order to assign degrees to attitudes.
In classical settings we find many of such formalisms. For example, assigning
probabilities to worlds, such as proposed in different classical modal settings
(G~rdenfors 1975] [van der Hoek 1992], is both intuitively appealing and could
be of importance to theories of communication. Dynamic interpretations of
communicative actions could then be decomposed in terms of the reliability of
information as well.
In [van Benthem, van Eijck 8i Frolova 1993] different suggestions have been
given to incorporate ordered preferential semantics in a modal logical style as
well. Such an approach for partial modal logic could be very useful for stipulating
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more fine-grained interpretations of preferences and intentions in combination
with the construction-elimination dynamícs of partial modal logics.
From a wider perspective, there are many other more general challenges for
our dynamic theory of partial states. First order logical extensions of partial
and constructive modal logic would be of particular interest12. Other relevant
extensions are temporal extensions. These kinds of extensions would supply
enough equipment for partial logic to imitate expressive classical systems such
as in [Cohen 8c Levesque 1990] 13
Another important issue with respect to theories of communication is the reli-
ability of agents, instead of the above-mentioned differentiation of the quality of
information. We could relate the epistemic force of an utterance to the authority
that a receiver assigns to the sender with respect to this utterance. Interpreta-
tion of this kind of reliabilities calls for more relational semantics. Besides static
and dynamic interpretation of propositions, we could incorporate an epistemic
interpretation of a proposition cp which induces an e~pertise orderover the set A
of agents. The epistemic force of an utterance cp from a sender a to a receiver b
would then depend on the reliability orderings that a and b associate to cp. Simi-
lar ideas can be found in so-called belief dependency logics as in [Zhisheng Huang
1991] and [Zhisheng Huang 8c van Emde Boas 1993].
A recent approach to communication which seems to be very promising is the
use of constrtrctive type theories, which has been propagated in (Ahn 1992] for
usermodeling in man-machine communication. In a more general style [van Ben-
them 1993] advocates this direction for epistemic logic. These type systems are
originally meant for automated proof checking , e.g. [de Bruyn 1980]. They
consist of powerful typed ~-calculi which are meant for representation of propo-
sitions and their proofs. This means that these systems have an essentially richer
information structure than standard logics. They keep track of the arguments of
propositions and this creates more possibilities to interpret and generate com-
municative behavior. However, just like the constructive propositional logics
which have been discussed in the thesis, these systems are too rigid for com-
mon sense modeling as they are meant for reasoning about proofs. Furthermore,
they model only one mathematical reasoner. In [Borghuis 1993] the reader finds
modal epistemic extensions of these ~-calculi, which are meant to overcome this
loneliness and rigidity.
As the logics which we have presented are not widely known, and some of them
are unknown, we will withdraw to their meta-theory. All the possible exten-
sions which we have mentioned above are therefore taken to be challenges for
future research. Instead, we wish to give a solid mathematical analysis of the
basic formalisms of this thesis, which are also meant to support such future
explorations.
12For a survey on first order partial modal logics see [Huertas 1994].
13Another aspect of communication which is relevant for modal approaches to communica-
tion is normative behavior. In [Weigand 1993] the reader finds a survey on the use of deontic





This chapter introduces a uniform method to derive completeness results for the
basic logics which were presented in the preceding chapters of this part. Com-
pleteness is the converse result of soundness. We have interpreted a sequential
derivation system S in terms of a consequence relation ~~ over a class of models
C7. The symbolic formulation of completeness of this system with respect to C~.
looks as follows:
I'~~0 ~ I'~S~ forallI',~cGs.
The method which we will use is based on the well-known Henkin- or canonical
style of completeness proving. We refer the reader to [Hughes 8L Cresswell 1984]
and [Chellas 1980] for systematic presentation of this style for classical modal
logics. As we will find out in the course of this chapter, we need to revise some
of the known basic definitions of this Henkin style in order to let the machinery
run fluently for partial logics.
The first section presents this modified, often even generalized, basic equip-
ment. The second section justifies these modifications, in the sense that the
Henkin method properly fixes completeness for the extensional and intensional
basic systems P and M. It shows that partial systems do not behave worse than
classical propositional and modal logic when it comes to proving completeness.
In the third section the reader finds the same method applied to construc-
tive propositional and modal logics. These latter systems need some special
attention because of their particular frame characteristics, that is the interplay
of accessibility and the information pattern which we have met in section 3.4
on the semantics of these logics. The last section focuses on completeness for
the up-and-down systems. Accomplishment of their completeness is simply an
imitation of the results which are to be presented in the third section. The sup-
plemental expressivity for judgement of the logical consequences of retraction of
information requires some adaptation, though the needed extra technical effort
is small.
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Completeness theorems of the mutual belief logics EÁ and C3` are postponed
until the following chapter on finite models. Due to the non-compactness of
such mutual belief logics, we need stronger meta-theoretical means. This is due
to the implementation of the common belief operator. In line with well-known
completeness proofs for modal logics with reflexive transitive closure operators
[Kozen 8z Parikh 1981] [Halpern 8z Moses 1992] , such as the mutual belief
operator, we exhibit a completeness result with respect to finite models. This
may seem queer, as it is a stronger result than just ordinary completeness. The
price is of course a somewhat weaker completeness result, which applies only to
finite sequents.
We will no longer dwell upon issues of later chapters here. We turn instead
to the basic principles needed to develop the technical equipment for a solid
meta-theory of partial intensional logics.
5.1 Saturated sets
In classical logic the notion of maximally consistent sets of formulae is the essen-
tial íngredient of Henkin-style completeness proofs. In classical modal logic such
maximally consistent sets have the same function [Hughes 8e Cresswell 1984].
Such a set of formulae is consistent with respect to the underlying logic, and
it is maximal in the sense that it does not have proper consistent extensions.
The utility of maximally consistent sets is that they enable us to get grip on the
semantic entities, like valuations in propositional logic, worlds in modal logic
or interpretations and assignments in predicate logic, by syntactic means. A
completeness theorem is then accomplished by making two steps.
One of these steps justifies this semantic use of maximally consistent sets. It
guarantees that the elements of such a set coincide with those formulae which
it verifies. This result, which is called the truth lemma of a logic, tells us that
maximally consistent sets behave like worlds.
The other step, which is normally made first, is called the Lindenbaum lemma,
and states that every consistent set can be extended to a maximally consistent
set. This result is normally established by adding as much information to a given
consistent set as long as one can, i.e. without losing consistency. The limit of
this construction turns out to be a maximally consistent set.
The completeness recipe is the following. On account of the Lindenbaum
lemma we obtain that whenever a set of formulae 0 is not a conclusion set of a
set of formulae I', there must exist a maximally consistent extension of I' U~0,
let us say I". The truth lemma tells us that I" verifies all members of I', but
none of 0. Therefore I", interpreted as a world, provides a counter-example
proving that 0 is not a valid consequence of I'.
The requirement of maximal consistency turns out to be too strict for selecting
sets of formulae in order to simulate the Henkin procedure for partial logics
properly. We have to be more liberal in accepting sets of formulae as valuations
or worlds. It could be the case that a formula cp is neither verified nor falsified. If
we want to imitate such gaps of truth-assignments by means of sets of formulae,
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then these sets do not necessarily have to be maximal. The following concept of
saturated set defines how such sets should behave if we want to simulate partial
states. Original definitions of saturated sets can be traced back to [Aczel 1968]
and [Thomason 1968] 1. Our definition of saturated sets of formulae, which we
present in the sequential style of the preceding chapters, boils down to maximal
consistency for total logics. In other words, saturation is not an adjustment of
maximal consistency, but is rather a generalization. We present its definition in
such a way that the forthcoming results can be applied just as easily to total
logics as to the partial logics which we focus on.
5.1. DEFINITION. Let S be a certain sequential derivation system, and let GS
be its language.
S is consistent iff 0 F~S 0.
A set of formulae r C GS is said to be S-consistent, whenever r Fjs 0.
A set of formulae r C GS is said to be S-saturated whenever for all 0 C G.S: -
r~so~onr~0.
The collection of all S-saturated sets will be denoted by C~ats in the sequel of
the text.
The criterion of saturation is the converse of the sT.altT rule. This can be seen
as the most basic step of inference in the sequential systems of part I. In this
sense, a saturated set can be seen as an ideal assumption set. Every consequence
set is already represented in the assumption set by means of at least one of its
elements.
5.2. OssEItvATION. An S-saturated set is always S-consistent, because when-
ever a set r is not S-consistent, then r F-S ~, but 0 n r- 0.
Maybe the definition of S-consistency is not immediately clear. The best
way to explain its definition is that whenever 0 is derivable from a set r, then
everything must be derivable from r by the rule It-MON: r F-S 0 for all ~ C GS.
Of course, not every system contains this rule, but in this paper it is contained by
all the derivational systems which were put on the stage in part I. We prefer this
style of definitions because it does not make use of linguistic specific properties
such as connectives.
In [Aczel 1968] saturated sets are presented as saturated theories. The word
theory indicates that they are deductively closed. This automatically follows
from our sequential definition, when we substitute singletons for the right hand
sequence:
r~Sb~óEr.
If finite S-conclusion sets might be replaced by disjunctions, which is the case
in the systems that we discuss here, we also obtain
r~Scpv~i~cpEror~Er
lIn these articles saturated sets are used to give completeness proofs for intuitionistic pred-
icate logic.
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for S-saturated sets. Sets of formulae which satisfy this property are called
prime in (Aczel 1968]. Sets which are consistent, prime and deductively closed
are called saturated there. Whenever S satisfies r~S ~p v~ t~ r~S cp, ~, our
definition coincides with Aczel's. Again, for reasons of linguistic independence2,
and also its conciseness, we prefer our sequential definition.
This definition of saturated sets generalizes the notion of maximal consistency
in classical logic indeed, because whenever a set is saturated with respect to the
sequential system for classical logic, the rule R-TRUE ~, i.e. r, cp ~ 0~ r~
~cp, ~, forces it to be maximal as well. Suppose that r is such a saturated set,
related to a sequential derivation system for classical logic. Clearly r, cp ~ cp,
and therefore also r ~~cp, cp. This entails for all formulae ~p either ~p E r or
~cp E r. If r had a proper saturated extension 0, then there exists cp E 0 such
that cp ~ r. Given the earlier observation, this entails ~cp E r, and because
r C 0 also ~cp E ~. This entails 0 F- ~cp, and by L-FALSE ~ and the double
negation property in classical logic, we have 0, ~p F- 0. cp E 0 makes us conclude
~~- 0, which contradicts the consistency of ~.
This observation also applies to systems with the weak negation ~ such as P~
and M~. In short, P~- and M~-saturation coincides with maximal P~- and
M~-consistency respectively.
Saturation lemmas
The construction of a maximally consistent set out of a given consistent set,
which proves the above-mentioned Lindenbaum lemma in classical logic, is most
often carried out without limitations of building materials. Maximality is just
the final stage of piling up arbitrary formulae, with the only restriction that we
are not allowed to give up the consistency. In partial logic the construction of
saturated sets is often more restricted in the sense that certain formulae are sim-
ply prohibited from being used as such building material. Especially in proving
truth lemmas for partial modal formalisms, as we will see in the completeness
proof procedure for M, saturated sets have to be built inside another set. Such a
limiting set is normally given in advance as an upper bound of the construction.
The generalization of the Lindenbaum lemma which we will present, guarantees
a successful construction whenever this upper bound is rich enough to intersect
all sequences which are derivable from the set with which we start the con-
struction. The following definition gives the precise prescriptions of such upper
bounds. We will call these upper bounds saturators.
5.3. DEF1rtlTlotv. Let S be a sequential derivation system and GS its language.
A C GS is an S-satu.rator of a set r C GS whenever for all 0 C GS:
r~so~onn~~.
We will call r an S-saturant of n. We abbreviate this relation between r and A
byrasn.
2Such dependence is relevant if we wish to arrange completeness for systems with a V-free
language. An illustrative example is a partial logic with weak Kleene conjunction ~ and the
strong negation, as we have discussed in chapter 2(page 48).
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5.4. OBSERVATION. Note that every S-saturant I' must also be S-consistent:
I' FfS 0. The reader should be aware of the possible S-inconsistency of S-
saturators. A simple example is the full language G which is a P-saturator
of every P-consistent set. In general we obtain
I' ds GS t~ I' is S-consistent.
If S contains the L-1vlotv rule and I' 4S A, then we also have I" as A for every
subset I" of I'. Note furthermore that I' 4S A' for all A' ~ A, whenever I' as A.
The definition of saturator expresses a relative richness with respect to the
deductive range of its saturants. The meaning of an S-sequent I' ~s 0, which
we presented in part I, was the guarantee that if all elements of the assumption
set I' hold, some ó E ~ also holds. In this regard, a saturator A of I' is rich
enough to select at least one the members of 0.
The-g,;neralization-of zhe classicaLl,indenbaumlemma, which we will b~-
tize as the bounded saturation lemma, shows that the richness of a saturator is
sufficient to guarantee that a saturated extension can be found for every satu-
rant. This result applies to all the systems which contain the sTnRT rule, the
two monotonicity rules and the cuT rule, hence to all the systems which we
discussed in the earlier chapters. In fact, this forthcoming result identifies the
definition of saturator as being the precise requirement for an upper bound to
contain a saturated extension. Notice that the converse of this bounded satura-
tion lemma is a trivial statement. If A is not a saturator of I', then it cannot
possibly contain a saturated extension of I' (L-NtoN).
Let I' ds A. Our aim is to find a I" E C̀~ats such that I' C I'' C A. The
procedure to obtain this result is by adding only formulae from A to I' in such
a way that A does not have to give up its role as S-saturator. The construction
is more careful then the construction of maximally consistent sets in classical
logic, as this proposed addition procedure implies the maintenance of consistency
according to observation 5.4.
The following lemr~a shows that such additions to I' are always possible from
its S-conclusion sets of the saturant.
5.5. LEtvtNtA. Let S be a sequential derivation system which contains the CuT
rule. If r as A and I' ~S 0 for certain finite set 0 C GS, then there exists
óEOsuchthatI'fóaSA. -
Proof. Let I' 4S A and I' ~S ~ with 0 finite, and suppose that I' f ó gls A for all
ó E ~. This means that for all b E 0 there exists E6 C GS such that
I', ó~S EB and Ea fl A- 0.
Let E:- U6EO E6. L-MON yields I', ó f-S E for all ó E 0. Application of CUT to
this last S-sequent and the assumption I' ~S ~ yields I' I-S 0- ó, E. Repetition of
CUT-application for all ó's eliminates the complete 0 from the last S-sequent. In short,
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r~s E. Because r ds A we conclude E fl A~ 0. This contradicts that Eó fl A- 0 for
allbEO. ~ -
This result is responsible for the success of the proposed construction of S-
saturated sets which we had in mind.
5.6. LEMMA. BOUNDED SATURATION LEMMA (BSL)
Suppose S is a sequential derivation system containing the structural rules
START, L-MON, R-MON and CUT. If A C Gs be an S-saturator of r C Gs, then
A contains an S-saturated set r' such that r C r'. In formal transcription:
dr,ncGs: rasn ~ ~r'Erats: rcr'cn
Proof. Let r ds A and let {cp;};Er, be an enumeration of A. We define the following
sequence of subsets of Gs
ro:-r
rntl :-
I rn ~~n lf rn ~~n aS A
rn
Fllrthermore we take r' C Gs to be the limit of this sequence:
r' :- U rn.
nEN
r C r' C A is immediately clear from the definition of r` above. Another direct
consequence of the construction above is rn 4s A for all n E IN. What is left to show
is r' E C~uts. -
Suppose r' ~s 0. We need to prove r' fl ~~ 0. The assumption set can be reduced
to a finite sequence ryl ,.., y„~ in r" such that ryl ,.., ry,,, F-s 0. Because every member of
r' is a member of some ri, this means that there exists rk such that {ryl, .., y,,, } C rk
(take for example k- max;E{1,.,,n} rn; where {rn; };̀ 1 is a subsequence of {rn}nEev
with ry; E rn; ) , and thus rk ~s ~ according L-MON. Since rk 4s A, we also have
~ fl A~ 0. Because 0 C Gs has been pícked arbitrarily as an S-conclusion set of r'
we have r' 4s A. This conclusion, combined with lemma 5.5, guarantees the existence
of a formula b E ~ such that
r'fb4sA.
This result also ensures that rn ~- b 4s A for all n E IN whenever r' ~s ~, because
all these sets are subsets of the limit set r' (observation 5.4). Obviously, b E A, which
means that there exists l E IlV such that ~pi - b. Because ri f cpi 4s A, we know that
b E rttl by the inductive definition of the sequence {rn}nEpv. We conclude b E r',
and so r' f10 ~ 0. This establishes the desired result: r' E C7ats. ~
Also the proof of this Lindenbaum-like lemma is a generalization of the nor-
mal proof of the classical Lindenbaum lemma. In order to obtain maacimally
consistent sets out of consistent sets, we add cpn to rn in the n-th construction
step of such a maximally consistent set whenever it is consistent with rn. In this
proof the parameter A is taken to be constantly the full language Gs. Accord-
ing to the last remark ín observation 5.4, this simplification turns the addition
otherwise.
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test in the inductive construction of r' into an ordinary consistency check, and
subsequently presents the classical proof of the Lindenbaum lemma for maxi-
mally consistent sets. This pictures the subtlety of the procedure in asL, when
we compare it to the relatively rough construction in the classical Lindenbaum
lemma.
BsL turns out to be useful in proving completeness results on the basis of
canonical Henkin models, whenever we have to look for saturated sets in a cer-
tain direction. Such manipulation from above is particularly relevant in the
completeness proof for M, but also for extensions of constructive logics with
additive non-persistent connectives such as N~ and NMo.
Lemma 5.6 has been given the name bounded saturation lemma because it
is an equivalent formulation of the so-called saturation lemma, which is widely
used for proving completeness of partial and constructive logics [Aczel 1968]
[Thomason 1968] [Veltman 1985] (Troelstra 8z van Dalen 1990] (Thijsse 1992]3.
It says that if a formula cp is not derivable from an assumption set r, then there
exists a saturated set which contains r but not cp. A sequential reformulation
of this result comes down to the existence of a saturated set E such that r C E
and E fl ~- 0 for all r, 0 C GS with r Ff S 0. The equivalence of these two
lemmas can easily be deduced from an observation made by Elias Thijsse, which
relates the notion of saturator and non-derivability.
5.7. PROPOSITION. If S is a sequential derivation system which contains the
R-MON rule, then
rasn a rysn~.
Proof. ~: Suppose I' E-s A~. Clearly A~ fl A- 0, and therefore I' ~Js A.
~: Suppose I' ~s A. This means that there exists ~ C GS such that I' ~s 0 and
0 fl A- 0, or in other words, 0 C A~. Hereupon, R-1vtoN entails I' ~s A~. ~
The precise formulation of the saturation lemma is given below.
5.8. LEMMA. SATURATION LEMMA
Let S be a derivational system as in ssL.
dr,OCGs: rIfSO ~ ~EEC̀~ats: rCE8eEf10-~.
Proof. Suppose I' Ffs 0. Proposition 5.7 shows that I' ds 0~. BSL proves the
existence of an S-saturated set E such that I' C E C 0~, or in other words, I' C E and
Eno-O. ~
- -
The proof above shows us that BSL implies the saturation lemma. A demon-
stration triat the saturation lemma is equivalent to asL for systems with the
structural rules which have been mentioned in these lemmas, can also be ob-
tained with the help of Thijsse's proposition 5.7. If r 4S n then also r Ifs A~,
3In [Thijsse 1992] this saturation lemma has been called generali2ed Lindenbaum lemma.
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and thereupon the saturation lemma entails an S-saturated set E such that
I' C E and E n A~ - 0, or in other words r C E C A.
Our understanding of saturated sets is now sufficient to prove the relevant
truth lemmas for the systems which were introduced in the preceding chapters,
and the demonstration of their consequential completeness.
5.2 Completeness of P and M
It is easy to show that the propositional system P is complete with respect
to ~:i-validity, by means of the more conventional saturation lemma (Thijsse
1992]. Suppose I' IfP 0 for certain I', 0 C G. This means that there exists
a P-saturated set I" such that I'~` n ~- 0. With every P-saturated set E
we associate a partial valuation VE which is defined completely by the atomic
content of E:
VE(p)-1qpEE and VE(p)-0t~~pEE forallpElP.
5.9. OBSERVATION. TRUTH LEMMA P
VE~~pq~pEE and V~~~pa~cpEE forall~pEG.
This is the truth lemma formulated for P. Besides truth we also refer to
falsity (~) in its presentation above. The formulation is equivalent with the left
conjunct only as a consequence of the truth conditional meaning of the negation
~. The reason to state the result in this way, is that it makes things easier during
the inductive proof procedure, which is based on the construction of formulae.
In the case of P this proof is completely straightforward. To show how it works,
we present the falsification step for ~.
Suppose ~(cp~~) E E. Because ~cp ~P ~cp and ~~ ~p ~~ we obtain through
application of R-FALSE n ~(~p ~~) ~P ~cp, ~~. Since E is P-saturated, we
obtain VE ~ cp~~ by application of the induction hypothesis (VE ~ cp or VE ~
~, because ~cp E E or ~~ E E). The other way around is instantaneously
obtained by the induction hypothesis and the definition of falsification of
conjunctions by VE.
Because I" n ~- 0, we know, by means of the truth lemma above, that Vr. ~ 8
for all b E 0, while Vr. ~-y for all ry E I', for I' C I". Therefore, I' ~~ 0. For
sake of presentation, we give a formal transcription of the completeness result
in the following theorem.
5.10. THEOREM. COMPLETENESS P
Foranr,oCG: r~~o ~ r~-po.
In classical modal logics the maximally consistent sets are normally assembled
as worlds in one Kripke model [Hughes 8z Cresswell 1984]. This is the so-called
canonical or Henkin model of the logic. This is what we will do as well in the
case of saturated sets with regard to partial Kripke models.
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VM(r)(p)-1qpEr and V,~(r)(p)-04~~pEr forallpElP.
The definition of VM makes sure that the proof of the truth lemma succeeds
for the propositional variables and the extensional connectives 1, ~ and n. Note
that this function is well-defined, for p E E implies ~p ~ E for all E E C7atM.
This is a simple consequence of the consistency of saturated sets (observation
5.4).
The accessibility relation R,~ has been defined in such away that it enables
us to prove the truth lemma for the intensional connective ~. We can simplify
this definition:
RM(r, o) a o-r c o c o-r.
This reformulation explicitly states that accessible saturated sets should be
contained in a given upper bound, which is imposed by the saturated sets from
which this set is accessible. The intuitive idea behind this upper bound is the
requirement that possible or accessible worlds should never contain more in-
formation than the information which is determined as being possible by the
original world (set).
BsL will be of help in respecting these upperbounds, whenever we look after
particular accessible saturated sets. In general, the essence of proving complete-
ness for intensional partial systems on the basis of ssL, most often boils down to
finding satisfactory saturators. Also in the truth lemma of M, which is presented
below, ssL facilitates the argumentation4.
5.12. LEMMA. TRUTH LEMMA M
For all r E C̀~at,u and cp E Go:
MM,r~cpacpEr and MM,r~~pa~~pEr.
Proof. The proof runs, as usual, by induction on the construction of formulae. We
skip the extensional cases p E If', 1, -~ and n. They follow immediately from the
definition of VM and the induction hypothesis. What is left is an exposition of the
induction step of the intensional O-operator. This part of the proof is established by
the right choice of the canonical accessibility relation Rly .
Suppose Ocp E I'.
The definition of the accessibility relation R,y guarantees cp E 0 for a110 E C7at,y
such that RM (I', 0). This entails, on account of the induction hypothesis, that
RM (I', ~) ~ Mn~, ~~ cp for all 0 E C̀iatna.
According to the truth condition of ~cp, this means Mn.r, I' ~ Ocp.
Take ~~cp ~ I'.
4Earlier completeness proofs for M were troublesome and lengthy, both in Henkin style
~Thijsse 1992] and also on the basis of normal forms (Jaspars 1993]
150 Chapter 5. Completeness
As in the induction step above, the definition of R,r~ and the induction hypothesis
gives us the desired result: M,yf , r~[]cp
The somewhat more difficult cases are:
M,y,I'~Ocp~OcpEr and -~~cpEr~M,y,r~Ocp.
Below we will demonstrate by means of the modal sequential derivation rules of M,
R-TRUE O, L-FALSE O and the monotonicity rules that the following two claims hold
(i) ~cp ~ r ~ t7-r 4,y (O-r - cp), and
(ii) ,o~ E r ~ (a-r -~ ,~) aM o-r.
If Orp ~ r, application of the bounded saturation lemma to the first claim (i) guarantees
the existence of a 0 E C7atn~ such that RM (r, 0) and cp ~ 0. The induction hypothesis
yields M,y, ~~ cp, and subsequently M,y , r~[]~p.
Responding to the second claim (ii), the bounded saturation lemma guarantees the
existence of a 0 E C7at,yf such that Rry(r,0) and ~cp E 0 whenever ~Ocp E r. This
~ enables us to use the induction hypothesis, and then conclude M1y, r~ Ocp.
The claims (i) and (ii) above can be demonstrated through two simple M-derivations.
Suppose OcO ~ r.
1. []-r i-M E ~ R-MON
2. []-r ~~y cp, E- cp ~ R-TRUE I]
3. oo-r I-M Ocp, O(E - cp) ~ L-MONS
4. r F~,y Ocp, O(E - cp)
Because r E C̀~at,~r and C7cp ~ r we know that there exists a E E- cp such that
Oo E r. Reformulation of this result gives us E n(O-r - cp) ~ (D. Because E
have been chosen arbitrarily as an M-conclusion set of O-r, this result establishes
o-r aM o-r - ~.
Let ~~cp E r.
1. O-r, ~~ ~M E~ L-FALSE 0
2. C)O-r, ~Ocp ~,y OE ~ R-MON6
3. r ~M OE
Because r E C7atn1 this result entails O-r n E~(~, and subsequently O-r f
~cp 4,y O-r, by the arbitrariness of E as a conclusion set of O-r -~ ~cp.
5.13. THEOREM. COMPLETENESS OF M
Fora11I',OCGa: I'~~O~I'F-,Np.
Proof. r IfM 0~ saturation lemma
3E E C̀~at,y : r C E 8e E n 0- 0~ truth lemma M
5(oo-r -{o~ ~a~ E r} c r).
e(,o~ E r and oo-r c r~.
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3EEC̀~níM`dryEI't16E0: Mn.r,E~yBeMM,E~b q I'~~0. ~
The proof of the final completeness result is fully analogous to the complete-
ness of P as a corollary of its truth lemma. Henceforth we will skip proofs like
the one above, because we will continuously use the same procedure.
A little reflection on the proof of the truth lemma for M shows that we have
made minimal use of specific properties of the system M. In fact the argu-
mentation can be copied for any extension X of M. If Gx - Go for such an
extension, then the truth lemma of X with respect to the X-canonicad rrcodel has
already been accomplished by the proof for M. This model is simply defined
as Mx -(C7atx, Rx, Vx) with Rx - RM ~ C7atx and Vx - VM ~ C7atx. The
reader may convince himself of the fact that all references to M-saturated sets
may freely be replaced by X-saturated sets.
5.14. OBSERVATION. Suppose that X is an extension of M with Gx - Go
~hatisr~0 ~ r~xOforallr,OCGo). ForallrEC7afxand~pEGo:
Mx,r~~pacpEr and Mx,r~~pa~cpEr.
The economic use of logical sources in the truth lemma 5.12 entails more
generalization, especially about the structural behavior of the modal rules, R-
TRUE 0 and t-FAI.sE ~. These two modal rules and the two monotonicity rules
were the only rules which have been employed in order to establish the desired
result for the modal operator ~.
5.15. OBSERUa,TION. The justification of the ~-steps in the proof of the truth
lemma 5.12 illustrates that for every system S, which contains these two modal
rules and the structural rules of M, if r E Cyats and cp E GS then
~~o-r ~ ~oEC~ats: a-rcoco-r8~~~o ,and
~Eo-r ~ ~oE~ats: o-rcoco-r~~Eo.
We did not use the structure of the canonical model MM which it has on
account of the other connectives. This means that a completeness result with
respect to ~l'i-validity for a system M- n with GM-„ - Go~, which consists
of the M-rules except the rules for ~, can immediately be distillated from the
truth lemma 5.12.
In fact all extensional connectives can be thrown out. This radical linguis-
tic impoverishment leads to an ultimate minimal modal logic. It contains the
structural rules and R-TRUE 0 and I.-TRUE O. Let us call this system Mod. Its
language G,yod is the smallest superset of IP such that for every cp E G,yod also
O~P E GMod and OcP E G~yod (the definition O-~O~ is no longer possible, be-
cause the negation has been dropped as well). Provision of the regular semantics
to this restricted language 7 leads immediately to a completeness result on the
basis of the same arguments as in the truth lemma of M and the observation
7M-(W,R,V)E~Ti,wEW: M,w~pqV(w)(p)-1,M,w~O~pqM,v~~pforall
v such that R(w, v), and M, w ~ O~p q M, v ~ ~p for certain v such that R(w, v). Note that
we no longer have to use falsity definitions.
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5.15 above. Only a slight modification of the `~~cp E I"- to a`Ocp E I"-step has
to be made. 8
Completeness of P~ and M~
These observations above also apply to the extensions of P and M with a weak
negation. The truth lemmas for these logics are really straightforward. Only
the weak negation step of the induction of the proof of the truth lemmas need
to be checked. We leave this to the reader. In fact, in the case of M, the earlier
canonical model can be used. It is not hard to see that M,y - MMti.
5.3 Completeness of constructive modal logics
In this section we present completeness proofs for constructive extensions of P
and M. Linguistically the difference with these basic systems is the constructive
implication. In chapter 3 we have seen that this implication is interpreted by
means of an intensional information structure. Accomplishment of complete-
ness for systems like N, N~, NM and NMo with respect to their correspond-
ing model classes consequently requires some deeper analysis for finding proper
canonical interpretation of this information structure. As truth lemmas are
quickly obtainable by the earlier results of the previous section, most of the
work in this section is spent on justification of this canonical interpretation.
This structural choice must be made in such a way that the canonical models
are inhabitants of the proper classes. Otherwise, such canonical models would
not serve as a uniform counter-model for non-sequents.
We will start this survey by an illustration of how a canonical interpretation
of this information structure can be implemented such that the completeness of
N and its most elementary non-persistent variation N~ can be accomplished in
the Henkin style of the preceding sections of this chapter.
Completeness of N and N~
As an example of a restricted class of partial Kripke models we have presented
Nelson models M-(W, C, V) for interpretation of Nelson's logic of constructible
falsity. The two characteristic requirements for such models as a suitable seman-
tics for constructive logics were that the relation C had to be a pre-order and
the valuation function needed to be monotonic with respect to this information
order.
As a matter of fact, our final choice for a canonical information structure,
which is forthcoming in definition 5.20, is closely related to the canonical inter-
pretation of accessibility in classical modal logic. Only a lower bound is required.
BActually, this completeness is also valid with respect to total Kripke models. In this case,
the lower-upper-bound definition of the accessibility relation in the canonical model has to be
used as well, due to the absence of a negation.
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In the next section on up-and-down logic, a lower-upper bound definition for in-
formation structures reappears.
It turns out that for constructive systems with a fully persistent language the
order of set inclusion can be used. Below we give the completeness procedure
for N.
5.16. DEFINITION. The N-canonical model is the triple MN -(C~atN, C, VN),
where VN is precisely the same valuation function as we defined for the M-
canonical model.
5.17. OBSERVATION. Mnr E ~.
Proof. C7aí1v is not empty, C is a pre-order and V~v is surely monotonic. ~
The demonstration of the truth lemma is short. We only expose the induction
5.18. LEMMA. TRUTH-LEMMA N
Let r be an N-saturated set, and let cp E G~ .
MN,r~cpqcpErandMN,r~cpa~cpEr
Proof. Again, we leave the induction steps for the G-connectives. They are im-
mediate consequences of the definition of V~v and the induction hypothesis. This is
also the case for ~(~p -a zG) E I' as the negation `extensionalizes' the implication into a
conjunction cp n ~z~i.
MN,r~~P-'~qMN,r~~G~MN,r~~p
~,,~Er~,(~-~~)Er
This last step is fully backed up by L- and R-FALSE -~.
In order to make the verification step for implications, we need the information order
in the N-canonical model, i.e. the order of set inclusion.
Let cp -i z~ E I'. 070
This means that for all 0 ~ I' with cp E 0 also -c~i E 0, because also ~p --~ z~i E 0 and
cp, cp -~ ~ I-N ~. By induction for all 0 ~ I' we obtain Miv, 0~ cp ~ Mnr, 0 ~ z~.
We conclude M1v, I' ~ ~p -~ ~. -
Suppose cp -~ ~i ~ I'. 010
This also gives us I' FfN ~p -~ ~ and therefore (R-TRUE ~) I',cp IfN ~i. Upon this,
the saturation lemma yields an N-saturated set 0 such that I' U {cp} C 0 with
z~ ~ 0. Induction gives us MN, ~ ~ cp and MN, ~ ~~, and in conclusion I' C 0
entails M1v,I' ~ ~p -~ ~.
~
5.19. THEOREM. COMPLETENESS N
Foraur,ocG~: r~~o ~ r~No.
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Admission of non-persistence means that the inclusion order cannot be used as
a canonical information structure any longer. As we have seen in chapter 3 non-
persistent variations of constructive logic do not preserve the logic N. They add
some axioms for the new connectives, but rule out the right hand introduction
of implication, because deduction property is lost. This also leads to a weaker
canonical information order. For the non-persistent variations of Nelson logic,
but also for the logic NMo, we use the relation C between saturated sets.
Intuitively I' C 0 says that all information in I' which is persistent with respect
to information orders in models for constructive logic also appears in 0. As we
have only syntactic means at our disposal to implement this definition we use
the following classification of persistent information of a set of formulae I':
pI' -{cp E I'~ cp !-~,ti T-~ cp}.
For a constructive system C, we also specify this in the notation of C and p by
subscripts.
5.20. DEFirriTiorr. Let I' and ~ be C-saturated sets.
I'CcObpCI'C0.
The converse relation CC1 is abbreviated by ~C.
5.21. OsSERVAT~oN. The proposition T-~ cp means that cp holds in every
extension of the current state. T--~ is therefore a special instance of a necessity
operator. This means this lower bound of the canonical interpretation of the
information order, is principally the same as 0-I' in the definition of RM. An
upper bound, like O-I' as in definition 5.11, is not needed here. In the next
section, where we prove completeness of up-and-down logic, an upper bound
reappears. This coincides with the anti-persistence of the left argument.
Notice furthermore that the definition of C is identical to the normal inclusion
order C if the full language Gc is persistent. This indicates that C can be
employed as a standard canonical information order for constructive systems.
For example, the canonical model for N in definition 5.16. Also for the modal
extensions of the constructive logics which we presented in the earlier chapters,
this information order is implemented.
5.22. DEFitviTiotv. Let C be a non-modal extension of N-. The C-canonical
model is the triple Mc -(C~atc, Cc, Uc), where Uc is precisely defined as in
definition 5.16 with the restricted domain C~atC.
If C is a normal extension of NM- - M-~ N-, then its canonical is the quadrup-
le MC -(SatC, Rc, Cc, Uc ) where RC is the imitation of R,y in definition 5.11
and Uc is defined as in the definition of the canonical valuation function above
(with the domain C7atC).
These definitions are a sufficient preparation for a short presentation of the
truth lemma for the most simple non-persistent variation of Nelson's logic: N~.
5.23. I,EMMA. TRUTH LEMMA N~
For all I' E C~atN~ and cp E G~~~
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MN~,r~cpacpEr and MN~,r~cpq~cpEr.
Proof. Only the verification step of the implication needs some clarification. Falsi-
fication of --~ is the same as in the proof of the truth lemma of N.
Suppose cp -~ ~i E I'.
This is the easy part. Clearly T--~ (cp ~~i) E I' by pERS ~. So, if ~~N~ I' then
also cp --~ z~ E 0. L-TRUE -~ guarantees upon this:
`dO~N~I': cpEO~~iEO.
By means of the induction hypothesis, we conclude
`dO~N~ 1~:MN~,O~~G~M1y~,0~~11.
This conclusion yields MN~ , I' ~ cp -~ ~.
Now consider, cp -~ ~i ~ I'.
This assumption also yields pNti I' IfNti cp -~ ~i, because pNti I' C I' and L-MON.
-~;n~ PN~~---LiP ~ T~-`P- E I'} (obserXation á.2T~-a,nd R-Tu~r~,-urEAK -~-,-w~
obtain p~,ti I', cp IfN~ ~i. Application of the saturation lemma gives us the desired
0: pNti I' C 0 8c cp E ~ 8t zv ~ p. The induction hypothesis proves
MN~,~ ~ cp and MN~,O ~ ~i.
Because 0 ~Nti I', this conclusion entails Mlv~ , I' ~ ~p -~ ~i.
~
5.24. THEOREM. COMPLETENESS N~
For all r, ~ c c~~~: r~~~ 0~ r~N~ ~.
Establishing truth lemmas for the basic constructive logics turned out to be
a relatively easy job. In fact, both truth lemmas, lemma 5.18 and lemma 5.23,
above can fully be adopted by the logics NM and NMo. The completeness
result only demands for a demonstration that their canonical models belong to
the proper class: MNM E~fiT and MN,~o E~Ro. The characteristic property
of the class ~J2fiT is that the information order in a given model M-(W, R, C
, V) E~ is a bisimulation over the accessibílity frame of the model (W, R, V).
Henceforth, what has to be proved in the sequel, to derive the completeness for
NM, is
~dr, r', o' E C7atNM : r C r' 8~ R„rM(I", o') ~
~0 E C̀7(IfNM : RNM(r, 0) óL 0 C 0' ( 1), and
dr, r', o E~atNM : r c r' a~ RNM (r, o) ~
~0' E ~QtNM : RNM (r', ~') óL ~ C 0' (2)9.
Reaching a completeness result for the system NMo with respect to ~fito-
validity is obtained by a demonstration that the equation ( 1), with replacement
of C by CNMo , holds for C~atN,yo .
In the following subsection we will dwell upon such extension orders in canon-
ical models in order to establish the classification of these canonical models as
inhabitants of ~7t~J7t and ~o, respectivelylo
9Remember that CN1y-C.
lOIn chapter 7 we will also mention other information orders which are based on bisimulations
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Extension orders in canonical models
A convenient procedure to establish the bisimulation result for C in the canonical
model of a system of some M-extension X, consists of showing that for all
r, r' E C~atX if r C r' then
d~' E CyatX : RX(r', 0') ~ o-r aX (O-r n 0') (3) and
`d0 E C~atX : RX(r, 0) ~(t]-r' U ~) aX o-r' (4) .
Such results would indeed, in combination with the bounded saturation lemma,
recognize C as a bisimulation on ~C7atX, RX). BSL responds to the first claim
that there exists a 0 E C̀~afX such that []-r C p C(~' n O-r), which can
be rewritten in the intended form: RX(r,0) and 0 C ~'. With respect to the
second claim, ssl, yields a 0' E C̀~atX such that (t]-r' U 0) C 0' C O-r', or
in other words RX(r', 0') and 0 C 0'. The following lemma presents a more
general result. -
5.25. LElv1Mw. Let X be an extension of M, and suppose r is an X-saturated
set and n C ,CX.
If []-r aX A then there exists an X-saturated set 0 such that
o-rCoCO-r and OCn.
If A 4X O-r there exists an X-saturated set 0 such that
o-rCoCo-r and nCO.
A full formal transcription of these results looks like this:
o-raXn~~DEC7atX:RX(r,0)Be~CA(1),drE~atXdnccX: - -n aX o-r ~~o E ratX : RX(r,o) ~ n c o(2).
Proof. To begin with, we prove the saturation result ( 1) above. Suppose ~-r dX A,
and O-r 1-X O for certain finite set O C .Cx. Combination of these two assumptions
yields O n A~ 0. Separation of O into a A- and a non-A-component set entaíls the
following reformulation: (]-r f-X O n A, O`A. Application of R-TRUE V entails
o-r ~X V o`n, o n n.
Thereupon, application of ft-TRUE t7 and L-MON successively yields
r~X o(U o`n), o(o n n).
The X-saturation of r guarantees that either O(v0 `A) E r or that there exists
B E O n A such that OB E r. In the former case we have O-r ~X O`A. This does
not reconcile with O-r 4X A, because the conclusion set O `A obviously does not
intersect A. This means that O n A n O-r ~ 0. Because O has been picked arbitrarily
as a finite X-conclusion set of O-r, we have made sure by the latter observation that
o-r ax A n o-r.
in canonical models. Such results are particularly important for finding good model-theoretic
characteristics for axiomatic extensions of the basic partial modal logic M.
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Application of the bounded saturation lemma gives us the desired X-saturated set 0
withO-rCOCO-randOCA (1).
Now we will prove the result (2) above. Suppose A 4x O-r and O-r,A ~x E for
certain E C Gx. The latter assumption implies, on account of L-TRUE n, the existence
of a finite subset A' C A such that
a-r, n n' ~x E.
L-MON and L-TRUE O transform this X-sequent into
r, o(n n') ~x oE.
Because A 1-x n A' and A dx O-r we know that O(n A') E r. This result tells us
that the X-sequent above is the same as r I-x OE. The X-saturation of r guarantees
thereupon E n o-r ~ m. As we have chosen E as an arbitrary X-conclusion set of
O-r U A, we may conclude that
o-r u n ax o-r.
According the bounded saturation lemma this last result means that there exists an
X-saturated set 0 such that ~-r C 0 C O-r and A C 0. ~
Note that we have used the presence of the disjunction and conjunction rules
to obtain the result of lemma 5.25. The proof above might be seen as a general-
ization of the results (i) and (ii) in the proof of the truth lemma 5.12 on page 149
for M. The single argument cp there is replaced by finite sets of formulae. To
derive a similar conclusion, these multiple arguments have to be compressed by
means of disjunctions and conjunctions, respectively. In this sense, our means
to prove the completeness of constructive modal logics are not as pure as in the
case of partial modal logics, and therefore, general transposition of completeness
results for sublanguages are no longer obtainable from our forthcoming com-
pleteness results for NM and NMo. So, a technical challenge which remains is
to show whether lemma 5.25 still holds for systems which evolve from retract-
ing the conjunction and its introduction rules. We leave this issue as an open
question.
An important corollary of lemma 5.25 is that the order of set inclusion is a
bisimulation over the canonical accessibility pattern (C7atx,Rx) for every M-
extension X.
5.26. CoROLLARY. The inclusion relation C is a bisimulation over the `canon-
ical accessibility' structure (C7atX, RX) for every M-extension X.
Proof. Let r, r', 0' E C̀~atx such that r C r' and Rx (r',~'). Obviously, ~- r 4x
0', because the last set is X-saturated. Moreover, o-r C o-r' C ~'. Application
of lemma 5.25 entails an X-saturated set 0 such that Rx(r,0) and ~ C ~'. This
argumentation shows -
(C oRx) C (Rxo C) (1).
Suppose r, r', 0 E C̀~atx such that r C r' and Rx (r, ~). Clearly, 0 4x O-r',
because 0 is X-saturated and 0 C O-r C O-r'. Lemma 5.25 makes sure that there
exists a 0' E C̀~atx such that Rx(r',0') and 0 C 0'. We conclude
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(~ oRx) C (Rxo ~) (2).
Findings (1) and (2) show that C is a bisimulation over (C̀~atx, Rx). 1
5.27. OssERVATtoN. Lemma 5.12 and corollary 5.26 prove that the converse
formulation of corollary 2.46 (page 70 holds for X-canonical models, for every
normal M-extension.
A question, which arises from the perfect match of informational contents
of worlds in canonical models of M-extensions and the bisimulation order, is
whether functional completeness results can be achieved for our language Go
with respect to these canonical models on the basis on the bisimulation extension
order. We think that bisimulation reformulations of information orders may be
useful to obtain such definability results for partial modal logics similar to those
of partial propositional logicsll. As said in chapter 2 such questions lie outside
the scope of the thesis, but the technical observations of this subsection may
support such future investigations.
Completeness of NM and NMo
Corollary 5.26 of lemma 5.25 immediately shows that the canonical model for
the logic NM is an inhabitant of the intended class ~7tfit.
5.2ó. LEMMA. M~y~y E ~t.
Proof. Because Go'~ is persistent with respect to the information structure in ~7i-
models, we know that CNM-C by observation 5.21. Corollary 5.26 shows that C is
a bisimulation over (C̀~atNM,RNM). The monotonicity of the valuation function is
accounted for in the same way as in the N-canonical model (see proof of lemma 5.17).
5.29. THEOREM. COMPLETENESS NM
dr, ~ C G~'~ : r~7Ifi2 ~~ I~ ~~rM ~.
Proof. The truth lemma is simply the same as for M and N. By means of this truth
lemma every non-NM-sequent has MNM as a counter-model, and the corollary above
shows that this model is in the proper class in ~7i~7i, and therefore it is an appropriate
counter-model. ~
Demonstration of MN,yo E~Jto, which would give us the completeness
theorem for NMo, needs a little modification of corollary 5.26. The extension
relation does not coincide with C, but with the less restricted relation C. Here,
the extra modal rule Dls t] -~ comes on the stage.
5.30. LEMMA. MNMo E ~to.
1tA study of definability for partial modal logic on the basis of bisimulation can be found in
(Thijsse 1992].
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Proof. We need to prove that ( CNMo oR1v~yo ) C (RNMo o CNMo ). This result
can be obtained by showing that -
0-I' 4ry~yo A With A:- 0' U(PNMo Go'~)~ (5),
whenever I' CNMo r' and RNMo ( I'', 0') for certain I'' E C̀~afN,yo . Indeed, lemma 5.25
would guarantee the existence of a ~ E C̀~at,vMo such that RNMo (I', ~) and 0 C A,
which entails p,",yo (~) C 0' ( ~ CNMo 0' ).
Suppose (]-I' ~~,~yo E for some finite E C Go'~. We need to prove E fl A~ 0. We
separate two complementary cases. -
(i): If Efl(pN,yoGo'~)~ ~ 0, then we immediately have intersection with the premed-
itated saturator A.
(ii): If E fl (pN1NoGo'~)~ - 0, then E C p,`,,~o Go'~, or in other words, for all v E E:
o ~N~ya T ~ v.
Because T-~ cp ~~,Mo T-~ (cp V~i), we also conclude for all these a E E:
~ ~NMo T -~ (V ~).
Iterative application of CvT yields
O-I' ~NMo T -~ (V ~).
By R-TRUE O and observation 3.29 on page 100, which captures the persistence preser-
vation of ~ in terms of NMo-deduction, we see that
I' ~NMo T ~ O(v E).
This last result shows that O(v E) E pN,yo (I'), which also implies O(v E) E I'' and
V E E ~'. Because the last set is NMo-saturated we have made sure that E fl ~' ~ 0,
and of course also E f1 A~ 0.
These complementary arguments ( i) and (ii) show the validity of (5). ~
5.31. THEOREM. COMPLETENESS NMo
dr, 0 C.C~'y : r~9T9Jfo 0~ r ~~rMo 0.
Proof. The truth lemma can be obtained by copying the implication step from N~.
The modal steps are precisely as in M, because NMo is an M-extension. Lemma 5.30
above shows that the NMo-canonical model, whose universal potential as a counter-
model for every non-NMo-sequent is recognized by its truth lemma, lives in the in-
tended class: fJiS.iJio . ~
5.4 Completeness of up and down logics
Canonical models for ud-extensions
A suitable definition of the canonical information structure for the up-and-down
systems, i.e. ud-extensions, can be given by an addition of an upperbound
restriction to the implementation of the canonical information structure of the
constructive logics in the previous section. This upper bound can be stipulated
by means of anti-persistent information.
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5.32. DEFINITION. Let X be an extension of ud, and let I' E C7aEx. The X-
persistent part of I', pxI', is the set {cp E I' ~ cp ~x []u cp}. The anti-persistent
part of I', apxI', is the set {cp E I' ~ cp ~-ud []d cp}.
The X-canonical information structure is the relation Kx over the collection of
X-saturated sets. This relation holds between two X-saturated sets I' and 0 if
and only if the persistent part of I' is contained by 0 arcd the anti-persistent part
of 0 is contained by I'. This is the above-mentioned additional upper bound.
Formally,
I'ccudOaPxrC~Btapx~CI'.
The following list presents some important properties of operators px and










The last two properties follow from cp ~x []ucp q ()dcp I-x cp and cp ~x
[]dcp q()u cp ~x cp. These equivalences can immediately be obtained by the
PERS and A-PERS rules in the ud-tables in chapter 3, table 3.17. The other
properties immediately follow from the definitions of px and apx, respectively.
5.34. OBSERVATION. From the last two properties in table 5.33 we also learn
that the canonical information structure of ud-extensions is in fact a reformu-
lation of the canonical accessibility structure of M-extensions.
I'KxOq[]u-I'COC ( ) u-I',and
I'ccx~q[]d-Ocrc( )d-0.
Proof. Let I' ccx ~. We prove the ~-direction of the first equivalence.
Suppose []„ cp E r. Because []u cp ~x []u []u cp, we obtain []u cp E pxI' and
therefore [ ]u cp E 0. Because [ ]u cp ~x cp, also cp E ~.
Suppose cp E 0. This assumption entails ( )u cp E 0, because cp ~x (}u cp. Fur-
thermore ()u E apx0, because (}u ()u cp ~x ( )u cP (last property of apx in
table 5.33). We conclude ()u cp E I'.
The ~-direction of the second claim above, can be proved by using the persistence and
anti-persistence rules of the ud-calculus, []dcp ~x ~p and cp ~x (}d cp.
The ~-directions can be obtained by a similar use of the modality reduction principles
of the ud-calculus. For example, if []u-I' C ~, and cp E pxl', then also []ucp E 1'
and therefore cp E 0. ~
Our reason for preferring the definition of ccx in 5.32 above is merely tech-
nical, and not yet important. In the next chapter on finite models, it turns out
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that this definition of the canonical information structure is very practical to
find finite counter-models for finite non-ud-sequents.
5.35. DEFINITION. Let X be a normal ud-extension. The X-canonical model
MX is the triple (C~atX, GGx, VX) with V(r)(p) - 1(0) q(~)p E r for all p E IP
and r E C̀~atX.
5.36. OBSERVATION. GGX is a pre-order over C7atX and VX is monotonic over
C7atX.
Proof. The reflexivity of GGx follows from the first two properties in table 5.33.
Transitivity of GGx follows from the second line of this table. Monotonicity of Vx is
an immediate consequence of p ~-x []u p and ~p ~x []u ~p for all p E IP (PERS (~)
IP). ~
In the forthcoming completeness proofs of up- and down-logics we use the
followíng siight re~oimuIation of the rules of R-TRUE an L-FALSE introduction
of the update and downdate operators.






PXr, ~P ~X ~, aPXO







r ~X [~]u ~, 0,
r, (~~u W ~X 0,
r ~X [~Pl d ~, ~, and
r, (~v)d~ ~X o.
These alternative rules can be derived from the weaker versions of the above-
mentioned rules in ud, which we have found in section 3.3 on page 95: R-TRUE'
[]u ~[]d and L-FALSE' []u 8c []d . The rules above can be derived immediately
by means of cuT and the finiteness property of ud.
The completeness of ud
F~om observation 5.36 we conclude immediately the structural appropriateness
of the ud-canonical model: Mud E~t. What is left to prove is the relevant truth
lemma.
5.38. LEMMA. TRUTH LEMMA ud
For all r E C̀~at,~d and cp E Gr'1:
Mud, r~~a~Er and Mud,I'~:pa~~pEr.
Proof. Again, we skip the basic step and the proofs of the extensional connectives.
For the intensional connectives, there are four cases which are nearly immediately
obtainable from the definition of GGud. Analogously to the O-step in lemma 5.12, these
four `easy' cases are:
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(i) [~vlu ~ E r ~ Mud, r ~ [~vlu ~G,
(ii) Mud, r~[wlu ~~~[~vlu EG E r,
(iii) [~P]d EG E r~ Mud, r~[~P]d ~,
(tv) Mud, r ~ [~]d ~ ~ ~[~]d ~ E r.
We will demonstrate the first and the last step. The two others are left to the reader.
[~p]u ~ E r ~ ([~p]u ~ ~ud [ ]u [~P]u ~, example 3.22)
`d0 ~~ud r : [~G]u ~ E 0 ~ (~P, [~P]u ~ ~ud ~)
d0 ~ud r: ~P E ~~ E~ E 0 ~ (induction hypothesis)
do ~~ud r : Mud, o ~ ~v ~ Mud, o ~ ~ ~ Mud, r ~ [~]u ~.
~[~P]d ~ ~ r ~ (~[~P]d ~ ~ud [ ]u ~[~P]d ~, second line of table 5.33)
`d~ Kud r : ~[~P]d EG ~ 0 ~ (~P ~ud ~[~P]d~, ~TG, example 3.22)
b'~ ~ud r : ~p ~ 0 ~ ~z~i ~ 0 ~ (induction hypothesis)
b0 ~ud r : Mud ~ ~ ~ Mud ~ ~ ~ Mud, r ~ [~]d ~.
The completing converse results of these four `easy' cases are consequences of the
following sequential statements, in combination with the bounded saturation lemma.
(v) [~]u ~ F r
(Vt) ~[lp]u1~ E r
(v:t) [cp]d ~i ~ r ~
Pudr f~P dud r U(aPudGt,l )C -~
Pudr ~ ~ ~ ,~ aud r U (aPudGr,l )c
aPudr aud r U (PudGi,l)c - ~P -,~
(vttt) ,[tp]d ~J E r ~ 8pudr ~ ,~1 aud r U (PudG?,1)c - ~
These saturation relations may seem complicated statements. The following simple
derivations explain why they lead to immediate success. For sake of briefness we only
prove that the claíms ( v) and (viii) give us the desired results: (v) ~ Mud, r ~[cp]u z~
and (viii) ~ Mud ~ [cp]d~i.
(v)~BSL3~EC7eltud:P udreoerU( aPud,Ci,l)CBecpE08eE~~0 ~
r~ud 0 óL Mud, ~~~~ Mud, 0 ~ 0 ~ Mud, r ~[~]u ~~
The second step in this formal transcription of the proof is correct, due to the
induction hypothesis and 0 C r U(apudGt,l)C ~ apud0 C apudr ~ ap„d0 c r
(table 5.33). - -
(viii) ~ssL ~~ E C7aEud : aPudr C 0 C rU(PudGt,l)c gz ~P ~ 0~~~ E ~~
~~ud r ÓL Mud, 0~~~ Mud, 0~~ ~ Mud, r~[~]d ~.
Again, the second step consists of application of the induction hypothesis and the
rightmost property of the second line in table 5.33.
The proofs of (vi) ~ Mud, r~[cp]u ~i and (vii) ~ Mud, r~[cp]d ~ are left to the
reader.
What is left to show is the validity of the claims (v) -(viii). Once again, we prove the
first and the last claim. The other two can be reproduced through mere imitation.
5.4. Completeness of up and down logics 163
Suppose [cp]u ~, ~ I'.
Let E C Gr'1 such that pudI', cp ~„d E. We need to prove that
E n (I' U ( aPudGt,l)~ - ~G) ~ 0.
If En(ap„dG?'1)C-z~ ~ 0, then we are done. So, suppose En(apudGr'1)C-,~ -~
which is the same as E C apudGi'1 ~~. In other words, all non-zli-elements of E
are anti-persistent, i.e. apud(E - z~) - E-~. The re-styling of R-TRUE []u in
observation 5.37 establishes the following derivation:
1. Pudr, ~P ~ud E - ~, ~ R-MON
2. I' ~ud E- zli, [cp]u z~i observation 5.37 and apud (E -~) - E- zG.
Because I' E C7c1E.,~d, the last ud-sequent above and the assumption [cp]u ~i ~ I'
entail ( E - zli) n I' ~ 0, and therefore also E n(I' U(apudG?'1)C - ,~i) ~ 0.
Suppose ~[cp]d ~i E I'.
Let E C Gr'1 with apudI' -I- ~~ ~ud E. We need to prove that
E n (I' u (P,.dGt,1)C - ~P) ~ ~ (2).
If E n((p4dGt'1)C - cp) ~ 0, then we have immediately our desired result. So, let
~ C pudGt'1 } cp. This means that pud(E - cp) - E- cp. The following derivation
settles this complementary case.
1. ap,.dr, ~~ ~ud E - ~P, ~P R-MON
2. I', ~(cp]d ~~ud E- cp observation 5.37, and pud(E - cp) - E- cp
3. I' ~ud E-~P ~[~p]d ~G E I'
Because I' E C̀~at,,d, we conclude E n(I' - cp) ~ 0 which also establishes (2).
~
5.39. THEOREM. COMPLETENESS ud
For all I' , o c Gr~~: r~~i.l o~ r~-ud o.
Note that the truth lemma of ud, just like the truth lemma of the minimal
partial modal logic M, can be used for any normal extension. Furthermore, the
induction steps only call upon the corresponding introduction rules. This means
that the completeness of systems which evolve from removing connectives or
operators immediately follow from the syntactically puritan proof of the truth
lemma above. For example, a complete system for only update-reasoning over
Nelson models is simply the system which consists of all the rules without the
ones which mention downdate operators. The only little modification which we
should make beforehand is a redefinition of anti-persistent information in terms
of updates. Table 5.33 shows that a re-styling like apXI' :- {cp E I' ~()u cp I-X
cp} for all I' C GX is satisfactory. This system is called u.
Sequential data logic
A system which is an update system over Nelson models is Veltman's data
semantics. As we have mentioned in section 3.1, this conditional logic uses
Nelson models with the refinability constraint: for all formulae there exists an
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extension of the current state which either falsifies or verifies this formula. Let's
write Veltman's conditional cp M zli as [cp]u ~. Their interpretations completely
coincide.
The additional axiom to u to capture the refinability constraint, in terms of
our update operator, is
r,~~o
[ ]u r, ~ ~[ ]u ~P, ( )u 0
SDL-R-FALSE [ ]u
Let's call this system sdl, i.e. u~ SDL-R-FALSE []u , an abbreviation of
sequential data logic. In terms of persistence and anti-persistence, the rule sDL-
R-TRUE []u above can be rephrased as follows:
Padlr~ tP ~edl aPad10 ~ r~adl ~[ ]u tP, 0-
The canonical model is the triple Madl - (C~at,at, GGadi, Vadl) where GG,dt is
defined as CGx in definition 5.32, with the definition of the anti-persistent part
replaced by its reformulation above. Vadi is defined as all previous global canon-
ical valuation functions. Clearly M,d~ E sJT (observation 5.33), and the truth
lemma for sdl can be obtained through a pure imitation of lemma 5.38. What
is left to show is that Mad~ is a model of data semantics, i.e. for all cp E G~ every
sdl-saturated set has an extension in Madi which determines the truth-value of
~.
5.40. OBSERVATION. For all E E C7at,d~ and cp E Gr there exists O E C~atadt
such that E K,dt O, and either cp E 0 or ~cp E O.
Proof. Let E E C̀~at,dt and cp E Gr. Because ~adt ()u cp, ()u ~cp, we know that
Ou ~p E E or Ou ~cp E E. In the former case, it can be proved that p,dlE f cp 4adt
E U(apadtGi)C just like claim (vi) in the proof of lemma 5.38. This means that there
exists O E C̀~at,dt such that E GG,dt O with cp E O.
The latter case establishes -~~p E O for certain O E C̀~atadt by the same argumenta-
tion, with ~p replaced by ~~p. ~
5.41. COROLLARY. sdl is a complete axiomatization of strong consequence
relation over models of data semantics.
The completeness of Mud
The Mud-canonical model is MMud -(~atMud, RMud, GGNrud, VMud), with
RMud being the canonical accessibility relation over C~atMtid ( see definition 5.11)
and GGn,rud is the canonical information structure of ud-extensions over C~at,y.~d.
VMud is the ordinary canonical global valuation function.
5.42. LE1vI1vIA. MMud E ~t~Jto.
Proof. We need to show that GGMud oRMud S RMudo KMud. This cannot be
shown as easily as the same interrelational constraint for the NMo-canonical model
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(lemma 5.30). The additional difficulty here is the `anti-persistence'-part of the defini-
tion of KMud.
Let r, r', 0' E~i~ltMud such that r GCMud r' and RMud(r', 0'). We have to demon-
strate the existence of a 0 E C̀iat,tirud such that 0 GGMud 0' and RMud(r, 0). This
can be enforced by means of the following claim:
O-r U apMudO~ aMud (0' U(PMudGo,i,l)~) n O-r (5).
This claim yields the desired Mud-saturated set 0 indeed. BSL shows that there
exists such a 0 E C7afMud such that a-r C o C O-r and ap,yud~' C 0 and
0 C ~' U(pM,~dGo'?'1)C. According to earlier observations in table 5.33, this last
conclusion demonstrates p,yud0 C 0'. In short, RMud(r, ~) and ~ CCMud 0'.
What is left to prove is the validity of (5), or formally,
0-r U apMud~~ ~Mud E~ E n(0' U(PMudGo,i,l)~) n O-r ~~ (Ó).
Suppose O-rUap1yud0' ~Mud E, and let E1 - En0-r and EZ - E`O-r. ~rther-
more, we define az - V E2.
To start with, we claim E1 ~ m (7).
This claim can be proved by the finiteness property of Mud. In combination with
L-TRUE I`, this property makes sure that there exists a finite sequence 61, .., án E
aPMud~~ such that
o-r, ó~ n... n ó n ~Mud ~(8).
Let b:- óln...nbn. According to table 5.33 we also may conclude 6 E apMudGo't,l
and 06 E apMudGo't'1. Because b E ~', and RMud(r', 0'), we obtain Oó E
apMudr'. This yields Ob E r, for r C~Mud r' (apMudr' C r). This result, in
combination with L-TRUE O and L-lvtox, transforms (8) into
r ~Mud OE (9).
Because r E C̀~AtMud, we find E n O-r - E1 ~~.
If E1 n(pMudGo't'1)C ~~, then we are done. So, let E1 C pMudGo'r'1. In this
complementary case, we need to prove that E1 n 0' ~ m. Remember E1 - O-r n E.
Because of the finiteness property of Mud, and a E ~-r„Q E ~-r ~ a n Q E ~-r,
there exists cp E ~-r such that
~
aPMud~ i ~ ~Mud ~1, Q2.
Because E1 C pMudGo'1'1 and observation 5.37, we know that
0', (Q2)d ~ ~Mud ~1 (10).
Suppose that (v2)d cp ~ 0'. Since (v2)d cp E PMudGo'i'1 al3O p(o2)d ~P E PMudGo'?,1
and therefore, O(QZ)d cp ~ r. Because cp ~Mud (az)d ~p,Q2, we obtain the sequent
~cp ~-Mud O(v2)d cp, OE2. This proves r 1-1yud 0(v2)d cp, OE2, and EZ n O-r ~ 0.
This conclusion contradicts the definition of Ez, and so, it must be the case that
(~z)d ~p E ~'. This reduces (10) to 0' I-Mud Ei, and therefore, E1 n ~' ~(~, since
~' E i7C1~Mud. .
5.5 Completeness of epistemic logics
Completeness proofs for the basic static and dynamic logic , EA and C3, are
really straightforward. Truth lemmas do not have to be proved, because the
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truth lemmas for their underlying modal formalism, M and Mud, respectively,
suffice (e.g. see lemma 5.14). In this case, the plurality of epistemic operators
does not complicate matters. The only thing which we need to check is whether
their canonical models have the desired frame properties: serial full introspective
accessibilities. A simple technical affirmation is presented in the next subsection.
A completeness result for the totally free preferential extension of C3, C; , is
just as simple. More difficult are the strengthenings by additional principles, like
REALISM and the cooperative QUALITY principles. For such completeness results
we also need a canonical definition of the coherence relation. We postpone this
definition and the completeness results of such additional communication pos-
tulates to our last chapter 7, because in this chapter we deal with frame char-
acteristics for so-called Geach extensions of partial modal logics. Relativized
formulations of these extensions come quite close to the above-mentioned com-
munication principles, and subsequently we can prove completeness for these
systems straightforwardly in that chapter.
Other epistemic systems of interest in chapter 4 were the systems with sup-
plementary `real worlds': C3R and C~. Many of the earlier techniques in this
chapter can be used to establish completeness for these systems as well. The only
difference is that a proper definition a unique canonical model is not possible
here. We need to define a bundle of canonical models. Still, the proof procedure
does not deviate from our Henkin procedure in the previous sections.
As have been yet announced in the introduction of this chapter, the complete-
ness proofs of the mutual belief systems EÁ and C3' are postponed until the
next chapter (section 6.4).
The completeness of EA and C3
5.43 . LEMMA. MEa E é~ and MC3 E~3.
Proof. We need to show that the Ea-canonical model is serial and full introspective.
We shortly present these relational requirements for (REa )a 12
Seriality:
Let I' E C̀~c1tEa, and suppose Oá I' ~-Ea E. The rule D establishes I' ~Ea OaE.




Suppose (REa)a(r,~). We need to show (REa)a(r,0) q(REa)a(~,O) for all
0 E C7atEa (1). This can demonstrated easily by means of the introspection axioms
in example 4.8 on page 115.
~acpEI'~OaOa~pEI'~OatpEO
d ~ ((REa )a (~i ~) ~ (REa )a (r~ ~))
~a~~r~QaDa~S~ r~Da~~O
12 (REa )a is the indivudialization of the canonical accessibility relation RM :
(REa)a(I',0) q Oá I' C 0 C OáI', expanded over the collection i7QtEa.
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OacpE~~Oa~acpEl'~DacpEI'
~a~G~~~[JaOa~P~I~~Da~G~r
~ ((~eA)a(r, ~) ~ (REA)a(~i0))
In a complete analogous manner one can prove the seriality and full introspection of
(RCs )a. 1
5.44. TxEOItEtvi. EA is complete with respect to the class é~. C3 is complete
for ~3.
Completeness of systems with realities: C3R and C~
As already mentioned above, a unique canonical model choice is not possible for
the mixture systems of classical and partial modal logics such as C3R and C~.
For each of these systems we define a collection of canonical models.
5.45. DEFINITION. A C3R-canonical model is a quintuple
, ~ ` J 1
M~3R - ~~aK..'3f~71(R:i3)afaEAi CCC3,VC3}, with
IP'ClPánd~t-{EEC7atC3R ~EnIP-1P'}.
This definition shows that the full C3-canonical model is employed. Because
we need canonical models with different selected realities, the unique canonical
choice is not possible for this system. In fact, there are 2~~ C3R-canonical
models.
5.46. OBSEItvATiotv. The membership of ~t can also be identified by the global
valuation function:
[ VCs(E) E `.~ 8z (VC3(~)(p) - 1) q p E IP~] ~ E E~i.
First, we need to prove that these models are all ~3R-models.
5.47. LEMMA. M~~R E~3R for all IP' C IP.
Proof. V~s(E) E`.f for all E E~i, because ~c3R p,~p for all p E IP, which means
p E E or ~p E E. Note that for all E E~: Vc3(E)(p) - 1 b p E IP'.
~i C C̀~tltcs, because C3R is an extension of C3. F~rthermore, ~ is clearly non-empty.
Suppose that E CCc3 0 for certain E E~. We need to show that O E~. E~Cs Ef
entails pCsE C O. Because p E E ~ p E p~sE and -~p E E~ ~p E p~sE,
we immediately conclude Ves(E) - Vcs(O) (1). [lmm] What is left to prove is
A E C̀~ctfCsR (2). In combination with (1), we have immediately EI E~.
Suppose O~C3R ~. We need to show ~ n 8~ 0. Without loss of generality we
may assume that both sets are finite, due to the finiteness property of C3R. We
define the following abbreviations.
Cl' :- 0 n GT,i B.- n(0 `~~)
~' .- ~ n GT,1 ~:- V(y `v~)
Clearly, 6', B~C3R ~, ~'. Application of R-TRUE-STRONG []„ yields
~' ~(,.3R [B]uS~~~~
168 Chapter 5. Completeness
Because E CC~a e , we have O' C O COu -E. By Ou ~p ~~3R ~p for all ~p E Gt'1,
we infer Ou -E n Gt'1 - E n Gt'1. This means 0' C E, because E~' C Gi'1. So,
~~C3R [B]u~,~', and because E E C7at~,R we obtain: -
[B]u ~ E E (3) or ~' n E~ 0(4).
Suppose ( 3) were the case. This implies [B]u t' E~ because [9]u ~ E pcsE. Further-
more, B E 0, and therefore also ~ E O. By definition of ~ and C)'s saturation, we
find~n0~0.
Assume (4), and let ~ E -' n E. Because ~ E G1'1, it is also C3R-persistent:
~ I- (]u ~. Fhrthermore, []u ~ E pCsGÁl, and so []u ~ E E), and of course also
~ E A. Finally, -' C O entails ~ n 0~ 0.
Both (3) and (4) entail O n-~~, and this confirms (2).
Second, we need the truth lemma for this system. This can be obtained in-
stantaneously from the truth lemma of Mud and C3. Because ~ C C~atc3, we
find -
M~aR, ~~~P b Mcs, E~ cp ~ cp E E (1).
This simple observa,tion, together with lemma 5.47, establishes the completeness
Of
C3R
5.48. THEOREM. C3R is complete with respect to ~3~-validity.
Proof. Suppose I' IfosR 0. This means that there exists E E~3~ such that I' C E
and 0 n E-~. Let 1P' - E n IP. Clearly E in Mp~R. Furthermore, according to (1)
above, E provides a I'-world, which verifies none of the members of ~. ~
A completeness proof for C~ can be found in the same fashion.
5.49. DEFINITION. A C~-canOnlCa1 model ls a Qulntuple
1P' c1~ jMG,3R -( ~QtC3, fJl, l(RC3 ) a}aE{S2,L11 CCC3, VC,3), with
IP'ClPand~i-{EEC7atC3n ~EnIP-1P'}.
The only difference with the definition of the C3R-canonical model is that ~t
is the selection of C~-saturated sets with the same atomic content. The only
essential specific property which has to be checked is whether the following
typical C~-constraint holds:
5.50. I,EMMA. R~(E ,O) 8~ E E~t ~ o E~.
Proof. Suppose (R~~ )n(E, O) for certain E E~. Totality of Vp3 (O) follows
immediately from the simple Cn-sequents ~-cs []np, ~p and ~c3 Onp, ~p for all p E IP.n n
So, what is left to prove is ~ E C̀~cttc3 .n
Suppose A I-Cn - for certain ~ C GÁ1, and define O', ~', B and ~ in the same way as in
the proof of lemma 5.47, but with Gr'1 replaced by Gnl. Analogously with this proof,
we obtain:
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0' ~c~ [e]u ~, ~.
Because (Rc~)n(E,0), we know that 0' C OnE n Gnl. Subsequently, Oncp ~c~ ~p
yields 0' C E n G~ 1, and therefore E n,Cn 1~c~ [B],. ~, ?'. Application of R-TRUE-
STRONG On entails E~cs ~n[9]ul-,~', and alson
On(B]u~ E E (1) or ~' n E~~ (2).
Suppose (1) holds. This means [8]ul; E O, and because 9 E O, and by the definition of
~,wefind0n~~0.
Take (2) to be the case, and let ~ E ~' n E. Because ~~c~ ~n~ (S E Gnl), we have
O~~ E E, and therefore ~ E 0.
Both (1) and (2) yield the desired result 0 n-~ 0, which means O E C̀~t1ECs .~n
5.51. TxEOxENt. C~ is complete with respect to ~~.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that establishing completeness results for partial in-
tensional logics does not have to be much more complicated than for classical
intensional logics. The generalization of maximally consistent sets to our defini-
tion of saturated sets in order to build suitable canonical models has turned out
to be fruitful.
The complication of establishing completeness results on the basis of these
canonical models for partial intensional logics is that in many truth lemmas
saturated sets need to be located below given upper bounds. A simple example
is the o-step in the proof of the truth lemma of M(page 149).
This problem of constructing saturated sets below an upper bound can be
reduced to saturation equations. If an upper bound is a saturator with respect
to the initial set from which we start the construction, then we know that the
construction will be successful, due to our bounded saturation lemma (page 146).
The sequen}.ial style of definition of the notions of saturation and saturators, is
thus shown to be practical in this respect. Many saturation equations were easily
solvable by the use of our sequential rules. In case of the systems M we managed
to give a completeness proof which is much simpler than earlier proofs [Thijsse
1992J [Jaspars 1993]. This technique has been extended successfully to the new
constructive modal logics of chapter 3.
In the next chapter we will show how these techniques can be used to construct
sets which are saturated up to a certain (finite) subset of formulae. On the basis
of these further investigations decidability results can be established for the logics
of part I. F~rthermore, we are able to prove the completeness for finite sequents
for the non-compact mutual belief logics EA and C3'.
Appendix
5.? Completeness of fused partial modal logic
In section 2.5 we have introduced a partial modal logic FM, the so-called fused
partial modal logic, which is weaker than the minimal partial modal logic M.
Below, we will give a brief exposition of the completeness proof for this `non-
normal' partial modal logic.
5.52. DEFItvITIO1v. The FM-canonical model is defined to be the triple MF,~ -
(~atFM~ RFM, UFM~ Wlth
RFM(r, ~) q o-r c ~~, ~~ c o-r, and
V(r)(p) - 1(0) q(~)p E I' for all r E C~atFM and ~ C C~atF,y.
5.53 . OBSERVATION. MF~y E ~~.
Proof. Suppose RFM(I',~). Of course ~FM OT, and therefore T E ~-I'. This
means T E U 6, and so, ~~ 0. ~
5.54 . LEMMA. Foi all r E C~atFM and ~p E Go:
MFM, r~~q~Er and MFM,I'~cpq~cpEr.
Proof. By induction on the construction of formulae. The steps of the P-connectives
can be made as immediate as before. We only elaborate on the O-steps.
Suppose ~cp E I'.
If RF1y ( I', ~) then cp E U(~, which means that there exists ~ E~ such that
~p E 0. The induction hypothesis establishes MFM, 0~ ~p. Because ~ has been
chosen as an arbitrary accessible collection of FM-saturated sets, we conclude that
MFM ~ r ~ o~.
Suppose O~p ~ I'.
Let [~ :- {0 E C̀~atF,y ~ cp ~ 0}. Because FfFM []cp, alSO IfFry cp (table 2.60) and
therefore ~ ~ 0 (saturation lemma).
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Suppose Oz~i E I'. Because Ocp ~ I', we know that Oz~i FfFM Ocp, and subsequently
~~FM ~p (table 2.60). The saturation lemma shows that there must exist Dy, E 6
such that z~ E Dy„ and therefore, zj~ E U ~. In other words,
o-r c U ~3 (1).
Suppose OX ~ I'. Because Ocp ~ I', we conclude FfFM []cp,OX, and therefore,
~FM ~p, X( table 2.60). The saturation lemma shows that there exists ~X E~ such
that X ~ Ox, which means X~ n ~. In short,
n QS C O-I' (2).
The results (1) and (2) prove that RF,t~(r,~). The induction hypothesis tells us
that MFM ~ ~p for all ~ E~. This entails MFM, I' ~ ~~p.
If ~Ocp ~ I', we obtain -~l7cp ~ I' immediately through the definition of RF,t~ and the
induction hypothesis.
Suppose ~Ocp E I'.
~learly,-~ip-E 4-~~.et ~-:--{0 E.C̀~AtFM-~~p E ~~. She FM-consistency of
~cp shows that ~ is non-emptyla
Take O~i E I'. Because O~, O~cp FfFM 0, we know that ~i, ~cp FfFM 0. The satura-
tion lemma proves that there exists ~y, E ~ such that ~i E 0,~, or shorter ~i E~.
Because C7~i E I' have been picked randomly, we conclude
~-I' C U,~ (3).
Let OX ~ I'. This means O~~p FfF1y OX, and therefore, ~cQ FfFM X. The saturation
lemma shows the existence of a OX E~ such that X~ Ox. This means X~ n~.
The arbitrariness of X~ O-I' shows
n ~ C O-I' (4).
The results (3) and (4) prove RFM(I',~), while the induction hypothesis entails
MF~y, 0~ cp for all 0 E~. The combination of these conclusions yields MFM, I' ~
~cp.
Completeness for the two `intermediate' systems which have also been discussed
shortly in section 2.5 can be obtained by combination of the method above and
the procedure of the truth-lemma for M(lemma 5.12).
13~„~ ~jrFM 0~~rG FÍFM 0 (table 2.60~.
Chapter 6
Finite Models
In this chapter we will continue our search for counter-models. The only dif-
ference with the previous chapter is a stringent restriction on our search space.
Our quest is to find finite counter-models. Such finite counter-models appear of
importance to us for two basic reasons.
First, we wish to establish decidability results in addition to the completeness
results of the previous chapter for the systems which have been discussed in this
thesis.
Second, due to the mutual belief operators in the system EÁ and C3', we
need to acquire a procedure for finding finite counter-models for these systems in
order to derive their completeness. Just like propositional dynamic logic [Kozen
8e Parikh 1981] and mutual knowledge and belief extensions of classical poly-
modal logics [Halpern 8e Moses 1992], where also (reflexive) transitive closures
of accessibility relations are employed, the extra complications caused by the
infinite nature of these operators turn out to be manageable by means of finite
imitations of their canonical models. This procedure settles the completeness
of these systems only up to finite sequents. But as we have seen earlier such
a restriction is necessary, since these logics are non-compact (observation 4.23,
page 123).
Of course, we need to establish enough meta-theoretical insights to justify
the above-mentioned finite limitations. This enterprise is the key issue of this
chapter.
6.1 Restricted saturated sets
Proving decidability of a modal logic is most often achieved by showing that
it enjoys the so-called finite model property (FlvtP) [Hughes 8c Cresswell 1984]1.
1 For an extensive treatment of the finite model property in classical modal logics see
[de Jongh 8z Veltman 1988].
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This means that for every finite non-sequent a finite counter-model can be found.
The combination of a completeness result and F1viP establishes subsequently a
decidability result for finite sequents.
In this chapter we will focus on the so-called strong version of the finite model
property. This means that a fixed upper bound of the size of the counter-model
of a given non-sequent can be stipulated beforehand, that is in terms of the size of
the assumption and conclusion set. This implies that if we want to know whether
r ~-S 0, with r and 0 finite, holds for a system S, then we only have to check
a finite space of models for finding a counter-model. If in this restricted finite
class of models such a counter-model is not found, then we know that r~S ~.
This strong F1viP immediately establishes the decidability result, without calling
upon the completeness of S.
We will use much of the techniques of the previous chapter to establish finite
model properties. We make use of so-called filtrations of the canonical models
which have been presented in chapter 5. We construct fcltrated canonical models
from sets which are saturated up to a given finite subset of formulae, which
contains only a set of `relevant' formulae with respect to a given non-sequent.
In general, these restricted sets of formulae are fairly small extensions of the set
of subformulae of the assumption and conclusion set of the non-sequent.
In the following section we will show that the main saturation lemmas of
section 5.1 also apply to these limited saturated sets. FiviP for M, N and ud
can be deduced quite easily from these new saturation lemmas. In the second
section we will show that proving FMP for constructive modal logics requires
somewhat richer filtrations. The last section is dedicated to completeness proofs
for finite sequents in EÁ and C3', which also employ these enriched filtrations.
Saturation lemmas for restricted sets
6.1. DEFINITION. Let S be a sequential derivation system, with GS its language,
and ~ C GS. A set r C ~ is said to be S-~-saturated if for all 0 C~
r~so ~ rno~~
The set of all S-~-saturated sets is written as C7ats. n C GS is said to be an
S-~-saturator of r C ~ if for all 0 C~ -
r~-So ~ nno~~.
We denote this relation by r ds n. r is said to be an S-~-saturant of A.
6.2. OBSERVATION. Note that all S-~-saturated sets are subsets of ~. This
does not have to be the case for S-~-saturators. All S-~-saturated sets are S-
consistent. We list some properties below of the definitions above, which are
for a great deal reformulations of the simple observation 5.4 (page 145) on the
general definitions of saturated sets, saturators and saturants.
r 4S A~ r is S-consistent.
rasn~r~cr~r~asn.
rasn~ncn~~rasn~.
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raSAB~~c~~rn~as A.
0 E C7ats q S is consistent.
There is a strong connection between these restricted saturated sets and normal
saturated sets.
6.3. PROPOSITION. Let S be a derivational system which contains all the struc-
tural rules of table 2.14.
For every S-saturated set E and every set ~ C GS the set E n~ is 5-~-
saturated: -
`d~cGS:EEC~atS~En~EC~afs.
This observation can be formulated somewhat sharper:
`d~,~CGS:~C~iBcEEC~atS~En~EC~afs.
if fi-~G~~nd ~-~Catstherr-there-exists~" E~iats such that E'fT~ -~
This can be made more general in similar terms as the result above: if ~ C
~ C GS and E E C̀~ats, then there exists E' E C̀~ats such that E' n~- E.
Formally,
~I~,~CGS:~C~iBtEECyats ~
3E' E C~afs : E' n~- E (1).
Proof. The first part of the proposition is really straightforward by using the L-1v1oN
rule. The second part requires some explanation. Let ~ C~Y C Gs, let E E C̀~ats
and A:- (~)~ U E. Clearly, E 4s A. The bounded saturation lemma 5.6 shows that
there exists E" E C̀~ats such that E C E' C A and E` n~- E. The first item of the
proposition proves E' n~Y E C̀~afs, and furthermore E C E' n ~Ir. So, E' :- E' n~ is
a fulfilling choice for the consequence in (1): E C E' C A. ~
The bounded and the ordinary saturation lemma are now easily obtained from
the observations made in the proposition above.
6.4. LEMMA. BOUNDED SATURATION LEMMA FOR FILTRATIONS
Let S be a sequential derivation system such as in BSL and ~ C GS. If A C~ is
an S-~-saturator of a set I' C~, then it also contains an S-~-saturated extension
of I'. Formally speaking, -
`dI',~,ACGS:I'aSA~~DEC̀~atS:I'COCA.




This filtration version of BSL is also equivalent to a relativized formulation of the
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saturation lemma 5.8 (page 147). It can be illustrated by means of an adaptation
of proposition 5.7.
6.5. PROPOSITION. Let S be a sequential system which contains R-MON, and
let r, ~, A be subsets of GS.
rasnarys~`n.
Proof. ~: r ~s ~ `A ~ r gls A (because (~ `A) C ~, and (~ `A) f1 A - 0).
~: r gls A~ 30 C~: r~-S 0 8e ~ f1 A- 0. Because 0 C~`A, we also have
r ~S ~ `n. ~ -
-
6.6. LEMMA. SATURATION LEMMA FOR FILTRATIONS
Let S be a sequential derivation system as in ssL. Let ~ C GS and let r and 0
be two subsets of ~. If r Ffs ~ then there exists a set E which is S-~-saturated,
withrCEandE~~-O.
Proof. A proof can be obtained from proposition 6.5 in the same way as lemma 5.8
has been deduced from Thijsse's proposition 5.7. The full equivalence of this lemma
and lemma 6.4 can also be obtained by proposition 6.5 and an analogous argumentation
for sL ~ aSL as in the previous chapter. ~
6.2 First decidability results
As already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, we are aiming at
suitable finite restrictions of the language such that from selecting the saturated
sets inside this restricted set a finite `canonical-like' model can be constructed.
This model is meant as a finite counter-model of a given finite non-sequent.
In the case of M this construction is relatively easy. The following definition
describes our syntactic needs for establishing the FMP of M.
6.7. DEFINITION. Let ~ be a subset of Go. The truth-value division of ~ is the
set
~ :- Sub(~) u ~Sub(~).
The modal assimilation of ~ is the set
~o :- 0~ U O~ U ~.
In classical modal logic the simple restriction Sub(~) is most often employed
for implementation of filtrated canonical models. It turns out that ~Sub(~)
need to be added for imitation of such filtrations for partial modal logics. This
is a direct consequence of explicit definitions of falsity in partial model-theory.
The supplementary syntactic material which we obtain through modal assim-
ilation of such a restricted set of formulae ~ is particularly useful for defining an
appropriate and technically manageable accessibility structure of the filtrated
M-canonical model. An important property of this modal assimilation ~o of a
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set of formulae ~, is the regularity of the modal content of ~o with respect to
the subformulae of the set ~: []-~o - O-~o -~.
The decidability of M
The M-~-canonical model is defined as follows.
6.8. DEF1rr1T1oN. Let ~ C Go. The M-~-canonical model is the triple M-




V,y(E)(p) - 1(0) q(~)p E E for all E, O E C̀~atM and p E IP.
The syntactic richness of ~o provides nearly a complete imitation of the truth
lemma for M(lemma 5.12, page 149 for this filtrated canonical model with
respect to the subformulae of ~. Only simple earlier observations on restricted
saturated sets, like proposition 6.3 and lemma 6.4, have to be used for the
finishing touch of this successful transposition.
Note that the filtrated version of the canonical accessibility relation is some-
what different from the ordinary canonical definition. This modification is really
needed. The left argument, E, only needs to recognize possibilities, that is for-
mulae of the form Ocp, which are contained in ~o. As a matter of fact, we
will employ this definition for filtrated canonical accessibilities in the sequel.
Furthermore, we will use the following convenient abbreviation:
Ec~O ~ En~cO and E-~0 b En~-O.
For every M-extension, we use
RS(E,O) ~ o-E C~ O C~ O-E.
Below, we will prove a restricted truth-lemma for the subformulae of ~ with
respect to the model M,~ .
6.9. LE1v11v1A. For all E in MM and for all cp E Sub(~):
MNr,E~~p(~cpEE andMM,E~cpq~cpEE.
Proof. By induction on the construction of formulae. The proof in the case of the
extensional connectives is as immediate as before2. Also the steps C)cp E E~ M,~y, E~
O~p and M,~y, E~ Ocp ~~~cp E E are direct consequences of the definition of RM.
The converse directions can be obtained from the truth-lemma for M, proposition 6.3
and lemma 6.4.
Suppose t]cp E Sub(~) and t7cp ~ E.
Let A C~. If O-E ~M p, then also O-E ~,y cp,6 - cp. As in the truth-lemma of
M, we may conclude E FM O~p, O(e - cp), and therefore 6 n(O-E - cp) ~ 0. This
step is completely legitimate, because OO C~o. This conclusion proves
2The ~-atep is facilitated by the fact that all negations of subformulae are present in ~o.
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o-E aM (O-E - ~p).
Therefore, BSL for restricted sets guarantees the existence of some 0 E C̀~at~ with
O-E C 0 C O-E and cp ~ 0. Proposition 6.3 then yields a ~' E C7afM with
0' -~ 0. By definition of RM, we conclude RM(E,0'), and because cp E~, we
find ~p ~ 0'. The induction hypothesis entails MM, 0' ~ cp and M,~ , E ~ Ocp.
The step ~~cp E E~ M,~y, E~ Ocp can be accounted for by a similar imitation of the
corresponding part of the proof of the truth lemma of M. We leave the details to the
reader. 1
6.10. OssERVAT~oN. By a similar generalization as made in observation 5.15,
we conclude that for every M-extension S and all ~ C GS, ~Y ~~o, E E C̀~ats
and cp E Sub(~) that -
cp ~[]-E ~~O E C~afs : RS(E,O) 8z cp ~ O, and
cp E O-E ~~O E C7ats : RS(E,O) 8L cp E O.
6.11. TxEOREM. The system M has the finite model property.
Proof. Suppose r FfM ~ with r,~ C Go finite. Because r U 0 C(r U 0)o we
know that there exists E E C̀~at1N~o~o such that r C E and E fl 0- 0. This means,
according to the filtration version of the truth lemma for M above, that E in the model
My~o is a r-world which verifies none of the 0-members. For all ry E r and b E 0
MMO,E~ryBzMruo,E~ó.
Because M,ry"o is finite, M has FMP. ~
Let I' Ff M 0 for finite r, 0 C Go . Now, consider models of the form (W, R, V)
with 0~ W C~,(I'UO)o, and let R and V be defined in the same way as R~ and
VM expanded over the elements of W. This class consists of 231~sueiruo~j - 1
members, and MM is one of these members. Consecutively checking these models
on the existence of a counter-world is therefore a successful sound and complete
finite procedure. This argumentation demonstrates the earlier strong version of
FMP.
6.12. TxEOREM. The system M is decidable for finite sequents.
In the sequel of this chapter we use the same kind of abbreviations for the
forthcoming definitions of the filtrated canonical information structures.
I' CS 0~ pSI' C~ 0 and
r~cso ~ pSrC~o~apSoC~r.
Decidability of N and ud
For a proofof FMP of N we only need the N-~-saturated sets for a given restricted
set of formulae ~. The N-~-canonical model is MN -(C7atN, C~, VN )3 with
VN being the restriction of VN to C~atN. For Nelson's logic, the restricted truth
3Notice CN-C~.
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lemma can be transferred from its general truth lemma ( lemma 5.18, page 153).
Its FMP and decidability follows from this restricted truth lemma in a similar
way as the decidability of M follows from lemma 6.9.
6.13. TxEOxEM. N has the FMP and is decidable for finite sequents.
A decidability result for the system ud can be found by the same means. We
define the ud-~-canonical model Má -(C7at~d, K~d, Vuá) in the same fashion
as MN above.
8.14. LEMMA. Mud E ~T.
Proof. The monotonicity of Vá follows immediately from the PERS-rules for literals.
Suppose I' GGá ~ K~d O for a triple I', 0, O E C̀~af.~d. Let cp E pudI'. This means
cp-1 ud-[~u sp, and a15~cQ- E pud-0 and cp E O. In short, p„~I'C-O. By a similar
argument we may conclude O C apud0. Altogether, I' GG~d O, or in other words, GG~d
is transitive. -
Reflexivity of GG~d is trivial. We conclude that GG~d is a pre-order. ~
The truth lemma for a set of subformulae ~ with respect to Md can be proved
by an imitation of the general truth lemma for ud (page 161). This observation
establishes the decidability result for finite ud-sequents.
6.15. TxEOREM. The system ud has the FMP and is decidable for finite se-
quents.
In the FMP proof of ud our definition of GGud appears to be advantageous.
If the more natural candidate of observation 5.34 (page 160) would have been
used, we would have to revise the definition of the canonical extension order for
the filtrated canonical models in a rigorous way. 5uch a procedure would divert
us from the general FMP strategy of this chapter. We try to enforce specific
structural properties of filtrated canonical models by modification of the filtering
set only. The clearest advantage of this straightness is that earlier results for
canonical structures, which have been found in the previous chapter, can be used
in FMP proofs as well. This means that we will stick with the definitions of RS,
CS and GGS above and have convenient transfer of results in chapter 5.
6.3 Richer filtrations
Proving the finite model property for systems which are interpreted in terms of
a more structured semantics, or have more expressivity than M may be propor-
tionately more complicated than the relatively easy proof of FMP for M, N and
ud in the previous section.
To start with, just like the completeness proofs for M-extensions, we need to
show that an appropriate finite counter-model for a given finite non-sequent can
be found in the proper model class. Sometimes the straightforward filtrations
180 ChaPter 6. Finite Models
of the canonical model, as used in the previous section, does not guarantee
satisfaction of the right model-theoretic constraints of the system in hand.
As already mentioned above, we try to find finite counter-models by appro-
priately enriching the filtrations. Such enrichments have to ensure preservation
of the structural properties found for the canonical models of chapter 5. It
might very well be the case that the syntactically poor filtrations of the previ-
ous sections are not `preservative' in this sense. A more specific reason to use
richer filtrations, which will become clear in the next section, consists of some
important structural additional properties which we will need for proving the
completeness of the more complicated mutual belief logics EÁ and C3'.
Decidability of constructive modal logics
An important result of the preceding chapter has been lemma 5.25 on page 156.
This lemma proved the bisimulation property for the inclusion relation over the
M-canonical model.
Furthermore, this result facilitated the proofs of many bisimulation-like con-
straints of canonical models for NM, NMo and Mud. In order to maintain
our style of FNIP-proving, we need a similar result for restricted saturated sets
in order to bring along FIvIP for these systems as well.
As we saw during the proof of lemma 5.25 we needed the disjunction and
conjunction for obtaining this structural result. The following definition is meant
as a new extra closure condition of filtering sets, in order to apply a filtrated
version lemma 5.25. Just like we added negations and modal operators to the
subformulae of a subset of formulae ~ for the M-~-canonical model (~o), we
also wish to employ disjunction and conjunction in the same manner.
6.16. DEFINITION. Suppose that ~ C GS for some sequential system S with
Go C GS. The conjunctive assimilation of ~ is the set
~" :- {~1 n... n~~, I~pt E~, and cpi - cpi a i- j}.
The disjv,nctive assimilation of ~ is the set
~~ :- {cpl V... V cpn ~ cpi E~, and cp~ - cp~ q i- j}.
The modal cover of ~ is the set
~~ :- O~~ U O~" U ~.
The following lemma rephrases lemma 5.25 for restricted saturated sets.
6.17. LENttvta,. Let S be an M-extension, and let ~ , A C GS and r E rats~
The following filtration version of lemma 5.25 holds. -
o-r 4S~ A~~~ E C~afS~ : RS(r,0) and 0 C~ A.
A as~ O-r ~~0 E Cyats~ : RS(r,0) and A C~ 0.
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Proof. We only prove the first item of the lemma. It is an imitatíon of the proof of
lemma 5.25, and the second item can be obtained by a similar application of the dual
result in lemma 5.25.
Let O-r ds~ A. This also means O-r n~ 4S A. Analogously to the proof of
lemma 5.25 in the previous chapter, we can prove
o-r n~ as O-r n n (1).
This claim yields the desired result. An application of ssL for restricted sets shows
that there exists 0' E C̀~a{S with
~-r C 0' C O-r and 0' C A.
~
Proposition 6.3 thereupon guarantees the existence of a 0 E C7uts with ~-~ 0',
and so
t7-r C~ 0 and 0 C~ O-r and 0 C~ A.
What is left to prove is the claim 1 above. Suppose ~-T fl ~ F-S - or certá,m 6~
We need to show O n O-A n A~ 0. We give a short formal transcription below.
a-rn~~so ~ o-rn~~so`A,onA ~
o-r n~~-S V o`n, o n n~ r~-S o(~ o`n), o(o n n) ~(2)
o(onA)nr~0 ~ onnno-r~0 (a).
Because O`A C~, we obtain O(v O`A) E~~. 0-r n~ n(O `A) -~b implies
[](v O`A) ~ r-(O-r ds~ A). So, because r E C7afs~, the implication in (2) holds.
Note that the modal cover definition is required to legitimate this step.
The final conclusion (3) establishes claim (1). ~
6.18. Coltol.I.AItY. The proof above shows that the conclusions of lemma 6.17
can also be obtained through replacing the requirements []-I' as~ A and A dS~
O-I', by []-r n~ 45 A and A n~ as O-I', respectively. - -
As mentioned earlier, lemma 6.17 is of great importance for establishing forth-
coming decidability and completeness results. Just like lemma 5.25, it facilitates
searching saturated sets. Most often the result of lemma 6.17 reduces the search
for a saturated set to a fairly easily provable saturation relation. The following
definition presents the ~-filtrated canonical models of the constructive modal
logics NM and NMo.
6.19. DEFINITION. Let S E{NM, NMo }. The canonical S-model filtrated
by ~ is the quadruple MS -(C~ats~, RS, CS,Vs ). All the definitions of the
different canonical model-theoretic parameters, can be found in the previous
section.
F1v1P and decidability of NM can easily be obtained. The only thing we need to
show is that MNM is an ~fi2-model.
Ó.20. LEMMA. MNty E ~Jt.
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Proof. V,~,y is clearly monotonic. Fïirthermore, we need to check the two bisimulation
conditions (C~ oRN1y) C (RNMO C~) and (~~ oRN,y) C(RN,yo ~~). They can be
obtained immediately from lemma 6.17 and corollary 6.18. If r, r', 0' E C7c1tNM with
r c~ r' and RNM(r', 0'), then also O-r f1 ~ 4N,u p'. Corollary 6.18 gives us the
desired ~: RNM (r, 0) and ~ C~ ~'. This establishes the first bisimulation constraint.
The second can immediately be found by the same corollary and the simple saturation
equation
r c~ r' óL RNM (r, o) ~ ~(1 ~ dNM o-r'.
~
The restricted truth lemma for NM can be proved in the same way as its
ordinary truth lemma. Note that ~o C~~, which is important for the []-
steps in the proof of this restricted truth-lemma. This result combined with
lemma 6.20 yields a strong FMP result and the consequential decidability of
NM.
6.21. TxEOREM. The system NM has the FMP and is decidable for finite se-
quents.
A decidability result for NMo can be established by means of the same proce-
dure.
6.22. LEMMA. MN~yo E~to for all ~ C Go'~.
Proof. Again, the monotonicity of VNMo is evident. The only structural constraint
can be obtained by application of corollary 6.18 and the saturation equation:
r CNMo r' óL RNMo (r',~') ~ ~-r (1 ~ QNMa 0~ U (PNMo ~o'y)~.
This validity of this equation can be observed in the same way as in the proof of
the structural adequacy of the NMo-canonical model, lemma 5.30 (page 158). An
inspection of this proof learns us that the closure step E C~~ O(v E) E~~
is again required. We leave it to the reader to check the precise justification of this
transfer. ~
A restricted truth lemma for NMo can be obtained in the same way as for NM.
6.23. TxEOREM. NMo has the FMP and is decidable for finite sequents.
Establishing a decidability result for Mud by means of the completeness proof
requires an enrichment of the filtrations which have not been used for NM and
NMo above. The proof of lemma 5.42, page 164, shows that we have also
used the downdate operator to establish the structural adequacy of the Mud-
canonical model: MM,~d E~JTo . The following filtration legalizes a similar
inference for filtrated canonical models.
6.24. DEFiN~T~otv. The down-closure of a set ~ is the set
~d - l(~P~d~ I~P E~v,~ E~~} U~.
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The set ~~d denotes the set which will be used as a filtration for Mud. It is
defined as follows:
~~d - ~~d U O~~ U ~.
a3
The Mud-~-canonical model for a set ~ is the model (C~atMtid, RMud~ CCNrud
, VMwd). The definition of the accessibility relation and the global valuation func-
tion are the same as in all the earlier filtrated canonical models. The information
structure GGM,~d is the same as GGud in Md.
6.25. LEMMA. MMud E ~to.
Proof. A complete ímitation of the proof of lemma 5.42, page 164, can be given by
the richness of the filtration. The central claim ( 6) there needs to be replaced by the
following reformulation. If I' CGM„d I'' and RMud(I'', 0') then
CJ-I~ Íl 8pMud~~ (1 ~ dMud (OI U(pud~Í,l)~) (1 ~-r.
83
Analogously to this proof, this reformulation establishes the desired 0 E C`~atMd:
RMud(I',~) and 0 CCMud 0~.
A pointwise inspection of the proof of lemma 5.42 shows that step (7) can be obtained
by 0 C ~~ O(n 0) E~~d. Reaching conclusion ( 10) does not require any filtration
richness, and the final conclusion can be recaptured by the closure step E, O C~ ~
t7(V E)d n O E~~d. ~
6.26. TxEOItEM. The system Mud has the FMP and is decidable for finite
sequents.
6.4 The completeness of mutual belief systems
As mentioned earlier, completeness proofs for the mutual belief systems require
finite filtrations of their canonical models. The structural properties of the acces-
sibility relation, i.e. seriality and full introspection, need suitable enrichments
of the filtrations which have been employed for the decidability proof of M.
The following definition presents different filtering sets which we will use for the
filtrated canonical models in this section.
6.27. DEFINITION. Let a E A and ~ C GS for some extension S of EA. The
set ~oa is the modal assimilation of ~ for the modal operator Da. The set ~~a
refers to the modal cover of ~ under oa. Furthermore, we define
~o" :- U ~oa ~~" :- U ~~'.
aEA aEA
~~A is the smallest superset of Su,b(~) such that
cp E ~~A ~ ~cp E ~~``, and
~pE~~`' ~ ~a~PE~~`'forallaEA.
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The filtration which we will employ for the forthcoming completeness proof of EÁ
is the set (~~" )~" . This set is infinite for all non-empty ~, but it is logically
finite whenever ~ is finite. If ~ is finite then the EÁ-~-canonical model is
finite as well. Due to the strong equivalences of EÁ, which have been listed
in example 4.8 on page 115, we can easily prove that every element of ~~" is
EÁ-equivalent with some member of ~o". This also means that every member
of the complex filtration (~~" )~A is EÁ-equivalent with some member of the
finite set (~oA)~".
6.28. OBSERVATION. For all cp E~~" there exists cp' E~o" such that cp -EÁ
cp'. For all cp E(~~")~A there exists cp' E (~oA)~A such that cp -EÁ cp'.
Proof. By an easy índuction on the closure principles in the definition of ~~A in
definition 6.27, and the modality reduction principles of EA in example 4.8. ~
Because ~o" C~~A, the former set can be seen as a finite representation of the
latter, as long as ~ is finite itself. For the same reasons the set (~oA )~" is a
finite representation of (~~")~" for all finite ~. This ensures that C~atÉAe 1~A
that is finite whenever ~ is finite.
The completeness of EÁ
Let us first give a formal description of the EÁ-~-canonical model for ~ C GÁ.
6.29. DEFINITION. Let ~ C GÁ. The EA-~-canonical model is the triple
MÉÁ -(CiQfÉ~~A~~A f IREÁA JaEA, VEÁ~i
with the following accessibility relation
~ ~a~EE ~ cQE~
(RÉ ")a(E, O) q `dcp E ~~" :
, and
A cpEO ~ OacpEE .
VÉ~ is defined as in the other filtrated canonical models of the previous sections
of this chapter.
A prerequisite for the adequacy of MÉÁ which should be demonstrated next,
is its membership of the class ~~. This means that we need to show the seriality
and the full introspection of (RÉÁ" )a for all a E A. As mentioned earlier this
follows immediately from the richness of ~~" and by a complete imitation of the
same lemma of the structural adequacy of the EA-canonical model (lemma 5.43,
page 166).
Ó.30. LEMMA. MÉ~ E ~~.
A useful side effect of the enrichment ~~" is that if []Xcp E ~~", then also
~n~Xcp E~~" for all a E A and cp E GÁ. This is a typical closure condition for
filtrations of systems with modalities for reasoning about reflexive transitive clo-
sures of accessibilities [Fischer 8i Ladner 1979] [Kozen 8e Parikh 1981] [Halpern
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8e Moses 1992]. The use of this closure is that formulae of the form ~XCp are
preserved under accessibility. The following lemma presents a formalization of
this effect.
6.31. LElvtivtw. Let E, O E C~,QtE~~A
i~A
and k E IN.
If [7Xcp E E and (RÉ~A)X(E,O) then oXcp E O, and
if ~oX~ E O and (RÉ~A)X(E,O) then ~oX~p E E.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. If k- 0 then the result is trivial, for
(RÉ~A )o(E, O) a E - O.
A
Let k~ 0 and suppose ( RÉ~A )k (E, O).
A
~his means-that there-exists~' E C̀~atÉ~AI~A suclrthat RÉ~a~e--A) attd~lsQ
A A
(RÉAA)k-1(~ O'). The induction hypothesis implies that OXcp E O'. Because
~z~P ~E~ ~x~X~P, we also know that Oat7XCp E O' for all a E X. By definition of
(RÉÁA )x and because OXep E ~4, we have OXcp E O.
A proof of the second claim in the lemma can be obtained analogously by the simple
fact that if ~l7Xcp E ~~A then also Oa~OXcp E~, for all a E A. The details are
omitted. ~
Our information on MÉ~ developed so far, suffices for the proof of the truth
lemma of EÁ with respect to MÉ~ . As usual the proof runs by an induction on
the construction of formulae. The only new and nasty part is the ~X-step. One
side of this step runs easily on the basis of lemma 6.31. The completion of this
step, which is the difFicult direction of the ~X-case, follows roughly the proof in
[Halpern 8z Moses 1992] for mutual belief and knowledge extensions of classical
(poly-)modal logics. The basic ideas of that proof can be traced back to [Kozen
8z Parikh 1981].
Of course, much of this procedure needed to be revised for installation in our
partial poly-modal logic. It turns out that the general definition of saturated
sets, is somewhat harder to handle in this proof. Nevertheless, earlier important
findings, particularly lemma 5.25 and its filtrated version lemma 6.17, are of
great help for this modification. Notice that the latter lemma applies to the
filtration set (~~A)~A, because ~~A - ~~A.
6.32. LEMtvtA. Let ~ C GÁ. For all cp E Sub(~) and r E C7atE~~A~~A.
MÉ~, r~~a~Er and MÉA,r~~pq~cpEr.
Proof. By induction of the construction of the subformulae of the set ~. Only the
4For all O j~ ip E tY also O jt ~p E~.
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~X-step needs to be accounted for. The other cases are identical to the FMP-proof of
M in section 6.2.
Suppose ~Xcp E r.
Lemma 6.31 shows that if (RÉ~A)X(I',O) then [7'cp E O for all O E C7atEÁ~`'1~A.
Because OXcp ~EÁ cp, we also have ~p E O for all O E C̀iafE~~A~~A such that
A
(RÉ~A )X (I', O). The induction hypothesis yields MEA, C~ ~ cp for all such 6, and
therefore MÉ. , I' ~ []Xcp.
A
Suppose MÉ. , I' ~ OX~p.
A
To begin with we need some abbreviations. The following definitions are particu-
larly important for the proof procedure:
Q3 :- {E E cQtÉ~A~~A I MÉÁ, E~ oX~}
cPE .- n(E f1 ~oA)
a :- V ~GE
EE~
Note that the finiteness of ~oA is required here, otherwise the conjunction cpE
would not be well-defined. This formula can be seen as a finite representation of
the ~~A-content of E.
The proof consists of three essential claims:
(3) a ~EÁ ~P,
(4) E E C~3 ~ E F-E~ ~, and
(5) a ~EÁ ~x a
Claim (5) settles a I-E. OXa (R-IND on page 124). This yields a~EÁ OXcp, by
means of claim (4), an~ so, OXa ~-EÁ OXcp (R-MOD-TRUE OX). Claim (3) shows
that I' ~EÁ c~, and therefore OXcp E I'. What is left to be proved are the three
claims (3), (4) and (5).
The first two claims are trivial. The induction hypothesis yields cp E E for all E E Q5.
Because cp appears in all conjuncts ~pE for all E E 6, we obtain E E C~5 ~ cpE F-EÁ cp.
L-TRUE V subsequently yields a ~-E~ cp (3).
For all E E C7afE~~A~~A also E~EA ~pE. So, if E E 6 then also E ~-E~ a.
Proving (5) is the nasty part of the proof. Suppose that (5) is not the case,
i.e. a FfEq OXtx. This means, according the saturation lemma, that there ex-
ists E' E C̀~afEÁ such that a E E" and [7Xa ~ E'. This last conclusion shows that
there exists a E X such that Dac~ ~ E'. An appropriate poly-modal reformulation
of observation 5.15 on page 151 shows that there exists another EÁ-saturated set
A' such that
Oá E' C E1' C OáE' and c~ ~ O' (6).
Because E' ~E~ a, and by definition of ~, we know that there exists E E~
such that cpE E E', This also means E fl ~~A C E'. Since Dá (E fl ~~A) -
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Oá E fl ~~a C Oá E' C~' (Oá ~~a - ~~a). and 0" E C̀~atEA, we know that
O-E fl ~~a QÉ. O'. Lemma 6.17, and its reformulation in corollary 6.18 showsa
that there exists E) E C7a{ÉÁ~a 1~A such that ( RE~A )d ( E, O) and O f1 ~~a C O'.
This last conclusion shows that ~ IfEÁ a5, and so O~~, according to (4). This
last conclusion implies
~ .MEA,O ~ ~x~P,
and so there exists ~ E Vi1t~~~A~~A such that (RÉ~A)X(O,~) and MÉÁ, - ~ cp.
Because ( RÉ~A )a (E, O) and a E X, also (RÉ~A ) X (E, ~). This conclusion entails
A A
MÉ. , E~ OXcp, which contradicts E E~.
A
This contradiction means that a ~-EÁ OXC~ (5) must hold.
The step ~OXCp ~ I' ~ MÉ. , I' ~ OXcp can be derived by means of the second result in
A
n!-,., c P-~~~o has-beeA~nfer--r~fre,.d,- t},~
first of this lemma. We leave the details to the reader. The converse of this implication
can be found through some dualization of the proof of Oz~P ~~ ~ MÉ~ ,~~ ~x~PA
above.
Suppose MÉ. , I' ~ O j~ cp.
A
We use the following three abbreviations.
~:- {Fi E V L1tÉ~~A ) ~A I MÉ.A t~ Tl OX ~~
~PÉ - V (~oa `E)
Q :- n ~É
EE~
This last induction step of the truth lemma will be established by proving the
following claims.
(7) ,~ ~EÁ a
(8) EE~~EFj`EÁ,6
(9) ~XQ ~EÁ ~.
These three results suffice indeed. Claim (9) yields OX~3 I-E~ a(L-IND), and (7)
entails ~OX~p ~EÁ Oj~Q (L-MOD-FALSE OX). Combining of these conclusions by
means of CUT gives us ~OXcp ~EÁ Q. Because I' E~, the second claim (8) yields
~OXcp E I'.
Claim (7) follows from the induction hypothesis: ~cp ~ E for all E E~ and therefore
~cp appears in all the disjuncts cp~ for all E E~, and so ~cp FEÁ cp~ for these E E~.
In combination with It-z'RUE n, this establishes ~cp ~Eá ,Q.
Because all members of ~ are EA-(~~a)~a-saturated, we know that E FfEÁ ~pÉ for
all E E~(~~a `E n E- 0). This result establishes E FfEp Q for all E E~(8).
66` 17~E.a ~~ b~F~ E~: ~" HEÁ ~PE ~ HE E ~ 3o E E n~~a : O" HEÁ v~`dE E
~3oEEn~~a:OyEÁ V~OffEÁ ~pEforallEE~ ~ OFfEqa.
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Suppose OX,Q FfEÁ ~3. An application of the saturation lemma shows that there
exists a E' E C7atE~ such that OXQ E E" and Q~ E'. Observation 5.15 shows
that there exists another O' E C̀~atEÁ such that for certain a E X:
~á~' CO' COá~' with~iEO' (10).
F~om ( 10) it follows that (RÉ~A )a (E' fl (~~A ) ~A, O' fl (~~A ) ~A )6. Furthermore,
E fl (~~A)~A FfEÁ ,6, which means that there exists E E~ such that
~" n (~~A)~A FfEÁ ~E (11).
This conclusion yields (E" fl (~~A )~A ) fl (~~A ` E) - 0, and therefore, E' f1 ~~A C
E. Lemma 6.17 shows that there exists O~ O` fl ~~A such that ( RÉ~A )a (E, O).
- A
Because O' fl ~~A ~EÁ ~37 we obtain O~EÁ ,Q. Hereupon, (8) yields O~~. By
definition of ~, this conclusion entails
MÉA,[') ~ (]Xcp.
In other words, there exists ~ E C7atÉ~A~~A such that (RÉ~A)X(O,?) with
A A
MÉ~,~ ~ cp. Because ( RE~A )a(E,O) and a E X, we conclude MÉ~,E ~ ~zcp.
This contradicts the fact that E E~.
The contradiction above shows that (9), i.e. Ox~3 F-E~ Q, must hold.
~
This truth-lemma shows the completeness of EÁ for finite sequents with re-
spect to the model class é~. Furthermore, due to the finiteness of the counter-
models, such as MÉ~ above, we have caught the decidability of EÁ with respect
to finite sequents.
6.33. THEOREM. COMPLETENESS of EÁ
For all finite I', 0 C GÁ: r~~a 0~ I' ~E~ 0.
ProoÏ. If r FfEÁ 0 then by the truth lemma above and the saturation for filtrations
MÉAo, E ~ ry and MÉÁQ, E~ b, for all ry E I' and b E ~. Or shortly, r~~~ 0. ~
An immediate consequence of the finiteness of MÉ~ for finite ~ C GÁ establishes
the decidability result immediately. -
6.34. TxEOxE1v1. The system EÁ has the FtvtP is decidable for finite sequents.
The completeness of C3~`
A completeness and decidability result for C3` can be obtained by a filtration
which combines the Mud- and the EÁ-closures. We take instead of (~~A )~A for
a finite ~ C GÁ~'1, the set (~~A)~d.A, which denotes the following complicated
filtration: -
~~A ~A
6E' n(~~A ~~A p" n(~~A ~~A E~ya{É ~ , according to proposition 6.3.
A
~By definition of Q and the fact that O" E C7atE. .
A
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~(~y~A)d u O(~~A)n U ~~A.
The C3'-~-canonical model obtains the following definition:
MC3~ -(VaLG.~3~A~~d A, ILG~-.~., GGC3~, VC3.,.
The truth lemma for the subformulae of such a finite ~ can be obtained
by an imitation of the proof of the truth lemma of EÁ. The structural claim
M~,, E~3` can be obtained by an imitation of lemma 6.25.
6.35. TxEOREivt. The system C3~ is complete for finite sequents, has the FMP
and is decidable for finite sequents.
6.5 Conclusions and reflections
We have seen that the basic results of chapter 5 could be transposed to restricted
saturated sets: Doing so, we have establishe~decidsrbilitiy~esulís- for ihe b~ic
formalisms of part I on the basis of finitely filtrated canonical models. In some
cases we needed to extend the filtering sets in such a way that earlier results of
chapter 5 could be employed in a proper way.
Furthermore, we proved completeness results for finite EA- and C3`-sequents.
An imitation of classical proofs for this type of systems could be given. Addi-
tional insights on saturated sets which we obtained in the previous chapter had
to be used to guarantee the correctness of this imitation.
Of course, our decidability results are very general mathematical results.
Apart from the finiteness, these results do not tell us very inuch about the
complexity of possible decision procedures. This may be disappointing, because
we may have made the impression with our plea for more `realism' by means
of partialization in chapter 1 that lower technical complexity results would sup-
port this ideology. However, as mentioned in section 1.2, we do not argue against
the use of large models for technical reasons. Our principal argument to prefer
partial modeling was to distinguish two different forms of negative information:
falsity and absence of truth. In epistemic logic, this distinction makes it possible
to separate different kinds of disbelief. In this respect, the absence of lower com-
plexity results does not bother us, and it certainly does not violate our arguments
in chapter 1 for using partial possible worlds semantics.
Of course, we do not wish to neglect the issue. We think that for many partial
modal logics well-known complexity upper bounds of their classical counterparts
can be used8. In fact, simple embedding results such as ín the appendix of chap-
ter 3 settle such classical upper bounds for constructive logics. For example,
the systems N and N~ are PSPACE-hard. This result can be obtained imme-
diately by the PSPACE-hardness of S4 [Ladner 1977~ and the linearity of the
translation. We have the impression that often things do not get worse in partial
logic, and take this conjecture as a starting point for further analysis of partial
intensional logics.
eFor an extensive survey on the complexity of classical modal logics, see [Spaan 1993].
Chapter 7
A Bit of Correspondence Theory
In this chapter we will discuss a regular class of axiomatic extensions of M and
define and demonstrate corresponding model-theoretic characterizations.
In classical modal logic, so-called correspondence theory is one of the main
research issues [van Benthem 1985]. The purpose of this study is to find precise
correspondences between modal axiomatic extensions of the classical minimal
system K and classes of possible worlds models. Most attention has been devoted
to classes of models defined on the basis of a frame-condition. We already defined
validity over frames in chapter 2. The characteristic class of frames ,~ of a modal
logic S is the collection of frames which verify all S-sequents.
~hat(S):-{FE~~I'~SO~I'~FO}
This characteristic class is the maximal class of frames to which soundness of S
holds.
Well known axioms like T- ~cp ~ cp, 4- acp f- DOcp, 5- Ocp ~ ~Ocp, B-
cp I- DOcp and G- O~cp I- oOcp can be characterized by well-defined classes of
frames. For example, T corresponds to reflexive frames, and B corresponds to
symmetric frames. All these logics find such a nice characterization because they
are all members of conveniently characterizable class of modal logics, namely
axiomatic extensions of the form:
Ok~~cp ~- D~Oncp with k, l, m, n E 11V.
This class of axioms is denoted as G~~n and are called Geach axioms. The
indices refer to the corresponding number of o- and O-iterations above. So, for
example T- Go,ó, 4- G2,ó and 5- Gi,o. All these logics can be characterized
by the class of frames with an accessibility relation R such that
dx, y, z: Rk(x, y) 8c R~`(~, z) ~~w : Rl(y, w) 8c Rn(z, w).
The following figure depicts this general relational frame constraint. The black
vectors have a universal meaning and the dashed vectors should be interpreted
as being existential.
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Í.1. FIGURE.
A stronger correspondence result is the so-called frame-completeness. It ex-
presses a maximal semantic utility of the characteristic frame restriction for a
given logic. It means that a counter-model of any non-sequent can be found in
this characteristic class:
r ~enaTcs~ o ~ r ~S ol.
All Geach extensions of the minimal classical modal logic K are frame-complete
(in classical possible world semantics). This means that, for every non-G~~n~-K-
sequent, there exists a total counter-model over a certain frame in the charac-
teristic class.
Such frame completeness of a K-extension S can most often be shown by the
canonicity of this system S[Hughes 8c Cresswell 1984]. This means that the
underlying frame of the canonical model is a member of the characteristic class
of frames: (C7ats, RS} E~har(S). Together with the truth-lemma of S, which
can be extracted straightforwardly from the truth lemma of the minimal system
K, this result guarantees frame completeness.
The following sections discuss different Geach-style extensions of M. The first
section discusses the normal extensions as presented above. It turns out that
these extensions have the same frame characteristics, but frame completeness is
most often lost. The second section discusses how completeness can be restored
through combination of the Geach characteristics of figure 7.1 with the extension
relation. The third section presents a correspondence result for weaker Geach-
like axiom rules Okt]~cp, On`t]n~cp ~ 0. Their characteristic conditions can be
caught by means of a frame definition and the bisimulation coherence order
which we have defined in section 2.4.
As may become clear from the title of this chapter, the contents of this chapter
do not include a generally exhaustive investigation of correspondence theory of
1F~ame completeness officially is the left-to-right direction of this equivalence. The other
direction is the soundness of S with respect to its own characteristic class. The definition
~haT(S) brings along this soundness.
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partial modal logics. It rather presents some ideas of using information orders
over worlds in combination with pure frame conditions. Roughly speaking, the
technical findings of this chapter establish completeness results for wide classes
of partial modal logics. For example, completeness results for the logics whích
evolved from pragmatic principles, and have been proposed in sections 4.2 and
4.3, can be obtained quite easily from the results of this chapter. Furthermore,
the use of different bisimulation orders allows us to capture difFerent subtle vari-
ations of Geach-like axioms. For example, the use of the coherence order allow
us to capture structural model-theoretical conditions for the above-mentioned
weakenings of the Geach-axioms.
In the last section of this chapter we will shortly speculate on further results.
On the basis of the combinatorial results in terms of frame-conditions and infor-
mation orders, we see that partial systems asks for fundamental insights on the
interaction of accessibility structures and constraints on valuations2.
7.1 Geach extensions of M
As mentioned above, the frame characteristics are precisely the same as for the
Geach extensions of K.
7.2. THEOREM. Every system Gml~ f M has the same characteristic frame
class as G~~~ ~- K: the class of G~1,~-frames. In short,
~C)ar(G,k„,~~, -~ K) - ~har(G~,1~ f M).
Proof. This characterization result can be obtained freely from the corresponding
proof for G;;,~n ~- K[Hughes 8z Cresswell 1984]. Classical frames are the same as
frames in our partial possible worlds semantics. This classical proof does not appeal
to properties of the system K, only the Geach axioms themselves are utilized. This
ensures that these proofs can be used here as well. Let us give an outline of the proof.
Suppose F is a Gm~n-frame. Let M-(W, R, V) be a partial Kripke model on F and
w a world in M such that M,w ~ OkOicp. Semantical decomposition of the modal
operators in front of cp entails the existence of a world v E W such that Rk(w, v), and
that all u E W with R~ (v, u) verify cp: M, u J- cp (1). Because of the Geach frame
condition, we know that if RTM` (w, t) then there exists s E W such that Ri (v, s) and
Rn(t, s). Conclusion (1) yields M, s~ cp, and therefore M, t~ Oncp, and subsequently,
due to the arbitrariness of t as a world in M with accessibility distance m from w,
M,w ~ ~n`Oncp. M was chosen freely on F and w in M. This yields Ok~~cp ~F
Om~n(P,
Let F-(W, R) be a frame outside the Gn,~n-class. This means that there exists a
triple of worlds x, y, z in F such that
Rk(x, y) 8z Rn`(x, z) 8e (t1w E W: Ri(y, w) ~ not Rn(z, w)) (2).
Take M-(W, R, V) with
2See also [Rodenburg 1986] and [Plotkin 8e Stirling 1986].




Clearly M, y ~ O~p and M, x ~ OkO~p. Because of (2) and the definition of V for
the input p, we know that all worlds which have an accessibility distance n from z do
not define p and therefore M, z~ Onp. This yields M, x~[]~`Onp. We have found a
counter-model for G;;,~n on an arbitrary non-G;;,~n-frame. ~
F~ame incompleteness
The optimism due to the easy transfer of the characterization given above cannot
be hold on to when frame completeness comes on the stage. In fact, according to
the formulation of frame completeness above, these Geach extensions are most
often frame incomplete: A simple illustration can be given by the logic T~
M, which we will call To in the sequel. In this system we have the following
non-sequent cp IfTo Ocp. The following model in the figure below illustrates this




In this depicted model, y C,~ x through the bisimulation {(x, x), (y, x), (y, y)}.
If M, x~ Ccp then M, y ~ cp, and because of y CM x and corollary 2.46
(page 157) we conclude M, x~ cp. This means that the world x in M satisfies
all To-sequents. Nevertheless M, x~~q but M, x~ O~q, and therefore
~P FÍTo Ocp3 (3).
Application of theorem 7.2 shows that the ~har(To ) is the class of reflexive
frames. It is not hard to see that every world in a reflexive model which verifies
~p also supports Ocp, and so
~P ~~hac(To) O~P (4).
Combination of (3) and (4) shows that To is frame incomplete according to the
definition of frame completeness in the definition on page 192.
Figure 7.3 already suggests the structural correspondence between the axiom
T and a world like x in the displayed model. It is surely not reflexive and it
is neither `reflexive-like' in the sense that it has access to some world which
has an identical informational content. Nevertheless it `sees a part of itself':
3In epistemic logic with O interpreted as a knowledge operator this non-derivability is
deairable. Of course a11 knowledge should imply truth (e.g. [Hintikka 1962]and [Lenzen 1978]).
However we do not want that everything which holds should be taken to be possibly true
by every agent. Simple incomplete awareness of agents prohibits this unnatural broadness of
mind. A logic of knowledge which usea the axiom To but not its contra-position can be found
in [van der Hoek, Jaspars 8t Thijsse 1993].
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R(x, y) and y C,Y1 x. In a trivial way y does the same. Models which bear
this property are called small reflexive in the sequel. In theorem 7.5 below a
completeness result for the system To with respect to this wider class of models
is given. This theorem adds also a completeness result for the `contra-positional'
system To :- M f cp ~ Ocp. This logic is complete with respect to the class
of big refiexive models. In these models every world has access to an extension
of itself. In order to avoid confusion, we give a formal definition of these two
classes below.
7.4. DEF~NiTioN. A model M - (W, R, V) is said to be small reflexive if
bxEW ~yEW:R(x,y)BzyCMx.
Such a model is said to be big reflexive if
b'xEW 3yEW:R(x,y) BcxC,uy.
These classes are abbreviated by ~o and ~o, respectively.
7.5. THEOREM. To is sound and complete with respect to `,~o. To is sound
and complete with respect to `~o.
Proof. Soundness of these logics can be understood immediately on the basis of the
persistence result for C,yi (corollary 2.46).
Completeness can be obtained in the same manner as in the procedure to which we
already have referred in the introductory part of this chapter, namely by showing that
the canonical model of these systems shares the structural condition. What has to be
proved are the following two claims:
MTo E`.fo (5) and MTo E`~o (6).
Lemma 5.25 on page 156 provides the essential equipment for proving the claims above.
Note that if r E C̀~c1tTo then O-I' C I', and also ~-I' aTo I'. Application of
lemma 5.25 yields a To-saturated set 0 such that -
RTo (I', ~) and ~ C I'.
This latter conclusion also entails ~ CMTO I', according to corollary 5.26 on page 157.
Because I' has been picked arbitrarily in C̀~afTo we know that MTo E`.fo
If I' E C7afTo then I' C O-I', and also I' 4To O-I'. Lemma 5.25 successively yields a
To-saturated set 0 such that -
RTo (I', ~) and I' C 0.
We conclude MTo E`,~o by corollary 5.26. ~
Intermediate worlds
In [Thijsse 1992~ one finds a completeness proof for the system M~- ~cp F- cp
~} cp ~ Ocp with respect to the class of reflexive partial Kripke models. In fact
this is a frame complete system. Of course, reflexivity is a stronger condition
than small and big reflexivity together. This restriction of the smaller class of
reflexive models can be understood easily by means of theorem 7.6 below. This
theorem states that worlds in partial Kripke models are insensitive for adding
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and removing so-called intermediate worlds. Whenever a world w in a partial
Kripke model M has two accessible worlds v and u, then every intermediate
world x of v and u in M, which simply means v C,u x C,~ u, can be taken to
be accessible from w as well, without changing the informational content of w.
7.6. TxEORENt. Let M- (W, R, V) E 91t, and take w E W such that for certain
v, u E W: R(w, v) and R(w, u). Suppose x E M such that v CM x C,~ u, and
let M' -(W, R', V) such that R' - R U{(w, x) }. Then for all cp E Go we obtain
M,w~cpf~M',w~cp.
Proof. By induction on the construction of formulae. The O and -~~-step are simply
obtained by the persistence result for C~y ( corollary 2.46). ~
In a model which is both big and small reflexive, every world has access to a
larger and a smaller world. This means that the original world is an intermediate
world of itself, and could therefore be taken to be accessible as well, without
loosing or gaining information. In this straightforward manner, we are able to
transform every model which is both big and small reflexive into a reflexive one.
In canonical models for M-extensions, according to the definition of accessibility,
all intermediate worlds are accessible. This means that the canonical model of
M~- []cp ~- cp ~- cp ~ Ocp is reflexive.
7.7. CottoLLARY. The system M~- Ccp f- cp } cp F- Ocp is frame complete, that
is, complete with respect to its characteristic frame class, the reflexive frames.
7.2 A completeness result for Gm~ln -~ M
In this subsection we present a uniform correspondence result for the Geach
extensions of M. As above, we define its model-theoretic characteristics by means
of a combination of constraints on the accessibility and the extension order
over possible worlds together. The correspondence theorem for this class is a
generalization of the empirical study on the logic To and To in the previous
section.
7.8. TxEORENt. The logic M f G~~n is sound and complete with respect to
the collection of models M-(W, R, V) with
dx, y, z E W: Rk(x, y) 8t Rn`(x, z) ~
Sv, w E W: R~(y, v) 8e Rn(z, w) 8c v C,~ w.
This class of models will be abbreviated by ~m~n. The following figure pictures
this relational requirement for partial Kripke models to be in this specific class.
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The only difference with the classical result is that the `end-points' v and w do
not have to be equal. The only requirement is that that w extends v.
Some meditation is needed to grasp this correspondence result. Some rehearsal
is given by the following examples. In the table below, the left column lists some
well-known Geach extensions of M. The right column gives the corresponding
constraint for a model M-(W, R, V) to be in the proper characteristic class.
`T.10. TABLE.
M f B (cp F ~O~p) b'x 3y, z: R(x, y) 8t R(y, z) 8t x C~y z
M f S (Ocp F ~O~p) b's, y, z: R(a, y) 8t R(x, z) ~ 3w : R(z, w) 8t y CM w.
M~ 4 (O~p h O~~p) b'x, y, z: R(x, y) 8t R(y, z) ~ 3w : R(x, w) 8z w C,y z
M f OO~p F O~p tla, y, z: R(x, y) 8t R(y, z) ~ 3w : R(x, w) 8a z C,y w
In agreement with our vocabulary of the two different forms of quasi-reflexivity
in the previous section , a proper christening of these four properties above would
be small symmetry, small Euclidicity, small and big transitivity resPectively.
The remainder of this subsection is dedicated to a proof of theorem 7.8. The
soundness result is, once again, a direct result of the persistence of the complete
language Go over C~y.
Proof. ( SOUNDNESS) Suppose M-(W, R,V) E Q3k,~„ for certain natural numbers
k, l, m and n, and suppose M, x ~ Ok O~cp. This means that there exists y E W such
that R~` ( x, y) and M, y ~ 0! cp, This entails for every v E W with Rl (y, v) M, v~ cp.
Suppose that a world z E W has an m-accessibility distance from x: Rn`(x,z). Since
M E ~,k„,~n, we know that there e~cists w E W such that Rn(z,w) and v CM w. The
persistence result for C,y brings along that M, w ~ cp, and also M, z~ Oncp. Because
z have been chosen as an arbitrary world living m accessibility steps from x, we obtain
M, x~ ~TM`Oncp. Because M E Qimi„ has been picked at random, and x as an arbitrary
world in M, we know that
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Ok~icP ~~min ~n`Onlp.
.
The completeness proof is accomplished by proving that MGm~n E Qi~~,~. This is
certainly not a straightforward result. The following generalization oflemma 5.26
will help us. It facilitates reasoning about saturated sets with a given finite ac-
cessibility distance.
7.11. LEtvttvlA. Suppose I' and 0 are two X-saturated sets, where X is an
extension of M.
o-kI' C 0~~0' E C̀~afX : ~' C 0 8z RX(I', 0') (7), and
OCO-~I' ~ 30'EC~afX:~'~08eRX(I',0') (8),forallkElN.
Proof. The proof runs by induction on the index k, that is, the X-canonical
accessibility distance. If k- 0, then the result is immediately obtained, because
~oI' - OoI' - I'. Substitute I' for 0' to get the desired result for the fulfillment of
both claims (7) and (8) in the case that k- 0.
To prove the induction step, we separate the two claims. We start by proving (7).
Let k 1 0 and 0-kI' C 0 with I', 0 E C7afx.
To start with, we need a bit of syntactic dressing in order to make the procedure
more digestable:
On - ~n ~ U(OnGo)C for all n E IN.
This set On consists of all formulae which are not of the form ~ncp and of all
formulae of the form ~ttb with b originating from 0. We claim that substitution
of k- 1 in this definition entails an X-saturator of O-I'.
~-I' 4x Ok-1 (9).
This result and the induction hypothesis establish (7). Application of lemma 5.25
to claim (9) yields a O E C̀~atx such that Rx (I', O) and O C ~k-1. By definition of
~k-1 we infer ~-~k-1~0 C 0. According to the induction hypothesis there exists a
0' E C7afx such that RX 1(O, 0') and ~' C 0. Because Rx (I', O), we also obtain
RX (I', ~' ) and consequently (7) holds.
What remains to be demonstrated is claim (9). To show the validity of this claim,
let C7-r ~x E for certain E C Go. We need to prove E n Ok-1 ~ 0.
To begin with we immediately conclude E~(t, for if 0-I' ~-x- 1~ then []-I' ~x
1, and by application of R-TRUE ~ and L-MON also I' ~-x ~1. Because O1 I-x
~k1, we would also get I' ~x 0~1, and so 1 E 0, which contradicts the X-
consistency of 0.
If E n(ak-1Go)C ~ 0 then also E n Ok-1 ~` 0 by the definition of Ok-1.
What is left to show is E n Ok-1 í~ 0 whenever 0~ E C Ok-1Go. In other
words, we need to prove the intersection with ~k-1 for all non-empty conclusion
sets E of O-I' which consist only of formulae of the form Ok-lcp
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This means that there exists Ok-lcpl, ..., Ok-lcp„L in E such that
O-I~~)( Ok-1cP1,...,Ok-lcPm.
Because Ok-lcpi ~X ~k-1(~pi V... V cp,,,) for all i E{ 1, .., m}, we may reform the
last conclusion into
~-r ~,y ~k-1(~1 V ... V (Pm).
Application of R-TRUE O and L-MON yields
r~X ~k(~Pl V... V c(Jm).
This last X-sequent entails cpl V... V ~pm E 0, and because this last set is
X-saturated, we know that there exists i E {1, .., m} such that cpt E ~ and
therefore Ok-lcp; E Ok-i. Because this ~k-lcp stems from E, we have made
sure that E fl ~k-1 ~~.
Proving (8), the dual result of ( 7), comes down to a similar procedure. Once again,
lemma5`25-paues the~uay. Let1c? O and-suppQS~-C Ok-1P for I'0 E C~a~-
To obtain the desired result we will show that
Ok-10 QX O-r (1~).
Lemma 5.25 subsequently shows that there exists a O E C̀~atx such that Rx (r, O)
and O1c-10 C O. This latter conclusion entails 0 C O-~k-1~0, which brings
along, according to the induction hypothesis, an X-saturated set 0' ~ ~ such that
Rk-1(O, 0'). This proves ( 8) because Rx (I', O) entails RX (I', 0'). -
To complete the proof, we need to show that E fl O-I' ~ 0 for any E C Go with
Ok-10 ~X E. To demonstrate the validity of this implication, and the consequen-
tial correctness of the claim (10) above, we presuppose the validity of the latter
X-sequent.
This X-sequent tells us that there exists a finite set bl, . ., b~ such that
Ok-lbi,...,Ok-'bi FX E.
Applying CUT an l number of times to this X-sequent and using the simple
X-seqi.ent Ok-1(bi n... n b,) ~X Ok-lbti (for all i E {1, .., l}) entails
O~-1(bi n... n b~) ~X E.
Upon this X-sequent application of L-TRUE O yields
Ok(61 n... n b,) ~X OE.
Of course ól n... n ái E ~ because 0 is X-saturated, and therefore we conclude
(L-MON) Ok0 ~,y OE. Furthermore, Ok0 C I' for 0 C O-kI', which means
I' ~-X OE. This last conclusion brings us the final result E f1 O-I' ~ 0, because
I' E C7atx.
?.12. COROLLARY. A simple corollary, which is important for the remainder
of this chapter, is the observation that this lemma combined with the bounded
saturation lemma settles the following conclusion.
o-~I'aXA~~EECyatX:RX(I',E)BcECA,and
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AaXo-kr~~EEC̀~atX:RX(r,E)BcACEforallrEC7atX,kE1N.
This result is a full generalization of lemma 5.25.
Proof. If ~-kI' dX A for I' E C̀~atX then there exists 0 E C7atX such that [7-kI' C
~ C A(BSL). Application of lemma 7.11 brings us the first implication above. The
second claim can be obtained analogously. ~
These results facilitate reasoning about arbitrary accessibility distances in the
canonical models of the Geach extensions of M. The modal metrical equipment
of lemma 7.11 gives us enough formal understanding of these canonical models
to prove their membership of the associated Geach classes, which have been
depicted in figure 7.9 on page 197. The following lemma presents a formal
demonstration and establishes the completeness theorem 7.8.
Í.l.i. LEMMA. MGm,tn E ~m~n.
Proof. Suppose that Rk k~ (I', 0) and Rn`k ~(I', O) for a certain triple I', EI and ~,
Gm.n cm.n
of G;;,ln-saturated sets.
Suppose [7-~0 f-Gm,~n E for a certain finite set of formulae E. This entails, by l
time application of R-TRUE O and L-MON, that ~~Gk,i Ol(VE), and therefore
m,n
Ok O! (v E) E I', because RG~,,n (I', ~). The Gn,~n-aXlom entails Ori`On(V E) E I'.
Because Rck,~n (I', Cl), we know that On(v E) E E). O-distribution over V, and the
m,
fact that ~ is G;,,~n-saturated, makes us conclude
Ono E O for certain a E E.
This means that E fl O-nC) ~(~. In other words, O-n0 turns out to be an Gm~n"
saturator of ~-~~. The bounded saturation lemma 5.6 tells us thereupon that there
exists an Gmin-saturated set ~ such that
~-10 C - C O-n0.
Lemma 7.11 finishes the job. Since ~-~0 C ~, we know that there exists a Gn,in-
saturated set ~I C ~ such that R~(0,~1). Because ~ C O-nCl, we may also conclude
that there exists a G;;,ln-saturated set -2 ~,r such that Rnk ~(0,82). Obviously,cm,,,
-1 C?z. On account of corollary 5.26, we know that C~y k i coincides with C over
- ~m.n
C7at k,~ , and so M k,~ E Cin,in. ~
Gm,n Cm~n
The completeness result in theorem 7.8 can be given by the well-known procedure
on the basis of the saturation lemma 5.8.
?.3 Correspondences by coherence
In section 4.3 we have met different pragmatic principles which restrain the in-
terplay of preferential worlds and doxastic alternatives. These model-theoretic
constraints were also defined on the basis of the bisimulation extension order. An
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apparent advantage of partial modal logic is its lack of contra-position for `rea-
sonable' weakening of this type of principles. An example of such a weakening
is the CAUTIOUS reformulation of the REALISIVt principle. The correspondence
for this weakening is that all preferential worlds are extensions of some doxastic
alternative. This result can be obtained immediately by a poly-modal gener-
alization of our correspondence result for the Geach axioms in the preceding
section. For every poly-modal axiom of the form
OQ, ...Oa,k 061...Oyt cP ~ 0~1...C~m Od1...Od„ ~P
we find a similar complete correspondence as for the singular partial Geach
logics. If M-(W, {Ra}QEA, V) E fit~, then it corresponds to the axiom above
if and only if
b'~, y, z RQ1 0.. o Rak (~, y) 8e R~1 0.. o R~m (x, z) ~
~~w Rb o .. o Rb,~ v) 8e Rd, o., o Rd„ ( z, w) 8z v CM w(~`)
The right correspondence of the CAUTtous REALIStv1 principle can immediately
be obtained from the proper substitution in the possible worlds constraint above.
Take Obl -[p]a and 0~, - ~a. To get the precise model-theoretic correspon-
dence, replace Rbl by RQ and R~1 by Pa in ( ~`) above.
Freedom of contra-position in partial modal logic is caused by the absence of
the classical rule R-TRUE ~. This means that the weakenings of axiomatic rules
can be enforced by moving formulae from the conclusion set in negated form to
the assumption set. An example of this alternative kind of weakening, which has
also been presented in section 4.3, is obtained by changing the arrogant principle
~n~ ~ [P]a~b~ lnt0 Dacp, (P)aOb-~cP ~ (b (QUALITY 2).
As have been claimed in section 4.3, this principle has a possible worlds cor-
respondence on the basis of the coherence relation, instead of the extension
order. Such correspondences arise by the kind of negation-to-the-left weak-
enings of Geach axioms. In this section we will find that the axiom rules
rG;;,,~n :- OkO~cp, O~`C~~cp ~ 0 correspond to the models which are defined
by replacing the extension order by the coherence relation in the Geach corre-
spondence in the previous chapter.
7.14. DEFINITION. The C1aSS tC~~,,~~ consists of models M-(W, R, V) such that
tÍx, y, z E W: Rk (x, y) 8t Rn` (x, z) ~
~v, w: R~(y, v) 8z R~`(z, w) 8e v~M w.
A poly-modal generalization of this result, which can be obtained by substi-
tution of N1y for C,~ the relational equation (~`), establishes the correspondence
result for QUALITY 2, by taking k- 0, l- 1, m- 2, n - 0 and ~b, - ~a,
~~~ - (P)a and O~, - O6.
This section is dedicated to a proof of the Geach-like correspondence result
for the logics rG~ln f M. To begin with, we give a simple illustration to get
the feeling of coherence correspondences.
202 Chapter 7. A Bit of Correspondence Theory
7.15. Exn1v1PLE. Let A:- rGóïó - cp, O~cp ~ 0. In classical modal logic this
axiom rule is equivalent with Ocp ~ cp, which corresponds to models where worlds
only may see themselves:
b'x : R(x, y) ~ x- y.
In partial modal logic this last axiom implies A: cp, O~cp ~Gó;ó}M 0, but not the
other way around Ocp FfA cp. A simple counter-model is depicted in the following
figure.
9
It is left to the reader to show that this model is indeed a model which sat-
isfies all rules of A. Clearly it violates Góïó because M, x ~ Oq, but M, x~ q.
This system A corresponds to partial Kripke models in which every world only
has access to worlds which are coherent with itself. Let us call this model class
~1. The formal definitions of the characteristic class looks as follows:
M-(W, R, V) E 2[ iff `dx, y E W: R(x, y) ~ x~,~ y.
The soundness of this system with respect to the class ~i is obvious from the
characteristic coherence theorem 2.48 If M, x ~ O~cp for certain M E 2! and x
in M, then there exists y in M such that R(x, y) and M, y~ cp. Because we
know x~M y, theorem 2.48 entails M, x~ cp.
The completeness of A~- M with respect to the class ~l in the example above,
can be determined by checking MA E 2i. This result can be established af-
ter some elementary inspection of the coherence relation in canonical models
(example 7.17 below).
Canonical coherence
Completeness of the logics rG R~n comes in two technical lemmas on the coher-
ence relation in the canonical models of partial modal logics. To start with,
we will prove an analogy of the structural result C,~X -C for normal extensions
X of M for the relation NMX, i.e. the structural coherence relation over the
X-canonical model. By means of this result, we obtain a similar justification of
our structural description of coherence as the one which we have found for the
structural extension order in corollary 5.26. In the case of the coherence order,
we claim that two X-saturated sets are coherent if and only if there is no formula
cp which is contained in one of the sets and appears in negated form, ~cp, in the
other.
Y~
7.16. LEtvttvtA. Let X be a normal extension of M, and let Mx -(C~atx, Rx, Vx)
be its canonical model. For all I', 0 E C̀~afx:
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rNMX o b rn,o-0
Proof. The left-to-right direction of this equivalence follows from the truth-lemma
for X-canonical models and theorem 2.48. The converse direction of the equivalence
can be proved by a procedure which is analogously to the proof of corollary 5.26.
Let C be the relation which links all pairs of X-saturated sets which are mutually
coherent with respect to their content.
c(r, o) dá rn,o - m.
We will prove that this relation is a bisimulation over Mx :
C o Rx C Rx o C and C-1 o Rx C Rx o C-1 (11).
The relation C over Mac is symmetric due to the "double negation" rules, i.e. FALSE
rules for ~4. This implies C- C-1, and therefore we only need to check one of these
interrelational claims in (11). We pick the left one.
Suppose r, ~, O is a triple of X-saturated sets such tFiat C(I~, 0) and RxjI', Q~-Wh~
we need to prove is that there exists an X-saturated set E such that Rx (0, E) and
C(O, E). This can be accomplished by the use of lemma 5.25 and a proof of that O-~
is an X-saturant of (-~~)~:
O-0 ax (~O)~ (12).
If this claim holds then lemma 5.25 entails an X-saturated set E such that Rx(D,E)
and E C(~O)~. Indeed, such a E is fulfilling, because the last conclusion is just
another way of saying C(0, E).
The only requirement which remains to be demonstrated is claim (12) above.
Suppose O-0 f-x "for a finite set - C Go. We need to show ~ n(~O)~ ~ 0.
Suppose that ~ n(~e)~ - 0, or in other words, ~ C~O. This means that ~ is of
the form {~B1i .., ~9„} with Bi E 6 for all i E{ 1, .., n}5. By R-TRUE O and L-ivtotv
we derive
p ~x O(~Bl V ... V ~B„)e.
A bit of (partial) propositional reasoning yields
o~,( o(~(el n... n en)).
Let 6 :- Bl n... n 8,,. Because 0 and t~ are X-saturated sets we conclude t]~B E ~
and B E O. The last observation yields ~D~B E r, since Rx (r, O). This means that
~~nr ~~, which contradicts C(r, 0). This makes us conclude that .- n(~0)~ ~ 0.
The bisimulation result of C combined with the simple observation that C(r, 0) ~
Vx (r) ~ Vx (0) for all r, ~ E C̀~atx affirms r n~~ ~ r~,r~x 0. ~
7.17. ExAMPLE. On the basis of this lemma we can immediately show that
the system A in example 7.15 is complete with respect to 2l-validity. A simple
proof of MA E~l together with the truth lemma 5.14 suffice.
Suppose that r and 0 are two A-saturated sets such that RA(r, 0), which
4If r n~0 - 0 and c~ E 0, then ~~a E 0 and hence ~o' ~ r. This means 0 n-~r - 0.
SThe limiting case is n- 0 which means that ~- 0.
óRemember that the empty disjunction is 1.
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means O-I' C 0 C O-I'. Suppose a E 0. This entails Oa E I', and by the
special A-axiom this brings along ~a ~ I'7. Because a E 0 have been chosen
arbitrarily we have 0 f1 ~I' - 0. Lemma 7.16 above makes sure that I' NMX 0.
Therefore, MA E 2l.
Our second lemma provides a tool for detecting coherence on arbitrary finite
accessibility distances in the canonical models of partial modal logics. It con-
sists of an result for the canonical coherence relation which is analogous to the
result which we have found in the previous section for the extension relation,
lemma 7.11. This result can be established easily by means of corollary 7.12 and
the previous lemma of this subsection.
7.18. LEMMA. Let X be a normal extension of M. If I', 0 E C7atX then
0-kI' n~~ - 0~ SO' E C~atX : RX(I', 0') 8e 0' ~MX ~, and
~0 n O-~`I' - 0~~0' E C~atX : RX(r, 0') 8e 0' ~MX ~ for all k E IN.
Proof. The result has been formulated somewhat too elaborate. The second claim is
simply equivalent with the first because ~0 f1 O-ki' - 0 if and only if ~-kI' f1 ~0 - 0.
Suppose O-kI' f1 ~p -~ for a pair I', ~ of X-saturated sets. We claim
o-kr aX (,o)~ (13).
Corollary 7.12 shows that if (13) holds, then the existence of a 0' E C7atX such that
RX(I', 0') and 0' C(~0)~, or in other words 0' fl ~0 -~. According lemma 7.16
this latter conclusion is the same as 0' ~1yX 0. A proof of (13) would therefore be
adequate.
Let ~-kI' i-X E for certain E C,Co, and suppose E fl (~0)~ - 0. This means E C~0.
This means there exists bl, .., b„ E 0 such that -
~-kr ~X ~~1, ..., ~bn.
Due to R-TRUE O, L-MON and the de Morgan principles of M, we may rewrite this
X-sequent by
r~X ak~(bi n... n bn).
This means that Ok~(bi n... n bn) E I' and because, O-kI' fl 0- 0, we conclude
bi n... n bn ~ 0. This last conclusion contradicts the X-saturation of 0, because
0~X bi n... n bn (for all i E {1, .., n} : ói E 0), and thus E fl (-~0)~ ~ 0. ~
A completeness result for rG~,~~n ~ M,
The two results in the previous subsection establish the completeness result for
the logics rG n~n fM- rG~~n for short - with respect to the model class róm~n.
To obtain this result, we use our saturation equation style for proving that that
the rGm~n-canonical model is contained in the class tóm~n.
~o„~ E r.
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7.19. LEMMA. NÍ k,~
T~im,n
t~,tE r~im,n.
Proof. Suppose I', Q, O E C̀~atrcm,in such that RTck,~ (I', Q) and RGm,in (I', O). We
m,n
have to demonstrate the existence of a pair of rG;;,~„-saturated sets -1 and -z such
that RTom,~n(Q, -i)~ Rrck~` (6,~z) and -i ~Mrck.i ~z.m.n m.n
To start with, we prove the following claim:
p-~Q 4r~m,~n (~O'"O)~ (15).
Suppose that (15) is not the case. This yields a set E C Go such that ~-~Q ~TcT,in E
(16) and Efl(~O-n0)~ - 0. In other words, E C~O-n0. This inclusion means that E
consists only of negated formulae ~~p with Oncp E O. This conclusion ~-~Q ~rGm,~n ~
can be rephrased by
,
O-~Q F-rcm,in ~cpl V.. V~cpn~ for certain {Oncp;}; 1 C O.
Let cp - cpl n.. n cp„~. Clearly [~Q ~rG~,(n ~cp. This yields Q I-rcm,in Ot~cp, and
therefore, O~`Ot-~cp E I'. Application of the rGm~„-axiom ensures OmOncp ~ I'. Because
O C O-n`I', we conclude []ncp ~ O. This contradicts ~ncpt E O for all i E{1,..,n'},
because {Oncp;}; 1 F-rG~,~n Oncp. So, the saturation relation in (15) must hold.
Application of sSL to the result of (15) shows the existence of a ~ E C7atTc~,in such
that O-~Q C? C(~~-n0)~. The first inclusion relation also entails ~-~Q fl ~~ - 0,
because ~.- rl -- 0. Lemma 7.18 thereupon guarantees the existence of a?1 E
C7utrck'1 such that R~ k i (Q, -1) and ~1 C~. A bit of `double-negation' reasoningm,n rGm, -
also shows ~~ fl O-n0 -n0, and therefore (lemma 7.18), there must exist a~z E
C7atrGm,~n such that RrGk,~ (O, -z) and ~z C~.
m,n
Because -1 and ?z have a common rGn,~„-saturated extension ?, we immediately
conclude -1 fl ~-z - ~ (~~ n - - ~ ~ ~~- C -1 - 0 ~ ~i fl ~-z - ~). To wind up
with, lemma 7.16 shows that -1 ~~y k~ ~z. ~rcm
7.20. THEOREM. rG ttln is sound and complete with respect to rC~imjn'
7.4 Reflections
In this chapter we have shown a clear and strong model-theoretic correspondence
for the class of Geach extensions of the minimal partial modal logic. Unlike the
Geach extensions of minimal classical modal logic, these correspondences are not
purely frame oriented. In a very straightforward manner Geach extensions of
M are in general not frame complete according to the classical definition of this
concept (page 192). This means that we cannot find completeness results with re-
spect to model-classes sharing the characteristic frame conditions of these logics.
These conditions are the same as the frame characteristics which correspond to
the Geach extensions of K. A contrasting poverty of partial Geach logics with
respect to their classical counterparts is the absence of contra-position. This
deficit causes the following inequality for most of the partial Geach logics:
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GminfM~GkinfM.
Nevertheless, they share the same frame characterization (see figure 7.1 on
page 192). This insight brings frame incompleteness immediately on the car-
pet for most of these partial Geach logics.
The deeper semantic reason of this failure is that there is nothing partial in the
definition of Kripke frames. The only partial parameter of our possible worlds
semantics is the assignment of truth-values to worlds. The classical definition of
frames brings along
~m~n~P ~e4aT~Gn,'~,.) ~k~~cP.
Partiality forbids this kind of contra-positional switching. The logical indepen-
dence of these contra-positional systems demands for a different style of corre-
spondence between model-theory and modal axioms.
Besides restraining accessibilities, we have presented some equipment to struc-
ture the global valuation functions over these accessibilities as well. Conditions
that intertwine information orders such as the extension order and the coherence
relation with the accessibility relation turned out to be very successful. We have
shown that this kind of model correspondences, gave us uniform completeness
results for the class of Geach extensions of M by means of the extension order
between possible worlds. We found a similar result for the weaker relativized
form of Geach extensions of M by using the coherence relation instead.
All these characterizations are weakenings of the classical Geach frame char-
acteristics. The classes of logic which we discussed in this chapter can be ordered
according their deductive strength in the following systematic way.
7.21. FIGURE.
Gk'~t K- G m:F Km,n k,~
G~~t M G~,it M
m,n `r
rGk'~ t M- rG k ~f Mm,n
An intriguing question which arises from the correspondence analysis of this
final chapter is whether the logics Gm~n f Gk~n f M are frame complete. Is
addition of the contra-position of the Geach axiom strong enough to give a
complete axiomatization of the frame condition of classical Geach logics? In
(Thijsse 1992J such a result has been positively conjectured. This optimism arose
from inspection of only simple Geach-logics with particularly low indices (k, .., n).
And indeed, from the simple observation which we have made in section 7.1 on
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intermediate worlds, we can recapture some frame completeness results for lowly
indexed Geach logics. One of these results which have already been outlined is
the frame completeness for the logic To f To. By a similar analysis we also
find that we may reform big and small transitivity as normal transitivity. The
same holds for symmetry and Euclidicity. In fact, by using theorem 7.6, we
can formulate relatively large partial confirmation of Thijsse's conjecture. For
example, as long as l- 0, we obtain a general frame-completeness result.
7.22. OBSERVATION. The logic O~cp ~ O~O~cp ~- O~O~cp ~ o~`cp -~ M is
frame complete. In other words, it is complete with respect to the class of frames
(W, R) with
b~e y, z: R~`(~, y) ~ Rm(~, z) ~ Rn(z, y).
Proof. Application of the correspondence result of theorem 7.8 to the separate Geach
axioms in question yield: M-(W, R,V) E éin,o f1 Cikó iff
Rk(x, y) 8c Rn`(x, z) ~ 3v, w: Rn(z, v) 8z R"(z, w) 8z v CM y C,y w.
An easy generalization of theorem 7.6 for arbitrary accessibility distances shows that
every such model can be reformed by taking Rn(z, y) in the equation above as well. ~
Many other similar results might be recaptured for larger parts of the Geach
class. Nevertheless, we are still very suspicious with regard to Thijsse's conjec-
ture. It is still unclear to us that for every Geach axiom, the contra-positional
addition yields a reduction to general frame completeness. It certainly needs far
more technical insights than our simple result on intermediate worlds.
A very easy way of restoring pure frame correspondences for Geach-style logics
is by adding them to the fully persistent minimal constructive modal logic NM
of section 3.4. The frame correspondence of Geach logics over NM can be
caught simply by replacing the bisimulation extension order by the informatíon
structure G in our correspondence result of theorem 7.8. Still, the valuations
interfere with such frame conditions by the postulated monotonicity constraint
over information orders in these constructive possible world models8.
Another interesting question is whether our results on partial Geach logics
can be put more general. Is it possible to transfer more general correspon-
dence theorems from classical modal logic, such as the powerful Sahlqvist the-
orem [Sahlqvist 1975]? We take this question as a challenge for future re-
search. As modestly stated at the beginning of this chapter, this survey has
been meant as an eye-opener. We state that additional information ordering
to frame correspondences is a useful method to capture partial modal logics
model-theoretically.
BFor an extensive survey of correspondences on the basis of `monotonic frames' many in-
sights can be extracted from Rodenburg's thesis on intuitionistic correspondence theory [Ro-
denburg 1986].
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Samenvatting
De doelstelling van het proefschrift is tweeledig. Enerzijds biedt het een math-
ematisch l~ische behandeling van partiële modale logica's en anderzijds laat het
zien dat deze logica's geschikt zijn voor het beschrijven van groei en afname van
informatie door middel van communicatieve handelingen. Deze twee doelein-
den zijn ook onderscheiden door middel van twee verschillende delen, die beiden
bestaan uit een drietal hoofdstukken. Het eerste deel presenteert de logische ap-
paratuur om dynamische interpretatie van communicatieve handelingen te geven
(hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4). Het tweede gedeelte behandelt een aantal belangrijke
abstract mathematische thema's met betrekking tot deze voorgestelde logica's
(hoofdstukken 5, 6 en 7). De twee delen worden voorafgegaan door een algemene
inleiding (hoofdstuk 1).
Een korte inhoud van de verschillende hoofdstukken wordt hieronder gegeven.
De inleiding geeft een aantal argumenten waarom de combinatie van partialiteit
en modaliteit interessant is voor algemene dynamische semantiek, en in het by-
zonder voor de formele semantiek van communicatieve handelingen. De twee be-
langrijkste argumenten zijn dat onwaarheid onderscheiden wordt van afwezigheid
van waarheid en dat partialiteit en modaliteit een dynamiek toestaat van con-
structie en eliminatie van mogelijke werelden.
Hoofdstuk 2 introduceert de minimale partiële modale logica. Allereerst
zetten we haar eenvoudige semantiek voor, en vervolgens definiëren we een
kort sequentensysteem voor deze logica. Daarna beschrijven we hoe informatie-
ordeningen over partiële mogelijke werelden gedefinieerd kunnen worden. Hoofd-
stuk 3 laat zien hoe de extensie-orde, zoals gedefinieerd in hoofdstuk 2, ge-
bruikt kan worden om constructief-dynamische uitbreidingen van partiële modale
logica te definiëren. Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft verschillende "epistemische" uit-
breidingen van de constructieve modale logica's van hoofdstuk 3. Deze zijn
bedoeld om dynamische interpretaties te stipuleren voor eenvoudige commu-
nicatieve handelingen. Naast axiomatische versterkingen worden ook talige
uitbreidingen gedefinieerd, zoals logica's met additionele "gemeenschappelijk-
geloofs"-operatoren en preferentiële operatoren.
Met dit laatste hoofdstuk is deel I afgerond. Deel II biedt een wiskundige anal-
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yse van de systemen zoals die beschreven zijn in deel I.
Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien dat door een relatief eenvoudige abstractie van de notie
van maximale consistentie uit de klassieke (modale) logica toegankelijke volledig-
heidsbewijzen voor de partiële modale logica te geven zijn. In hoofdstuk 6 to-
nen we beslisbaarheid aan op basis van de eindige modeleigenschap voor de log-
ica's uit deel I. Bovendien bewijzen we volledigheid voor eindige sequenten voor
de niet-compacte logica's met "gemeenschappelijk-geloofs"-operatoren. Hoofd-
stuk 7 heeft een minder directe betekenis met betrekking tot deel I. Hierin
geven we een opzet voor correspondentie-theorie voor partiële modale logica.
We laten zien hoe informatie-ordeningen met relationele frame-karakteristieken
interacteren in partiële mogelijke wereldensemantiek als het gaat om het vinden
van correspondenties voor modale axioma's.
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1. Kennisrepresentatie door middel van partialiteit en modaliteit staat een dynamiek
van constructie en eliminatie toe.
(Hoofdstuk 1 en 3 van dit proefschrift)
2. De generalisering van het klassieke Lindenbaumlemma, die garandeert dat voor
elk tweetal formule-verzamelingen I' en A een verzadigde formule-verzameling 0
bestaat zodanig dat P C E C A dan en slechts dan als A een verzadiger is van r,
versoepelt de meta-theorie van p~,rtiële~odale -logisa-in byzendere ~nate: - --
(Hoofdstuk 5 tot en met 7 van dit proefschrift)
3. Fine's definitie van modale normaalvormen is door tekort aan expressiviteit niet
direct te gebruiken voor de minimale partiële modale logica M. Via een lange
omweg is echter wel te bewijzen dat elke formule :p E Go met modale diepte kleiner
of gelijk aan n equivalent is met een disjunctie van aangepaste normaalvormen ~n
van graad n. Deze collectie wordt bepaald door de volgende inductie:
~o :- {n(II U~II') ~ II, II' verzamelingen atomen, II n II' - 0},
~; :- {o(V ~) ~ (n o~) n ~ ~ ~ c ~i-1, ~ E ~o} u ~,-,
voor i ~ 0.
Deze normaalvormen kunnen evengoed als volledige wereldbeschrijvingen gebruikt
worden en daarmee, in analogie met Fine's analyse, direct aangewend worden voor
een volledigheids- en beslisbaarheidsbewijs voor M.
(in: J.O.M. Jaspass, Normal forms in partial modal logic, C. Rauszer (ed.), Proceedings
of the 38th Banach Semester on Algebraic Methods and Their Computer Science Applica-
tions, Polish Acadamy of Sciences, Warsaw, Pp. 37-50, 1993.)
4. De systemen gegeven door de Geach-axioma's Okt]icp ~ t7~`Oncp tezamen met de
minimale partiële modale logica M is volledig met betrekking tot de klasse van
partiële Kripke-modellen M-(W, R, V) waarbij
b'x, y, z E W:[Rk (x, y) 8z Rm (~, z) ~
~v,w E W: R~(y,v) 8c Rn(z,w) 8t v C,y w] (~`).
Hierin staat C,y voor de structurele bisimulatieve extensie-orde.
(Hoofdstuk 7 van dit proefschrift)
5. Volledigheid voor de systemen O~Otcp, On`t7n~cp ~ 1~ M kan verkregen worden
met betrekking tot de klasse van modellen die gegeven is door substitutie van de
structurele bisimulatieve coherentie-orde ~,y voor C,~ in de relationele vergelijking
(~`) hierboven.
(Hoofdstuk 7 van dit proefschrift)
6. Het gebruik van partiële modale logica voor epistemische logica levert de mogelijk-
heid om niet alleen op kennis te minimalizeren maar ook op twijfel.
(in: W. van der Hoek, J. Jaspars ót E. Thijsse, Proc. of the 9th Conference on the
Principles of Knowledge Representation
7. Een algemeen modale interpretatie van Rescher en Brandom's gefuseerde seman-
tiek om onderlinge inconsistentie te modelleren, geeft het systeem van klassieke
propositie logica plus de volgende zwakke modale regel:
r~~, o~(~ u o) ~ 1 (~~).or ~ o 00
(in: J.O.M. Jaspars, 'Logical omniscience and inconsistent beliefs', M. de Rijke (ed.),
Dinmonds and Defaults, Synthese Library 229, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Pp. 129-
146, 1993.)
8. Een partiële modale interpretatie van Rescher en Brandom's gefuseerde semantiek
varieert met de lezing van (epistemische) mogelijkheid. In geval van de "verwarde"
lezing krijgt men het partiële systeem P, de modale regel (~`~`) hierboven en zijn
contrapositie:
r,~~-o ~(rUo)~1
or, o~ ~ oo ~
De `niet-verwarde' lezing van mogelijkheid geeft een versterking die gegeven wordt
door de voorwaarde ~(r U 0) G 1 in de regel hierboven te vervangen door ~r c 1.
(Hoofdstuk 2 en 5 van dit proefschrift)
9. "Diamonds are not forever" .
(Constructieve communicatie met René Ahn n.a.v hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift)
10. "Truth is not what you get, truth is what you take".
(Constructieve communicatie met Jan Ketting n.a.v. dit proefschrift)
11. Waarom schaamt de KUB zich voor haar Katholieke identiteit? Om dít onterechte
gevoel van gêne enigszins weg te nemen zouden de volgende veranderingen doorge-
voerd moeten worden.
(a) Het iJFO-vormige stiltecentrum op het middenterrein van de campus moet
vervangen worden door een fatsoenlijke O.L.V.-kapel.
(b) De Engelse naam van de `Universiteit moet zijn Catholic University' of Bra-
bant in plaats van `Tilburg University'.
(c) Het openingsgebed bij de promotie-plechtigheid moet tenminste een volledig
duidelijk uitgesproken `Wees Gegroet Maria' zijn.
12. Naamsverandering van colleges, studie-trajecten en zelfs volledige studierichtingen
op basis van louter budgetaire motieven draait meestal uit op bedrog van studenten.
13. Veel psychische en sociale problemen worden veroorzaakt door de menselijke neiging
om willekeurige structuren plat te slaan tot lineaire ordes. Alleen al daarom zou
het heilzaam zijn grote gedeeltes van de hedendaagse schoolwiskunde te vervangen
door moderne algebra en logica.
14. PR en wetenschap gaan niet samen.
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